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Has anyone else here read any articles by Szasz in school? Just curious what other people had to say.
Szasz
- Thread starter spillsomepaint
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thoughts?
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Although he makes some good (although obvious) points about the role that societal norms play in perception of what is "abnormal behavior"....I never could get past the notion that most his points were purely arguing semantics, and that none of his arguments precluded the notion that disease entities effect the brain (mind), therefore affecting behavior. It does not explain why schizophrenics hear voices, and most other do not. To me, there is a cause for this. It is happening to these people.
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There's a thread from a while back about this that I posted on a bunch, if you want to go through my post history to find it. Sometime in January would have been the last post, I think.
I agree with most of Szasz' positions. I would agree with Erg that a lot of it was semantics, but I would argue that that's because diagnosis is semantic.
I wasn't really catching the drift of the rest of your post, Erg... Szasz' position is not that people don't hear voices, become depressed, act hyper, or whatever, but that those behaviors don't constitute an illness of the same kind as a broken arm, and that illness is not a suitable analogy.
I agree with most of Szasz' positions. I would agree with Erg that a lot of it was semantics, but I would argue that that's because diagnosis is semantic.
I wasn't really catching the drift of the rest of your post, Erg... Szasz' position is not that people don't hear voices, become depressed, act hyper, or whatever, but that those behaviors don't constitute an illness of the same kind as a broken arm, and that illness is not a suitable analogy.
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Well that was kind of my point. It happens, people dont like it, we identify it, and help the person. What you call it, is a pure academic question. Its a very interesting one, but it complexities should never stop or prevent the actual treatment of psychological distress in people.
I see many of his points when he discusses the issues of forced psych commitment and treatment. I understand his points and what he is saying, however, I am a strong believer that life is just a big risk/benefit analysis. I think that there is a plethora of evidence to support the notion that people do not always know what is best for them, and sometimes people have to be protected from themselves (i.e., seat belt laws) for various reasons the serve the greater good of society. This principle is most notable in the confidentiality laws of clinical work, where confidence of an individual is broken for a greater good of the person (risk of suicide), or of the greater good of the protection/society from physical harm (abuse of children or HI threat).
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Ooo, yeah, we'd have a fundamental difference of opinion there, then. The libertarian-socialist in me cringes at any of what I see as this really bad neo-con position that *some people* need *us* to take care of them, because *they* don't know what's best for them. I think that's been used to justify a lot throughout history, and I hope anyone who holds that opinion about anything has given it long and careful consideration.
And, I think the parallels to the classical Szaszian example of homosexuality and the DSM are too obvious to require listing.
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jocknerd,
how do you feel about that care taking position being applied to an individual with an FSIQ of 30?
just curious. not trying to pick a fight.
how do you feel about that care taking position being applied to an individual with an FSIQ of 30?
just curious. not trying to pick a fight.
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I think applying any position across-the-board is an idea bad enough that it should be reserved solely for politicians.
I think that my position is adequately demonstrated by the history of "taking care" of people who are MR; helping others to achieve the most they can is consistent with a Szaszian viewpoint, and is a different and superior purpose for labeling particular people with particular things, but shackling them in chains (which, make no mistake, was done "for their own good") is not. This would be a point pretty central to a Szaszian view, although I'm sure it would meet with cries of "semantics!" from many (as if that in some way invalidated it).
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the following argument of his is very unfortunate because it results in people dismissing him when there is much of worth in what he says:
1. diseases are disorders of the body / brain.
2. the mind is not the body / brain.
C. there is no such thing as mental disease.
premiss one is pure stipulation. who disagrees with him? why, everyone who thinks that there is no conceptual confusion in considering minds (or societies for that matter) to be LITERALLY sick. premiss two is almost uniformly rejected these days (it really is unfortunate that he says this). so... his argument for the 'non-existence' of mental disorder is crap crap crappy.
fortunately, there is a different interpretation of Szasz. on this other interpretation he isn't so interesting because he denies mental disorder exists (even though he says as much at times) rather, he is interesting because he tells us that the nature of mental disorder is radically different from what we had supposed.
In particular: That psychiatry has more in common with other forms of social control such as law than with medicine.
In psychiatry we lock people up against their will before they have done anything wrong on the supposition that they will go on to harm themselves or another. We can't do that in law. But psychiatry takes up where law leaves off. Another form of social control.
We say it is for the good of the individual and / or society. And it may well be. (That is an empirical matter). That doesn't alter the point, however: Psychiatry is a form of social control. We tell ourselves it is more medicine than law so we sleep better at nights but we should consider the values that are in play so that we can discuss and debate them. To ensure that we don't label people as mentally disordered when we are better to alter the society that is intolerant towards them rather than attempt to alter the individual.
