What are you talking about? What fuzzy legal or ethical concerns are there?
Courts have dealt with the issue of uncertainty in psychiatry before both generally and with regard to risk assessment/dangerousness. In general, courts give deference to psychiatry, recognizing that many questions within the purview of psychiatry do not have clear-cut black-and-white answers.
Specifically relevant, in
Barefoot v. Estelle, Barefoot appealed his death sentence, claiming that psychiatric assessments of dangerousness were unreliable and shouldn't be admitted. The Supreme Court, in that case, denied a stay of execution and held that psychiatrists' opinions as to dangerousness are admissible and that a jury would be able to determine the reliability of such predictions.
Neither petitioner nor the Association suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future dangerousness, only most of the time.
The suggestion that no Psychiatrist's testimony may be presented with respect to a defendant's future dangerousness is somewhat like asking us to disinvent the wheel.
Ake v. Oklahoma also acknowledged the uncertainty involved in psychiatry and found that juries should be allowed to resolve differences in opinion offered by psychiatrists:
Perhaps because there often is no single, accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal insanity in a given case, juries remain the primary fact-finders on this issue, and they must resolve differences in opinion within the psychiatric profession on the basis of the evidence offered by each party.
We've discussed
Daubert and I think it is a legitimate question whether it overrules
Barefoot. As mentioned, there are many reasons that it might not. First, as discussed previously, no one factor is dispositive and the Court did "not presume to set out a definitive checklist or test." Additionally,
Daubert concerned federal hearings and it's not clear that the standard applies at the State level or to to the type of administrative hearings that we're talking about here. At the state level, some case law suggests that
Daubert does not necessarily apply in all contexts (see
Nenno v. State).
Going onto the ethics, I strongly feel that this is all about how you present your testimony and represent the case. I do believe that it would be unethical to claim in court that there is strong evidence to suggest that an individual has a high or low likelihood of being dangerous in the future. However, I think it is ethical if you represent, as I did here, that psychiatric risk assessments have not generally proved reliable but that there are certain characteristics which are risk factors for violence, that a person has certain risk factors, or that certain risk factors have been modified since the circumstances that led to the restriction of their rights. This is different from saying "As a psychiatrist, I can know with certainty that this person is very unlikely to kill someone in the future." I definitely think that there is a way to give ethical testimony on this subject.