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Philosophical Naturalism
Started by Nemo
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Dark Child:
LOL! If I were a nerd, I would be an MD instead of a DC!
It is precisely that I did not study in college which has me being a DC.
Augmel:
That's not much of argument...it's an appeal to authority...what makes you think there are immaterial parts of ourselves at all, let alone some relevent to medicine? Why can't every part of us be explained in the language of physics, chemistry, and biology?
I think the neurologists who are typically reductionists would take issue with your position.
Best, Nemo
LOL! If I were a nerd, I would be an MD instead of a DC!
It is precisely that I did not study in college which has me being a DC.
Augmel:
That's not much of argument...it's an appeal to authority...what makes you think there are immaterial parts of ourselves at all, let alone some relevent to medicine? Why can't every part of us be explained in the language of physics, chemistry, and biology?
I think the neurologists who are typically reductionists would take issue with your position.
Best, Nemo
Augmel,
Please don't take all this personally- I am sure you are a well intentioned person.
However, I am curious as to why your post has not received the same criticism as the Chiros making similar claims in the other stream.
One one hand, many are faulting the Chiro for his holding to some sort of life force, yet your denial of PN and MN has gone unaddressed.
Where are your critics???
Take care, Nemo
Please don't take all this personally- I am sure you are a well intentioned person.
However, I am curious as to why your post has not received the same criticism as the Chiros making similar claims in the other stream.
One one hand, many are faulting the Chiro for his holding to some sort of life force, yet your denial of PN and MN has gone unaddressed.
Where are your critics???
Take care, Nemo
hi nemo,
of course an appeal to authority is not much of an argument if you don't believe in the concept of authoritarian knowledge. that's another issue though. you seem to be arguing from a logical positivist stance, which says that nothing is true unless it can be logically or empirically demonstrated to be so. but as the first logical positivists found out, that very assertion cannot be logically or empirically demonstrated, therefore the whole school of thought was basically abandonded. at least in the world of philosophy. amongst "scientists" it is still alive and well.
of course i cannot argue from a logical standpoint that naturalism is wrong. it is something i believe on non-logical grounds. and as i said before, many other physicians and scientists have also done so in the past. to me that demonstrates that your original question deserves a negative response. that is, one can have faith in things other than naturalism and be a good physician. what part that has in medicine is more difficult. it is certainly necessary to believe that our physical selves are primarily explainable in physical terms. we have to do that to have effective diagnosis and therapies. i just don't understand why we must stop there and say that is all there is. the rest might not have much place in the nuts and bolts of medicine but to demand that those that practice medicine believe in nothing more is wrong imho.
i think the responses the life force people got are because they were asserting that these "life forces" are somehow readable and can be manipulated for treatment. that is a far cry from a physician who believes in God but still gives the appropriate antibiotic for the infection they see before them. i believe in God but will still trust the ekg in front of me to diagnose an MI instead of my impression of the patients "life force."
hope this clears up my stance
of course an appeal to authority is not much of an argument if you don't believe in the concept of authoritarian knowledge. that's another issue though. you seem to be arguing from a logical positivist stance, which says that nothing is true unless it can be logically or empirically demonstrated to be so. but as the first logical positivists found out, that very assertion cannot be logically or empirically demonstrated, therefore the whole school of thought was basically abandonded. at least in the world of philosophy. amongst "scientists" it is still alive and well.
of course i cannot argue from a logical standpoint that naturalism is wrong. it is something i believe on non-logical grounds. and as i said before, many other physicians and scientists have also done so in the past. to me that demonstrates that your original question deserves a negative response. that is, one can have faith in things other than naturalism and be a good physician. what part that has in medicine is more difficult. it is certainly necessary to believe that our physical selves are primarily explainable in physical terms. we have to do that to have effective diagnosis and therapies. i just don't understand why we must stop there and say that is all there is. the rest might not have much place in the nuts and bolts of medicine but to demand that those that practice medicine believe in nothing more is wrong imho.
i think the responses the life force people got are because they were asserting that these "life forces" are somehow readable and can be manipulated for treatment. that is a far cry from a physician who believes in God but still gives the appropriate antibiotic for the infection they see before them. i believe in God but will still trust the ekg in front of me to diagnose an MI instead of my impression of the patients "life force."
hope this clears up my stance
Greetings Aumel!