Some examples of the current attitudes we might do well to consider and question: we should be more tolerant towards homosexuals. we should medicate kids with ADHD and not worry about educating parents in appropriate forms of discipline / reducing teacher student ratios / reducing additives and preservatives in food etc etc. we should medicate people who say they are god but not people who say they eat god during communion rituals... we should tolerate political dissent... we should encourage people to consider whether they might be depressed or anxious... really really hard... such things are really very underreported... we should worry about the mental health 'epidemic' and not about the diagnostics alterations that created it... and so on and so forth...
1. diseases are disorders of the body / brain.
2. the mind is not the body / brain.
C. there is no such thing as mental disease.
premiss one is pure stipulation. who disagrees with him? why, everyone who thinks that there is no conceptual confusion in considering minds (or societies for that matter) to be LITERALLY sick. premiss two is almost uniformly rejected these days (it really is unfortunate that he says this). so... his argument for the 'non-existence' of mental disorder is crap crap crappy.
fortunately, there is a different interpretation of Szasz. on this other interpretation he isn't so interesting because he denies mental disorder exists (even though he says as much at times) rather, he is interesting because he tells us that the nature of mental disorder is radically different from what we had supposed.
In particular: That psychiatry has more in common with other forms of social control such as law than with medicine.
In psychiatry we lock people up against their will before they have done anything wrong on the supposition that they will go on to harm themselves or another. We can't do that in law. But psychiatry takes up where law leaves off. Another form of social control.
We say it is for the good of the individual and / or society. And it may well be. (That is an empirical matter). That doesn't alter the point, however: Psychiatry is a form of social control. We tell ourselves it is more medicine than law so we sleep better at nights but we should consider the values that are in play so that we can discuss and debate them. To ensure that we don't label people as mentally disordered when we are better to alter the society that is intolerant towards them rather than attempt to alter the individual.
Some examples of the current attitudes we might do well to consider and question: we should be more tolerant towards homosexuals. we should medicate kids with ADHD and not worry about educating parents in appropriate forms of discipline / reducing teacher student ratios / reducing additives and preservatives in food etc etc. we should medicate people who say they are god but not people who say they eat god during communion rituals... we should tolerate political dissent... we should encourage people to consider whether they might be depressed or anxious... really really hard... such things are really very underreported... we should worry about the mental health 'epidemic' and not about the diagnostics alterations that created it... and so on and so forth...
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I just threw those out there as examples of how whether something is considered a psychiatric disorder or not has a normative or evaluative component. it isn't something that we simply read off the biological or sociological data. it is a form of social control. as law is. and... something that he doesn't really consider... as medicine is too... we value life over death. that don't seem so bad... but it is evaluative nevertheless.
there was a movement to the effect that people who are deaf aren't disabled or disordered they are differently abled. sounds like a matter of semantics, huh. what hangs on the choice in terminology? well... if we regard them to be disabled or disordered we focus on what it is that they cannot do. we describe them as being deficient or defective from our normative standard. they don't deny they can't hear. but then i can't fly... the notion is that differently abled is neutral - one might be motivated to investigate what they do differently and how they do that and what they might actually be able to do better. our attitude isn't one of pity anymore... that is the thought.
there was a movement to the effect that people who are deaf aren't disabled or disordered they are differently abled. sounds like a matter of semantics, huh. what hangs on the choice in terminology? well... if we regard them to be disabled or disordered we focus on what it is that they cannot do. we describe them as being deficient or defective from our normative standard. they don't deny they can't hear. but then i can't fly... the notion is that differently abled is neutral - one might be motivated to investigate what they do differently and how they do that and what they might actually be able to do better. our attitude isn't one of pity anymore... that is the thought.
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to say a person isn't able to be morally / legally held responsible for their behavior is to treat them as less than a person.
children aren't considered persons before law or society...
and neither (in many cases) are the mentally disordered.
paternalism. 'for their own good', of course...
and pity and charity.
Szasz and others (Colin Ross regarding DID, for instance) think that the insanity defense should be abolished. There are circumstances that result in our sentencing easier, yes. Compassionate grounds and the like. But they think that insanity should not be a defense. To consider it to be a defense is to dehumanize people who are regarded as insane. To treat them as less than persons.
not saying i agree... but i'm glad that there are critics who get us thinking about these issues... so that we face up to the normative issues and try our best not to abuse the authority that society gives us...
children aren't considered persons before law or society...
and neither (in many cases) are the mentally disordered.
paternalism. 'for their own good', of course...
and pity and charity.
Szasz and others (Colin Ross regarding DID, for instance) think that the insanity defense should be abolished. There are circumstances that result in our sentencing easier, yes. Compassionate grounds and the like. But they think that insanity should not be a defense. To consider it to be a defense is to dehumanize people who are regarded as insane. To treat them as less than persons.
not saying i agree... but i'm glad that there are critics who get us thinking about these issues... so that we face up to the normative issues and try our best not to abuse the authority that society gives us...