premises of neuroscience

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I am doing research on the premises of neuroscience and would like any help or comments about the premise stated in Chapter One of Principles of Neuroscience by Kandel. I can paraphrase it: the source of all behavior and all thought is the brain.

Prior to reading this book, I was of the opinion that I am me, and not the product of my brain. I've looked at the concept of dual aspect monism, but that seems to be a semantically obfuscated theory that tries to explain the way some people perceive the same premise that Kandel postulates.

Is it generally agreed by all psychologists that the source of thought is biological? Is there anyone here that can shed any light on this?

Thanks,

"Chev"
 
Is it generally agreed by all psychologists that the source of thought is biological?

If it's not, it should be. Dualism is pretty indefensible. Where are your thoughts coming from if not your brain?

There is reasonable debate, though, about whether transitive properties can be reasonably applied from your thoughts down to neurological events, or whether that level of reduction is useful or meaningful.
 
If it's not, it should be. Dualism is pretty indefensible. Where are your thoughts coming from if not your brain?

Jocknerd, Let me give an example as an illustration of what I am researching.

A man is involved in a serious car accident. He is unconscious and near death. He is taken to the emergency room and his life is saved. While being attended to in the operating room, he "sees" what is going on from a point of view outside his unconscious body. Upon awakening in the recovery room, he asks the MD who was working on him about his experience and relates to the MD what he remembers. The MD verifies that what the man has related is what actually occurred.

From this, a premise could be formed that the man was outside his body and he remembered what happened. The suggestion here is that thought and memory are independent of the biological entity.

The question I am researching is: Is the man lying, hallucinating, or giving empirical evidence of his experience?
 
Chev,

In order to accept that this man was thinking and developing memories outside of his body that were subequently transferred to his brain, we would have to admit there are flaws in the fundamental laws of physics regarding energy and motion. Before I would be willing to do that, I would like to see evidence that his brain and sensory organs were completely offline while he was in the ER. You may find Bruce Greyson's research on electrical stimulation of the angular gyrus (http://www.near-death.com/experiences/triggers07.html) provides a more simple explanation of what this man experienced.
 
A man is involved in a serious car accident. He is unconscious and near death. He is taken to the emergency room and his life is saved. While being attended to in the operating room, he "sees" what is going on from a point of view outside his unconscious body. Upon awakening in the recovery room, he asks the MD who was working on him about his experience and relates to the MD what he remembers. The MD verifies that what the man has related is what actually occurred.

And what if a man reports seeing a unicorn, being abducted my space aliens, or whatever? That hypothetical is meaningless; I'm not aware of any instance of such an act being recorded by an independent observer. If you're aware of such documentation I'd be interested to read it.

From this, a premise could be formed that the man was outside his body and he remembered what happened. The suggestion here is that thought and memory are independent of the biological entity.

Here's the flaw in that premise: the bolded part makes no sense. The man was outside his body? What does that mean? What was outside of his body? What was capable of intaking sensory information without itself being visible to the people around?

The question I am researching is: Is the man lying, hallucinating, or giving empirical evidence of his experience?
I don't think that hypothetical follows the typical definition of "empirical."

I would like to see evidence that his brain and sensory organs were completely offline while he was in the ER. You may find Bruce Greyson's research on electrical stimulation of the angular gyrus (http://www.near-death.com/experiences/triggers07.html) provides a more simple explanation of what this man experienced.

Also, this.
 
Stating that the origin of consciousness (i.e. all thought and behavior) is strictly biological is equally indefensible on the basis that there exists no reasonable scientific understanding about how neurons or any biochemical subunits can combine to produce the observed abilities displayed by humans. The body of research supporting a biological basis shows little more than damage to particular regions of the brain resulting in different deficits/phenotypes. There is a tremendous explanatory gap between any research i've seen and a biological explanation for human consciousness.

I have 10 years research experience studying the molecular biology of neurodegenerative disease and believe that neuroscience is far away from any scientific explanation of how the brain produces all thought and behavior.

That said, scientists shouldn't turn to something even less empirically supported (dualism) simply because it provides a plausible explanation. Dualism (which I do lean towards to be honest) is unscientific. It's a belief/philosophy rather than science.
 