I am in partial argreement with you. I completely grant that you are employing a much more intellectually responsible understanding of vitalism than the DC in the other stream.
I, myself, used to be a Thomist substance dualist but found it very difficult to defend. Aquinas held that the soul is equally present in all parts of the body and animates it.
One reason I backed off this view (and became a modified Cartesian substance dualist) is Ockham's Razor which states that we cannot have any extra parts to our theories; that is, if something is not necessary to (or made probable by) our theory, it must be jettisoned. Secondly, if natural laws can explain a thing, they should explain a thing. This is what protects us from believing in things such as fairies and the "Innate Intelligence" which DCs defend so mindlessly.
The only place I see a reasonable defense of some sort vitalism is our mental events. In fact, I think it is self-referentially refuting to claim that there is no immaterial part of ourselves. If natural law completely describes us as humans then the real ability to reason and have free will is lost. ( I am prepared to defend this position).
Again, I think neuros here would have a cow upon hearing this.
However, even Nobel Laureate Eric Kandel identifies this as a problem (Principles of Neural Science 2000).
Finally, I radically part with you on your views on logic. It is self referentially refuting to deny logic in any form. Logic must be assumed before anything intelligible can be said about anything.
Self referentially refuting statements or positions are necessarily false because they cannot hold to their own criteria for truth. A classic example of such a statement (or position) is "It is wrong to judge" because if judging is wrong then judging judging is also wrong.
Take care, Nemo
I am in partial argreement with you. I completely grant that you are employing a much more intellectually responsible understanding of vitalism than the DC in the other stream.
I, myself, used to be a Thomist substance dualist but found it very difficult to defend. Aquinas held that the soul is equally present in all parts of the body and animates it.
One reason I backed off this view (and became a modified Cartesian substance dualist) is Ockham's Razor which states that we cannot have any extra parts to our theories; that is, if something is not necessary to (or made probable by) our theory, it must be jettisoned. Secondly, if natural laws can explain a thing, they should explain a thing. This is what protects us from believing in things such as fairies and the "Innate Intelligence" which DCs defend so mindlessly.
The only place I see a reasonable defense of some sort vitalism is our mental events. In fact, I think it is self-referentially refuting to claim that there is no immaterial part of ourselves. If natural law completely describes us as humans then the real ability to reason and have free will is lost. ( I am prepared to defend this position).
Again, I think neuros here would have a cow upon hearing this.
However, even Nobel Laureate Eric Kandel identifies this as a problem (Principles of Neural Science 2000).
Finally, I radically part with you on your views on logic. It is self referentially refuting to deny logic in any form. Logic must be assumed before anything intelligible can be said about anything.
Self referentially refuting statements or positions are necessarily false because they cannot hold to their own criteria for truth. A classic example of such a statement (or position) is "It is wrong to judge" because if judging is wrong then judging judging is also wrong.
Take care, Nemo
If this topic is of interest, let recommend a website:
http://www.iscid.org/boards
http://www.iscid.org/
Or if you want to join, click here:
http://www.iscid.org/membershipscript.php?promocode=kn78x0
Nemo
http://www.iscid.org/boards
http://www.iscid.org/
Or if you want to join, click here:
http://www.iscid.org/membershipscript.php?promocode=kn78x0
Nemo
Well, I do not know how much interest there is here, but nonetheless I will make my case for viewing mental events as immaterial there by openning the door to a limited and qualified vitalism (references available upon request):
Anyone who argues that something physical determines our thoughts paints himself or herself into a horrible indefensible corner. Geisler explains:
"A determinist insists that both determinists and nondeterminists are determined to believe what they believe. However determinists believe nondeterminists are wrong and ought to change their view. But, "ought to change" implies they are free to change, which is contrary to determinism?naturalistic, complete determinism is irrational. For determinism to be true there would have to be a rational basis for their thought. But if determinism is true, then there is no rational basis for thought, since all is determined by nonrational forces. So, if determinism claims to be true then it must be false."
