On track with when we’re all transitioning to Cerner, right?
This job is becoming undoable. The OIG just published a report where, among other things, they fault a social worker (who was, literally, just a few weeks into her job here) for not responding aggressively (in terms of safety planning, consulting with medication provider, and ‘lethal means safety counseling’) because a veteran with whom she did an intake scored in the ‘moderately depressed’ range on the PHQ-9 (completed electronically AFTER the appointment [I told them that doing this was a stupid idea]) and—hold your breath for this one—scored a ‘ONE’ (1) out of 3 on Item 9 (regarding thoughts of being better off dead (not necessarily suicidal) or hurting themselves in some way (extremely vague language in this item)), meaning ‘several days in past two weeks.’
https://lnks.gd/l/eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1N...i5QITVfWZ0bqrE/s/3179501511/br/249878396170-l
Do they realize how high the base rate of endorsement of Item 9 at a level of a ‘1’ (or more) is in the outpatient population? They are basically trying to establish a standard where we are supposed to go into high alert every time a patient even endorses that item at all, which would NOT represent standard of care/practice in the field.
It is so enlightening (and frightening) to read these OIG reports regarding ‘failures of the mental health system.’ They are bending over backwards to play ‘gotcha’ and tag the blame on providers who—in my estimation—were not at fault…at least in terms of departing from standards of care/practice in the field. No experienced provider would look at this situation and conclude that a CSRE was necessary because they endorsed a 1 on item 9 of the PHQ-9. Not to mention the fact that the VA/DoD’s own clinical practice guidelines regarding the assessment/management of suicidality endorses ‘weak for’ (or worse) evidence in favor of all of these things (lethal means safety counseling).
Regarding routinely ‘sending’ (electronically) clinical measures (PHQ-9/PCL-5) to veterans in between appointments (outside the context of a clinical encounter), I have ALWAYS expressed the opinion that this was a HORRIBLE idea to require us to do this (and actually, arguably, beneath standard of care/practice) and that it would come back to bite us in the ass…which it will…witness this OIG report.
These OIG reports appear to take the position that the expected/required level of performance of outpatient mental health providers with regard to preventing ANY suicide is perfection (not actual standard of care). The VA organization, by continuing to slather layer upon layer of policy/procedure/requirements on top of providers is just creating a monstrous system of expectations that is undoable and creating a system with more and more POINTS OF FAILURE opening themselves up to OIG criticism for failure to fully follow their own policies/procedures/mandates.
They also mis-quote the actual text (in a very misleading way) of PHQ-9 Item 9 to make the signficance of the endorsement appear more than it is.
Relevant excerpt from the full report below:
Inadequate Suicide Risk Assessment and Lethal Means Safety Counseling During the PTSD evaluation on day 98, the patient reported “passive suicidal thoughts without any plan or intent approximately 2 to 3 weeks ago” and denied current suicidal ideation. The patient denied a history of suicide attempt, reported access to a firearm, and that the “firearm and ammo are stored in two separate locations.” The patient completed PTSD and depression rating scales that the social worker sent the patient through text and electronic mail. Approximately two hours after the PTSD evaluation, the social worker received the patient’s depression rating scale results.35 The depression rating scale indicated “moderately severe symptoms,” which included the patient had thoughts of being “better off dead” and self-harm several days during the prior two weeks. In an interview with the OIG, the social worker acknowledged not following up with the patient in response to the patient’s depression rating scale results. The social worker described not being concerned about the patient’s suicide risk based on a discussion with the patient regarding protective factors, including “future plans and goals and [the patient’s] support systems.” The social worker also reported the impression that the patient’s suicide risk was “minimal” based on the patient’s report of no prior suicide attempts or plan and because the extent of the patient’s suicidal ideation was “vague death wishes.” The social worker reported not considering completing a comprehensive suicide risk evaluation, which would have evaluated and 32 VA Suicide Risk Identification Strategy, “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ),” updated January 5, 2023, and April 4, 2024; Deputy Under Secretary for Health for Operations and Management, “Suicide Risk Screening and Assessment Requirements,” memorandum to the Veterans Integrated Service Network (VISN) Directors, VISN Chief Medical Officers, VISN Mental Health Leads, May 23, 2018. 33 VA Suicide Risk Identification Strategy, “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)”; Deputy Under Secretary for Health for Operations and Management, “Suicide Risk Screening and Assessment Requirements,” memorandum. 34 “Safety Plan Reminder Dialogue Template: Instruction Guide,” VHA Office of Mental Health and Suicide Prevention, accessed February 7, 2024, dvagov.sharepoint.com/sites/VACOMentalHealth/Safety Planning SBR/Forms/AllItems.aspx?id=%2Fsites%2FVACOMentalHealth%2FSafety Planning SBR%2FSafety Planning%2FClinician Instructions and Quick Guides%2FSafety Plan Note Template User Guide%2Epdf&parent=%2Fsites%2FVACOMentalHealth%2FSafety Planning SBR%2FSafety Planning%2FClinician Instructions and Quick Guides. (This site is not publicly accessible.) 35 The social worker reported typically sending mental health rating scales to patients through text and electronic mail within the two days prior to a scheduled appointment. The social worker did not recall when the depression and PTSD rating scales were sent to the patient. VA OIG 23-02393-250 | Page 13 | September 26, 2024 Mismanaged Mental Health Care for a Patient Who Died by Suicide and Review of Administrative Actions at the VA Tuscaloosa Healthcare System in Alabama documented the patient’s risk and protective factors and suicide risk level, based on the assumption that the patient would have had a negative C-SSRS result.36 The social worker told the OIG about not considering completing a safety plan or conducting further lethal means safety counseling with the patient due to a lack of knowledge about VHA safety plans and options, such as gunlocks, at the time.37 However, the OIG found that approximately one month prior to the patient’s PTSD evaluation, the social worker completed required suicide prevention and lethal means safety trainings, which reviewed safety planning and recommended discussion of firearm removal from a patient’s home and safe storage.38 In an interview with the OIG, the supervisory social worker reported being responsible for PTSD clinic operations at the facility and described an expectation for a social worker to discuss lethal means safety counseling for patients with access to a firearm, including giving the firearm to someone and offering a gun lock. The supervisory social worker reported providing the social worker with additional safety planning training after the patient’s death. Given the patient’s report of depression symptoms and firearm possession and responses on the depression rating scale indicating thoughts of death and self-harm, the OIG would have expected the social worker to pursue further evaluation, seek supervision, or consult with the patient’s prescriber, as later discussed. The OIG would have also expected the social worker to discuss additional lethal means safety measures with the patient to enhance firearms safety. The social worker’s failure to thoroughly evaluate the patient’s suicide risk and conduct adequate lethal means safety counseling may have contributed to the social worker’s underestimation of the patient’s suicide risk and the patient’s immediate access to the means to engage in suicidal behavior. Further, the social worker did not document the patient’s risk and protective factors and suicide risk level. Failure to document a patient’s risk and protective factors and suicide risk level in the EHR may result in lack of communication of important clinical information to other providers involved in the patient’s care.