While I agree with rejecting dualism (because it is unscientific), I wouldn't jump to accepting reductive materialism as being the best, or even ultimate way to understand human behavior.

Best way to illustrate this is by pointing out that we don't consult neuroscientists to understand the works of Shakespeare - we consult literature professors. We don't consult (at least, not exclusively) nuclear physicists in order to understand the threat of global thermonuclear war - we consult foreign policy experts.

Maybe those analogies / illustrations are a bit clumsy, but you probably get my drift.
 
I am doing research on the premises of neuroscience and would like any help or comments about the premise stated in Chapter One of Principles of Neuroscience by Kandel. I can paraphrase it: the source of all behavior and all thought is the brain.

Prior to reading this book, I was of the opinion that I am me, and not the product of my brain. I've looked at the concept of dual aspect monism, but that seems to be a semantically obfuscated theory that tries to explain the way some people perceive the same premise that Kandel postulates.

Is it generally agreed by all psychologists that the source of thought is biological? Is there anyone here that can shed any light on this?

Thanks,

"Chev"

Short answer, chev, there is no general agreement. Did you honestly expect there to be?

JockNerd -- You seemed to confuse the possibility of a bio basis for thought with a strictly brain based explanation. I am not an expert, but in all due respect, you sure you want to go there?

FWIW, I like W.S. Burroughs suggestion that language is viral, but I would add the caveat that biology be taken as metaphor. I don't hold that all thought is linguistic, but what if thoughts think us?
 
JockNerd -- You seemed to confuse the possibility of a bio basis for thought with a strictly brain based explanation. I am not an expert, but in all due respect, you sure you want to go there?

...I think you need to reread my post.

What is it if not ultimately reducible to brain events? Of course thought is completely reducible to physical events. What else would it be? Souls, minds, or other magic? As I wrote in my initial post, the real question is whether that level of reduction is useful (as DrGero put in different words). In many cases, the answer is probably no.
 
Stating that the origin of consciousness (i.e. all thought and behavior) is strictly biological is equally indefensible on the basis that there exists no reasonable scientific understanding about how neurons or any biochemical subunits can combine to produce the observed abilities displayed by humans.

I agree that we are not yet able to describe consciousness fully in neurophysiological terms. We can explain the neurophysiological basis for many of the mental abilities of humans and animals, however.

The body of research supporting a biological basis shows little more than damage to particular regions of the brain resulting in different deficits/phenotypes.

Neuroscience research is not limited to lesion studies. There is a large amount of evidence (from electrophysiological recordings, fMRI, etc...) supporting the involvement of specific regions of the brain in cognitive functions. Additionally, we have evidence from parallel evolutionary trends in the complexity of the brain and cognitive functions.
 
True enough there's more research then lesion studies (especially in flatworms where if i remember correctly the whole system is mapped?). But what does it all mean to you in context of the question? Is the body of research evidence that consciousness is biologically based? To me the work seems to provide more of a wiring diagram than an explanation of the origin of thought and behavior.

I see it something like this: A car's engine revs and the car goes. You can observe that the engine moves the car. Yet you wouldn't say the car is driving.

It's an untestable and therefore unscientific assumption that the initial causes of the behavior are biological. Am I wrong?

I agree that we are not yet able to describe consciousness fully in neurophysiological terms. We can explain the neurophysiological basis for many of the mental abilities of humans and animals, however.



Neuroscience research is not limited to lesion studies. There is a large amount of evidence (from electrophysiological recordings, fMRI, etc...) supporting the involvement of specific regions of the brain in cognitive functions. Additionally, we have evidence from parallel evolutionary trends in the complexity of the brain and cognitive functions.



...I think you need to reread my post.

What is it if not ultimately reducible to brain events? Of course thought is completely reducible to physical events. What else would it be?

No offense but this is the kind of perspective that will keep us running around in circles on this issue as we have since the beginning of...well as far back as those history books go.

"What else would it be" isn't good enough, and it isn't science. It is the basis of a theory that can shape a line of research if you know what i mean, but I give that no points in a discussion. There are a lot of things that can't be perceived with the senses and over the years some of them have been demystified by science. I think open-minded inquiury will help people think about new ways to study thought/consciousness and push the science forward. Of course, thats probably a dream- if someone does ever find something other than biology as the origin of consciousness, they'll probably be ridiculed long before mainstream science ever gives serious thought to it 🙂
 
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If it's not, it should be. Dualism is pretty indefensible. Where are your thoughts coming from if not your brain?