Hence, if persons do in fact have a free will and it is self-refuting to argue otherwise, then logical necessity dictates that a personal explanation cannot be reduced to a scientific explanation because scientific explanations cannot account for the real ability to choose; that is, act contrary to a given action. Statements may be right but we could never know it. Put another way, we must ask, "How can we get the ability to reason out of a system of physical causes and effects?" If molecules are determining what we think, then how can we really reason? Our thoughts and actions would really look like a system of falling dominoes rather than something under our control. Rather, we must posit some immaterial part of ourselves lest we fall into the trap of determinism. Many are aware of this problem and deny determinism. However, why should we let them if he or she also holds that an immaterial world does not exist and that an aimless biological evolution can completely account for our existence? Precisely what, in the determinist's view, gives us the ability to reason? If it is something immaterial, then one must reject his or her Philosophical Naturalism and Darwinism can hardly account for any immaterial entity.
An exchange between philosophers of science James Robert Brown and Michael Ruse will very aptly elucidate the dilemma (as presented in Brown's Smoke and Mirrors: How Science reflects the Nature of Reality). Here, Brown is arguing against Ruse?s work: Taking Darwin Seriously: A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy:
1) How do we acquire beliefs, attitudes, and practices?
2) How ought we acquire beliefs, attitudes and practices?
According to Brown, "Naturalists are those who think that only question 1) matters; or that 2) is a hopeless question since there is no such thing as a normative standard with which to judge; or that an answer to 1) will be, in fact, an answer to 2); that we cannot answer 2) until we know the answer to 1)." Norms, under this view are reduced to the physical. And, just as evolution itself is aimless and devoid of teleology, so is our epistemology. There are two distinct approaches to evolutionary epistemology. One views the "development of science as importantly similar to the evolution of biological species" and the other is not concerned with the theory of change but is focused on the human cognitive capacity as the product of evolutionary change, that is, how we are hard wired to think in a certain way. Ruse identifies the first as evolutionary epistemology and the second as Darwinian epistemology. Ruse rightly rejects evolutionary epistemology as we do not get random variation in new conjectures-theories are highly directed. Moreover, as Brown says, "a teleological account is needed to do justice to scientific theorizing." For this reason, Ruse opts for Darwinian epistemology. An important distinction to be made is that Ruse holds that it is the methodology of science not the theorizing that is genetically hardwired. The methodology includes, for instance, deductive and inductive reasoning. These are epigenetic rules; the argument may be constructed as:
1) Activity A has survival value
2) Characteristics which have survival value are genetically based
3) Hence, Activity A is genetically based
The Darwinian epistemologist holds that activity A is basically a modus ponens manner of thinking which is genetically based and increases our survival value. This, however, is self-refuting. If reasoning is ultimately based on genes, reasoning about Darwinian epistemology itself is based on genes. Therefore, there is no justification for the Darwinian view other than that it is based on our genes which is circular reasoning. In the end analysis, we do not believe things for reasons under this view; we believe things because our genes make us think in a certain way. But under this view, how would we know if the way we think is actually the case if it is determined by something else, something physical? This view does not allow for the plasticity of mind that science and proper reasoning require. Brown says that merely: "citing modus ponens and consiliences of induction is not much to go on. Does Ruse want to include all the elementary rules of deductive and inductive inference? If the answer is yes, then why do people so often commit the fallacies of affirming the consequent or denying the antecedent? On the other hand if the answer is no, then what is the status of the nongenetically determined rules we regularly employ. If Ruse does not have a naturalistic account of these, then why have a naturalistic account of a limited few when a Platonistic account could do the whole job?"
Brown's point is a powerful one and it is evident that true beliefs are often not those which survive anyway. There are many, many instances in nature whereby a false belief lead to survivability. This was also of concern to Darwin himself:
"With me the horrid doubt always arises whether the conviction's of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would anyone trust in the conviction of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?"
In what he claims is a novel move, Brown offers that set theory can be employed to demonstrate that Ruse's views are false: since "standard set theories can provide the representation of any possible way that reality might be, hence all possibilities within a given set, how is it that genes can be coding this knowledge?? Genes, then, do not seem a likely candidate to ground our knowledge or explain mental events.
Turning to the brain, JP Moreland offers several reasons why the emergent supervenient view of mental states and properties should be rejected by the naturalist. (By emergent supervenient view, it is meant that mental states are "a completely new kind of property that is different from any physical property, especially from the physical properties attributed to brains and bodies".
He adds, for example, " pain is a simple, nonstructural property unique to the emergent level of reality; and in no way is it capturable in terms of the spatiotemporal, physical, causal relations among the states and parts of the lower level reality of the brain."[i.e. nerves are stimulated to cause pain but nerves themselves are not equal to the sensation of pain]).
Further, Moreland cites Churchland as saying:
" The important point about the standard evolutionary story is that the human species and all of it's features are the wholly physical outcome of a purely physical process...there seems to be no need, nor room, to fit any nonphysical substances or properties into our theoretical account of ourselves. We are creatures of matter. And we should learn to live with that fact."
Hence what comes from the physical by means of physical processes will also be physical. Viewing mental events this way threatens the completeness of physics. There are no physical laws to account for intensionality or a free will. Swinburne says that the materialist needs laws, not merely a collection of generalizations, correlating brain events to mental events and we cannot have a law of physics that accounts for a free will. What physical law gives rise to a free will and reason?
Searle, a physicalist, is quoted by Moreland as saying:
"Our conception of physical reality simply does not allow for radical freedom.... In order for us to have radical freedom, it looks as if we have to postulate that inside each of us was a self that was capable of interfering with the causal order of nature. That is, it looks as if we would have to contain some entity that was capable of making molecules swerve from their paths. I do not know if such a view is even intelligible, but it's certainly not consistent with what we know about how the world works from physics".
And William Provine offers:
"Free will as it is traditionally conceived...simply does not exist...there is no way that the evolutionary process as it is currently conceived can produce a being that is truly free to make choices".
Nemo
Anyone who argues that something physical determines our thoughts paints himself or herself into a horrible indefensible corner. Geisler explains:
"A determinist insists that both determinists and nondeterminists are determined to believe what they believe. However determinists believe nondeterminists are wrong and ought to change their view. But, "ought to change" implies they are free to change, which is contrary to determinism?naturalistic, complete determinism is irrational. For determinism to be true there would have to be a rational basis for their thought. But if determinism is true, then there is no rational basis for thought, since all is determined by nonrational forces. So, if determinism claims to be true then it must be false."
Hence, if persons do in fact have a free will and it is self-refuting to argue otherwise, then logical necessity dictates that a personal explanation cannot be reduced to a scientific explanation because scientific explanations cannot account for the real ability to choose; that is, act contrary to a given action. Statements may be right but we could never know it. Put another way, we must ask, "How can we get the ability to reason out of a system of physical causes and effects?" If molecules are determining what we think, then how can we really reason? Our thoughts and actions would really look like a system of falling dominoes rather than something under our control. Rather, we must posit some immaterial part of ourselves lest we fall into the trap of determinism. Many are aware of this problem and deny determinism. However, why should we let them if he or she also holds that an immaterial world does not exist and that an aimless biological evolution can completely account for our existence? Precisely what, in the determinist's view, gives us the ability to reason? If it is something immaterial, then one must reject his or her Philosophical Naturalism and Darwinism can hardly account for any immaterial entity.
An exchange between philosophers of science James Robert Brown and Michael Ruse will very aptly elucidate the dilemma (as presented in Brown's Smoke and Mirrors: How Science reflects the Nature of Reality). Here, Brown is arguing against Ruse?s work: Taking Darwin Seriously: A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy:
1) How do we acquire beliefs, attitudes, and practices?
2) How ought we acquire beliefs, attitudes and practices?