Jocknerd, Let me give an example as an illustration of what I am researching.

A man is involved in a serious car accident. He is unconscious and near death. He is taken to the emergency room and his life is saved. While being attended to in the operating room, he "sees" what is going on from a point of view outside his unconscious body. Upon awakening in the recovery room, he asks the MD who was working on him about his experience and relates to the MD what he remembers. The MD verifies that what the man has related is what actually occurred.

From this, a premise could be formed that the man was outside his body and he remembered what happened. The suggestion here is that thought and memory are independent of the biological entity.

The question I am researching is: Is the man lying, hallucinating, or giving empirical evidence of his experience?

I think you would find trans personal psychologists to be less likely to take a monistic approach. You may wish to look at some of the literature on the quantum theories of consciousness such as the work of Hammeroff and Penrose and others. The problem of consciousness is bedevils psychology. Hammeroff and Penrose have speculated that consciousness is an expression of something occurring at the quantum level rather than the level of chemical neurotransmission. Such processes may include quantum processes occurring in neural microtubules or gap junctions between neurons. So the answer about "what else" consciousness might be involves some interesting cutting edge physics. Look up the name David Bohm. He wrote *the*classic textbook on quantum theory (with which he had problems and disagreements) and was considered by Einstein to be the next great thinker in physics. He has also discussed consciousness and the nature of physical reality. His ideas about implicate versus explicate order in the universe are quite interesting.

This view posits that consciousness operates through brain activity but is actually something embedded in the structure of the universe itself: hence consciousness can continue to operate outside of the physical brain but is unable to interact with the physical universe without a physical substrate. What is fascinating about consciousness studies is that it involves cross-disciplinary work in which psychologists and physicists collaborate. This despite the fact that most psychologists are clueless about hard science (myself included). The university of Arizona has a consciousness studies center that does some interesting work in this area. There is also a referred online journal called Neuroquantology that publishes some stuff in this area too. I myself operate under the assumption that monism is the most parsimonious philosophic stance but I am quite convinced that the truth about consciousness is beyond our current philosophic paradigms. Besides, nothing is more fun than challenging the fragile certainties of psychologists whose creativity has fossilized into dogma :laugh: !
 
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.

Oh, but we do consult neuroscientists for this as well. What is art? What is creativity?

The question of "what is art" and "what is creativity" are many orders of magnitude more general questions than the question you pose below, and still, AFAIK, neuroscience still doesn't have very meaningful or (more importantly) useful answers for this yet.

My take is that neurobiological research is probably necessary for meaningfully understanding creativity at some level (and I don't think we even have that level of understanding yet), but it will never be sufficient for a complete understanding.

And the question of "what is art?" I can't even see how neuroscience could ever even hope to answer that question - we don't even have reliable, consensual definition of what "art" is anyways in terms of popular culture (is it "art"? Is it "obscenity"? etc).

Why do we judge Shakespeare to be aesthetically pleasing?

I would be definitely interested if you or anyone else would cite me one piece of neuroscience research that even gets close to providing a useful answer to that above question.

Regardless, to date, no one consults neuroscience in order to understand and appreciate Shakespeare. The truly meaningful and useful discussions as to why great literature is great literature are to be had with literature experts. I don't think that will ever change, even if we happen to get to a future where the neurobiological basis of creativity is completely explained.

Now, I completely forgot, what was this thread supposed to be about? 🙄
 
I dont remember being bothered by the first chapter in the Kandel and Schwartz book. In undergrad, I was kind of irritated by the first chapter in Carlson's Physiology of Behavior. He made some statement about out brain being the result of a long series of accidents with no creator, or something like that. It was basically an unprovable statement, and his worldview, hidden behind the guise of objective science. Thats great if you love Richard Dawkins (and you have the right to that). But its not good scholarship in my opinion when only the naturalists are invited to the table.

Ledoux, in Synaptic Self, did a great job of addressing the issue in a way that invites people of all worldviews to the table. He wrote, "Many will surely counter that the self is psychological, social, moral, aesthetic, or spiritual, rather than neural, in nature. My snyaptic theory of the self is not proposed as an alternative to these views. It is, rather, an attempt to portray the way the psychological, social, moral, aesthetic, or spiritual self is realized" (Ledoux, 2002, p. 2-3). This is coming from one of Gazzaniga's former students...who could not stop gushing over Richard Dawkins in The Mind's Past (great book by the way).

I tried reading the comments about near death experiences...but fell asleep. Its one of those debates where you will always leave with the same opinion you came in with.
 
He made some statement about out brain being the result of a long series of accidents with no creator, or something like that. It was basically an unprovable statement, and his worldview, hidden behind the guise of objective science. Thats great if you love Richard Dawkins (and you have the right to that). But its not good scholarship in my opinion when only the naturalists are invited to the table.

I'm not quite sure what you're meaning by "accidents", but this is implying that evolution is a chance process. It is not. It is the very opposite of that. Yes, there are chance elements (eg gene mutation), but the mechanisms by which selection occurs (eg natural selection, or sexual selection), and through which evolution works, are NOT by chance.

And this is not only provable, it has been proven, as evolution is a solid fact.
 
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I'm not quite sure what you're meaning by "accidents", but this is implying that evolution is a chance process. It is not. It is the very opposite of that. Yes, there are chance elements (eg gene mutation), but the mechanisms by which selection occurs (eg natural selection, or sexual selection), and through which evolution works, are NOT by chance.

And this is not only provable, it has been proven, as evolution is a solid fact.

WOW. I believe in evolution, and I dont believe its a chance process. It was Carlson who said the accidents part, not me. I wouldnt choose that language.

Try reading my post again more carefully.
 
WOW. I believe in evolution, and I dont believe its a chance process. It was Carlson who said the accidents part, not me. I wouldnt choose that language.

Try reading my post again more carefully.

I know it was Carlson, but you said some things that could be taken in different ways. Try reading your own post again more carefully if you don't see this. I have no idea who you are or what you believe, so I wrote my previous post bc I'm tired of the deniers of evolution and the creationist/"intelligent design" nonsense. That evolution occurred (and occurs) without a creator is not only demonstrable, it has been demonstrated.

Whether my statements about this apply directly to you or not is of incidental concern.

You did say a couple of other things in your post coming directly from your own views that I would contest, but I hate internet debates, so I let it go. I only addressed the evolution thing for my aforementioned reasons.
 
Psy01,
I see where you are coming from, but I'm not going to excuse you from taking my post completely out of context and interpreting it based on your irritation towards a group of people who do not represent my beliefs.

My post was directed to the OP.

I presented two ways to look at the topic at hand, both of which relate to the Kandel quote. One was the Carlson way; the other was the Ledoux way. I prefer the Ledoux way and I already stated why. It doesn't make me a lesser scientist than anyone. If you prefer the Carlson way or some other way, have at it and contest away. I don't expect everyone to think like I do. Critical thinking is good, and so are debates…just have some concern about what I'm actually saying. I'm not saying my points are always perfectly clear, but if you have a question, just ask!
 
Psy01,
I see where you are coming from, but I'm not going to excuse you from taking my post completely out of context and interpreting it based on your irritation towards a group of people who do not represent my beliefs.


I don't think you do see where I'm coming from. Maybe partially, but I can pretty much guarantee that most of it you don't see. At any rate, lighten up. I didn't take anything out of context, as there are (still) a couple different ways I can read your entire post. One of them seems like you fall into a couple of groups that supremely irritate me. I now know that you don't belong to one of those groups, though I still don't know if you belong to another. But again, I have no idea what you believe, and I'm not going to go questioning you about these specific beliefs. Instead, I wrote a general post in civil fashion addressing one potential issue that I did not want to let go without a comment. As I typed it, I figured that if it did apply to you, fine. That was part of why I posted it. If it didn't apply, then fine too. No biggie. There was no need to take offense. I wasn't being rude, it was totally civil. I don't care if you "excuse" me from anything though.

I presented two ways to look at the topic at hand, both of which relate to the Kandel quote. One was the Carlson way; the other was the Ledoux way. I prefer the Ledoux way and I already stated why. It doesn't make me a lesser scientist than anyone. If you prefer the Carlson way or some other way, have at it and contest away. I don't expect everyone to think like I do. Critical thinking is good, and so are debates…just have some concern about what I'm actually saying. I'm not saying my points are always perfectly clear, but if you have a question, just ask!