According to Brown, "Naturalists are those who think that only question 1) matters; or that 2) is a hopeless question since there is no such thing as a normative standard with which to judge; or that an answer to 1) will be, in fact, an answer to 2); that we cannot answer 2) until we know the answer to 1)." Norms, under this view are reduced to the physical. And, just as evolution itself is aimless and devoid of teleology, so is our epistemology. There are two distinct approaches to evolutionary epistemology. One views the "development of science as importantly similar to the evolution of biological species" and the other is not concerned with the theory of change but is focused on the human cognitive capacity as the product of evolutionary change, that is, how we are hard wired to think in a certain way. Ruse identifies the first as evolutionary epistemology and the second as Darwinian epistemology. Ruse rightly rejects evolutionary epistemology as we do not get random variation in new conjectures-theories are highly directed. Moreover, as Brown says, "a teleological account is needed to do justice to scientific theorizing." For this reason, Ruse opts for Darwinian epistemology. An important distinction to be made is that Ruse holds that it is the methodology of science not the theorizing that is genetically hardwired. The methodology includes, for instance, deductive and inductive reasoning. These are epigenetic rules; the argument may be constructed as:
1) Activity A has survival value
2) Characteristics which have survival value are genetically based
3) Hence, Activity A is genetically based
The Darwinian epistemologist holds that activity A is basically a modus ponens manner of thinking which is genetically based and increases our survival value. This, however, is self-refuting. If reasoning is ultimately based on genes, reasoning about Darwinian epistemology itself is based on genes. Therefore, there is no justification for the Darwinian view other than that it is based on our genes which is circular reasoning. In the end analysis, we do not believe things for reasons under this view; we believe things because our genes make us think in a certain way. But under this view, how would we know if the way we think is actually the case if it is determined by something else, something physical? This view does not allow for the plasticity of mind that science and proper reasoning require. Brown says that merely: "citing modus ponens and consiliences of induction is not much to go on. Does Ruse want to include all the elementary rules of deductive and inductive inference? If the answer is yes, then why do people so often commit the fallacies of affirming the consequent or denying the antecedent? On the other hand if the answer is no, then what is the status of the nongenetically determined rules we regularly employ. If Ruse does not have a naturalistic account of these, then why have a naturalistic account of a limited few when a Platonistic account could do the whole job?"
Brown's point is a powerful one and it is evident that true beliefs are often not those which survive anyway. There are many, many instances in nature whereby a false belief lead to survivability. This was also of concern to Darwin himself:
"With me the horrid doubt always arises whether the conviction's of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would anyone trust in the conviction of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?"
In what he claims is a novel move, Brown offers that set theory can be employed to demonstrate that Ruse's views are false: since "standard set theories can provide the representation of any possible way that reality might be, hence all possibilities within a given set, how is it that genes can be coding this knowledge?? Genes, then, do not seem a likely candidate to ground our knowledge or explain mental events.
Turning to the brain, JP Moreland offers several reasons why the emergent supervenient view of mental states and properties should be rejected by the naturalist. (By emergent supervenient view, it is meant that mental states are "a completely new kind of property that is different from any physical property, especially from the physical properties attributed to brains and bodies".
He adds, for example, " pain is a simple, nonstructural property unique to the emergent level of reality; and in no way is it capturable in terms of the spatiotemporal, physical, causal relations among the states and parts of the lower level reality of the brain."[i.e. nerves are stimulated to cause pain but nerves themselves are not equal to the sensation of pain]).
Further, Moreland cites Churchland as saying:
" The important point about the standard evolutionary story is that the human species and all of it's features are the wholly physical outcome of a purely physical process...there seems to be no need, nor room, to fit any nonphysical substances or properties into our theoretical account of ourselves. We are creatures of matter. And we should learn to live with that fact."
Hence what comes from the physical by means of physical processes will also be physical. Viewing mental events this way threatens the completeness of physics. There are no physical laws to account for intensionality or a free will. Swinburne says that the materialist needs laws, not merely a collection of generalizations, correlating brain events to mental events and we cannot have a law of physics that accounts for a free will. What physical law gives rise to a free will and reason?
Searle, a physicalist, is quoted by Moreland as saying:
"Our conception of physical reality simply does not allow for radical freedom.... In order for us to have radical freedom, it looks as if we have to postulate that inside each of us was a self that was capable of interfering with the causal order of nature. That is, it looks as if we would have to contain some entity that was capable of making molecules swerve from their paths. I do not know if such a view is even intelligible, but it's certainly not consistent with what we know about how the world works from physics".
And William Provine offers:
"Free will as it is traditionally conceived...simply does not exist...there is no way that the evolutionary process as it is currently conceived can produce a being that is truly free to make choices".
Nemo
You've shown two things:
1. That most of America is right to abandon philosophy as jargon filled nonsense that does not make any impact upon our lives at all - philosophy as epiphenomenon.
2. That materialism doesn't fit well with strong free will. But, I'd like to point out, that doesn't mean its wrong and its the best thing out there.
1. That most of America is right to abandon philosophy as jargon filled nonsense that does not make any impact upon our lives at all - philosophy as epiphenomenon.
2. That materialism doesn't fit well with strong free will. But, I'd like to point out, that doesn't mean its wrong and its the best thing out there.