Geez. I wasn't saying you are "a lesser scientist." I don't even know you. Like I said, I hate internet debates, so I'm not going to go asking all sorts of questions about your personal views. Thus, I simply posted a few general statements, and I did so in a civil fashion. Whether they apply to you directly or not, it really doesn't make much of a difference.


This kind of thing is why I don't go to message boards much anymore. Misunderstandings so easily occur. I've seen it a million times, all across the internet. And here it happened again. I misunderstood you, and you misunderstood me.

I'm leaving this thread for good, so if you were going to reply to this, know that I will not read it, whether here or via PM.

Peace.
 
I see that the discussion has pretty much ended on a rather sour note. That is unfortunate.

Since I started it, I should probably post the last message.

I wanted to know if there was an agreement amonst psycologists (and psychology students) that the source of thought is biological, as postulated by Kandel in "Principles of Neuroscience."

The first person to respond to my query was JockNerd, who expressed the opinion that if such a premise was not agreed upon, it should be, as any other premise is indefensible. In a later post, JockNerd offered the opinion that my hypothetical example was nonsensical. jnine and DrGero offered some arguments against JockNerd belief but all agreed that, assuming Kandel's premise may not be totally accurate, Dualism is a belief and not a science. Neuropsych2be offered some interesting additional thoughts...and then IT514 and Psy01 got into a debate about semantics ending with Psy01 taking his or her ball and going home.

I ended up getting some useful information regarding my question. I hope you all will pardon me putting the obtuse language and conceptual nit-picking aside and giving you some additional food for thought.

The hypothetical example I offered of the man who was outside his body while his body was being operated on in the hospital isn't actually a hypothetical situation. It happened to me, and it is what started me off in my reseach about 40 years ago. I found it utterly fascinating that I could see things and hear things while not inside my head (including things that my eyes could not see had I opened them while being attended to by the MD), and that I could remember these things (memory), and that when I asked the MD about the experience he not only verified that what I had perceived was accurate, he also told me that he had been an MD in WWII and that my experience, while not common, was not at all unique; he had heard similar things from other people he had operated on.

I leave it to you to form your own conclusions, and I will humbly offer the following thoughts to those of you who are not locked in to a premise that the brain is the source of all thought.

It appears that few of the people that responded to my query are in agreement about the basic concepts. This in itself is interesting from a scientific research viewpoint.

Neuroscience can exist very comfortably without the need to "prove" that the brain is the source of thought. Insistence upon the validity of the premise could possibly serve no useful purpose, and at worst, could possibly inhibit the formulation of correct scientific conclusions. I would encourage those of you who have any doubt about the factual reality of the premise to read (or reread) the Hippocratic Oath.

There is another premise possible; that the source of thought is not the brain. It is also possible that science, (what we agree upon as the scientific method), can in fact validate this premise...which is in fact the earlier of the two in what we might call the space-time continuum.

Finally, my brain and my body are excellent tools, but I find the assertion that I have to have a brain to think with, or even that I have to have a body at all, or that I am hallucinating about all this, amusing in the same way that I might look out the window of an airplane and see a puppy barking at me from below.

Thank you for your time and your consideration, and I wish all of you the best in your journey towards the discovery of the truth.
 
at least no one seems as self assured as to what consciousness is as Steven Pinker is...

I see a lot of humility and grappling with a difficult subject matter in this thread. We all struggle with it, regardless of whether one is atheist, agnostic or even a believer.

Actually the spine "learns" as do other parts of the body but without a brain we are no longer alive for one, and without a human highly convoluted brain we cannot think, calculate, observe, and philosphize as we do, now can we?

The problem often as Pinker surprisingly does get right is language and well, then again he should get it right as he is a linguist.

Oliver Sacks studies the connection between the human brain and appreciation of music.

Anyways: yes the short answer is it is the brain and the long answer is it is a synergy. Apart from that neuroscience cannot really comment: spirits, souls, man eating clowns from planet Neptune, etc, are outside of the domain of neuroscience; well, almost anyways. In science we do a lot of inferring from given set of data points or lines of evidence. We can infer that the physical realm is the only one or that the laws of classical physics are all that apply in terms of consciousness (this post does not address quantum effects on consciousness now becoming better evidenced) and for the most part if not 100% that seems to be the gist of it.

I am not saying there are not rare events that may follow the physical laws but seem strange to most of us or that god cannot exist, once again that is not for science to make a determination on.

Without a brain living animals (in general) do not process information and are not conscious. Even the hypothetical man in the hospital has a brain. Even when the heart stops the brain keeps firing.
 
Perhaps the simplist answer is that the brain is required for consciousness. If you give me a brain, I can take consciousness away through injury. We can argue whether it is contained within the connections of neurons, which is what Crick postulates or microtubules, which is Penrose's theory. Both are in the paranchymal tissue. I have not heard a debate for Jung's collectivist theories win any points with current psychologists. I would add that we also don't appear to be born concsious either, rather this is something that develops as mutliple cortical areas come on-line.

There is always and will always be debate as to whether reductionist models are useful clinically. Certainly in injury and pathology, they are. Whether neuroscientists can explain the subtleties of personality is certainly up for debate; but that might reflect the limits of our tools more than the certainty that personlity or consciousness lives within the skull.
 
Perhaps the simplist answer is that the brain is required for consciousness. If you give me a brain, I can take consciousness away through injury. We can argue whether it is contained within the connections of neurons, which is what Crick postulates or microtubules, which is Penrose's theory. Both are in the paranchymal tissue. I have not heard a debate for Jung's collectivist theories win any points with current psychologists. I would add that we also don't appear to be born concsious either, rather this is something that develops as mutliple cortical areas come on-line.

There is always and will always be debate as to whether reductionist models are useful clinically. Certainly in injury and pathology, they are. Whether neuroscientists can explain the subtleties of personality is certainly up for debate; but that might reflect the limits of our tools more than the certainty that personlity or consciousness lives within the skull.

I would say that at birth we are conscious but over time our awareness improves.
 
It would be pretty hard to imagine a newborn baby that is aware of themself, own feelings, thoughts and their surroundings. The womb must really suck if they are. We can demonstrate areas within the brain required for self awareness and these are not operating at birth. You are welcome to believe whatever you want though.
 
I'd say that at birth, our brains have the structures in place to be "conscious", but not the necessary neural connections to be "conscious." I use quotations because part of me does believe that there is at least the tiniest bit of "consciousness" at birth, though. Maybe that's a spiritual side of me, or maybe that's a somewhat naive, arrogant (that since humans are *so* special, they are conscious since birth, in spite of contrary "evidence") side of me. So heck, I dunno. :laugh:
 
It would be pretty hard to imagine a newborn baby that is aware of themself, own feelings, thoughts and their surroundings. The womb must really suck if they are. We can demonstrate areas within the brain required for self awareness and these are not operating at birth. You are welcome to believe whatever you want though.


There is plenty of research in neuroscience indicating some awareness and consciousness from birth but you are welcome to cherry pick the data if you want to. This is easily demonstrated.
 
I'd say that at birth, our brains have the structures in place to be "conscious", but not the necessary neural connections to be "conscious." I use quotations because part of me does believe that there is at least the tiniest bit of "consciousness" at birth, though. Maybe that's a spiritual side of me, or maybe that's a somewhat naive, arrogant (that since humans are *so* special, they are conscious since birth, in spite of contrary "evidence") side of me. So heck, I dunno. :laugh:

On how you define conscious. Newborns are certainly not blank slates and that is where Steven Pinker gets it right, albeit a little late.

Just one example:

http://www.seminperinat.com/article/S0146-0005(10)00018-2/abstract
 
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PsycheGraduate: Let me see if I am understanding you correctly. From the abstract:

"The newborn shows several signs of consciousness, such as being awake and aware of him/herself and mother. The infant processes olfactory and painful inputs in the cortex, where consciousness is believed to be localized. Furthermore, the newborn expresses primary emotions such as joy, disgust, and surprise and remember rhymes and vowels to which he or she has been exposed during fetal life. Thus, the newborn infant fulfills the criteria of displaying a basic level of consciousness, being aware of its body and him/her-self and somewhat about the external world. Preterm infants may be conscious to a limited degree from about 25 weeks, when the thalamocortical connections are established."

So, the article's premise is that consciousness is a biological process mediated by certain connections in the brain. Or, at least that these are a necessary component of that process. I'm arguing that it is probably more like the end of the first year for true self-awareness because frontal cortices that mediate episodic memory are also needed; but that is just a question of where you draw the line at bare minimum components.

What components do you believe are needed for self-awareness or that which extends beyond the skills of most vertibrates?

I'm not sure we are still talking about what consciousness is? If you are posing this level of basic neural processes is consciouness, then most animals have it. If it means more of self-awareness, then this is not functioning at birth though several of the components need are on-line.
 
PsycheGraduate: Let me see if I am understanding you correctly. From the abstract:

"The newborn shows several signs of consciousness, such as being awake and aware of him/herself and mother. The infant processes olfactory and painful inputs in the cortex, where consciousness is believed to be localized. Furthermore, the newborn expresses primary emotions such as joy, disgust, and surprise and remember rhymes and vowels to which he or she has been exposed during fetal life. Thus, the newborn infant fulfills the criteria of displaying a basic level of consciousness, being aware of its body and him/her-self and somewhat about the external world. Preterm infants may be conscious to a limited degree from about 25 weeks, when the thalamocortical connections are established."

So, the article's premise is that consciousness is a biological process mediated by certain connections in the brain. Or, at least that these are a necessary component of that process. I'm arguing that it is probably more like the end of the first year for true self-awareness because frontal cortices that mediate episodic memory are also needed; but that is just a question of where you draw the line at bare minimum components.

What components do you believe are needed for self-awareness or that which extends beyond the skills of most vertibrates?

I'm not sure we are still talking about what consciousness is? If you are posing this level of basic neural processes is consciouness, then most animals have it. If it means more of self-awareness, then this is not functioning at birth though several of the components need are on-line.

Recent research has demonstrated that many vertebrates are more intelligent and self aware than previously believed which is also of interest.

In terms of self awareness newborns certainly show such capacity but agreed in a more limited manner than after the first year, however, even in this regard babies show some awareness prior to one years of age. Now, if you hold specific definitions of self aware and consciousness I can respect that you draw the line differently from where I do and where much research has been directing us as of late.

One could argue that people around the age of 18 and under 21 do not have fully developed prefrontal cortex connections yet and lack many experiences to put life in context, so they do not have a full consciousness.

Really the mirror test, the social smile and a sense of embarrassment do develop too but these develop at around 2 years of age and older.

Defining consciousness is not such an easy matter and self awareness as I see it in the literature begins at birth but certainly does not end there.

Self awarness continues to broaden and deepn as one ages, the brains develop connections and experienced is gained.

What I was pointing out was a basic consciousness which the newborn baby exhibits. We would not expect most 10 year olds to be able to calculus and neither would we expect a newborn to walk, drive a car talk and talk on the phone🙂

Infants do have some episodic memory, however, and this is clearly demonstrated and between the ages of 9 and 12 months typically cause and effect are quite well understood.


http://cogweb.ucla.edu/Discourse/Narrative/Wheeler-97.pdf


Here is a more detailed and gradual, progressive take on self awareness in young children:

www.psychology.emory.edu/cognition/rochat/Five%20levels%20.pdf

And here is a basic coverage that holds true:

http://www.madeformums.com/baby-development/your-babys-self-awareness/769.html

http://www.aboutkidshealth.ca/pain/...rns.aspx?articleID=7167&categoryID=PN-nh3-04d

I do agree, however, that after the first year there is a far greater capacity for self awareness and knowledge of cause and effect along with episodic memory.

http://cogweb.ucla.edu/Discourse/Narrative/Wheeler-97.pdf


In my own obervations and studies I have seen some remarkable variance among newborns and 1-4 year olds. Piaget made astonishing observations of babies sucking on a nipple for milk and other early stage development of intelligence, albeit his books had me snoring to sleep quite often... they were good reading material.

Further we used to believe that long term memory did not engage until the age of 1 or so but here we see differently:

The influence of training views on infants' long-term memory for simple 3D shapes.

Kraebel KS, West RN, Gerhardstein P.
State University of New York, Cortland, USA.
Abstract

This investigation explored infants' ability to retrieve a memory for a simple 3D shape from a novel view following a 24-hr delay. Tests of memory for shape in infancy have typically used extremely short delay intervals between familiarization and test in examining the ability to equate between substantially different views of a 3D object. The current study used longer delays to assess the content of a long-term memory representation. Infants 3-4 months of age learned to kick to move a mobile displaying a simple 3D shape (brick or cylinder). Results of three experiments show that infants can recognize 3D shapes in a novel viewpoint across a 24-hr delay, provided that experience with a sufficiently wide range of views is available during training. The results suggest a capacity for the perception of 3D shape that enables access, across long delays, to a memory representation of sufficient detail that discrimination between two simple shapes (i.e., a cylinder and a brick) is possible. The results suggest that this representation is of a sufficiently abstract nature that perception of the 3D form of the object, independent of the changes in specific features accompanying changes in viewpoint, is also possible. This finding suggests that infants, like adults, possess a functional memory system for the distal shape of simple 3D objects, and can transfer training to a novel view using long-term memory, but that this ability is not as strong as in the mature system. These results have implications for the development of shape perception and for theories of object recognition in general

Abstract

Infants' preferences for a novel or familiar nursery rhyme were examined as an index of long-term memory. One- to 2-month-old infants' preferences were tested, using a nonnutritive sucking, discrimination-learning procedure, at 1, 2, or 3 days after the last of multiple familiarization sessions. A consistent novelty preference was observed at the 1-day retention interval, no consistent preference occurred at the 2-day interval, and a familiarity preference was found following the 3-day interval. This pattern of results is consistent with attentional preference models which interpret novelty and familiarity preferences as reflecting the discrepancy between an external stimulus and the infant's representation of the stimulus. The findings also reveal that infants as young as 1 month of age encoded and subsequently recognized a repeatedly experienced nursery rhyme after a 3-day retention interval. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/...199612)29:8<685::AID-DEV4>3.0.CO;2-P/abstract

How the memory of adults evolves from the memory abilities of infants is a central problem in cognitive development. The popular solution holds that the multiple memory systems of adults mature at different rates during infancy. The early-maturing system (implicit or nondeclarative memory) functions automatically from birth, whereas the late-maturing system (explicit or declarative memory) functions intentionally, with awareness, from late in the first year. Data are presented from research on deferred imitation, sensory preconditioning, potentiation, and context for which this solution cannot account and present an alternative model that eschews the need for multiple memory systems. The ecological model of infant memory development (N. E. Spear, 1984) holds that members of all species are perfectly adapted to their niche at each point in ontogeny and exhibit effective, evolutionarily selected solutions to whatever challenges each new niche poses. Because adults and infants occupy different niches, what they perceive, learn, and remember about the same event differs, but their raw capacity to learn and remember does not

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2693033/


Accounting for change in declarative memory: A cognitive neuroscience perspective.

Richmond J, Nelson CA.
Harvard Medical School And Developmental Medicine Center Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience, Children's Hospital Boston.
Abstract

The medial temporal lobe memory system matures relatively early and supports rudimentary declarative memory in young infants. There is considerable development, however, in the memory processes that underlie declarative memory performance during infancy. Here we consider age-related changes in encoding, retention, and retrieval in the context of current knowledge about the brain systems that may underlie these memory processes. While changes in infants' encoding may be attributed to rapid myelination during the first year of life, improvements in long-term retention and flexible retrieval are likely due to the prolonged development of the dentate gyrus. Future studies combining measures of brain and behavior are critical in improving our understanding of how brain development drives memory development during infancy and early childhood

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18769510



In many ways the jury has still been out for quite sometime and recent data is reinforcing some previous hand waving and speculation regarding pre-natal and perinatal consciousness. I included other references to be fair and balanced regarding the ongoing scholarly work in different fields of psychology, cognitive neuroscience and developmental biology. Not all of my references defend my point of view to be sure.

Of course what constitutes an infant precisely is debatable as well.

Once again thank you for your reply.

P.S. a little OT but the infant also develops an ego-ideal too. The newborn cries and shakes his baby rattle for attention.

Yet humans are born very vulnerable and "premature" compared to many other animals:

http://books.google.com/books?id=bD...&resnum=1&ved=0CBIQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false
 
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