Avoid Military Medicine, part II

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USAFdoc

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Lastest journal of The UNIFORMED FAMILY PHYSICIAN:Winter 2008

Basically more,"times are tough", glass halffull "things will get better" etc.

I 100% agree with "looking on the bright side,but dont be surprised if after 6 months at your new USAF billet you will also be looking for the door.:idea:


http://www.usafp.org/Word_PDF_Files/2007-Fall-Newsletter.pdf

highlights include:
From the USAF Rep:
1)Retention continues to be an issue.
We are trying to address the calls for
improved scope of practice through our
clinical practice optimization (CPO)
training but realize that has not gotten
to many bases to date. Best practices
certainly can, and need to be shared
by all. An excellent example of this
is the new procedure clinic that was
started by Col Dale Agner at Maxwell
AFB. Concerns regarding high ops
tempo will hopefully be addressed by
the CDM and CBD mentioned above.
Financially, it has never been better for
FPs with the advent of the $33,000 four
year MISP. The Force Development
division continues to look at other avenues
to address reimbursement within
the confines of the DoD budget.
Besides retaining folks, we are also
struggling with "growing" enough AF
FPs to fill the already vacant slots. As
such, I would like to expand the recruiting
network that Dr. Haynes began
developing and mentioned in his
last article. Many of you have already
volunteered and I will soon be asking
interested folks to be available to speak
with interested med students and residents,
as well as potential civilian accessions,
regarding the opportunities in AF
medicine. While the unique aspects of
military medicine are often deterrents
for some, I am equally convinced that
they may attract certain folks as well
and would like to take, in conjunction
with the Force Development folks, a
more aggressive approach to recruiting
potential AF physicians. Please contact
me, if you have not already, if you are
interested in being a part of this team.
In closing, the current state of AF
medicine is the classic example of optimism
vs. pessimism.
When I look into
the field, I see a glass half full and on
the rise. While we are challenged, I am
supremely confident that we have the
people in place and processes in motion
that will not only allow us to survive,
but thrive in the years to come. I am
honored to represent such a phenomenal
group of physicians and look forward
to serving you over the next three
years. Please contact me for any assistance.
 
Article below talking about the pitfalls of poor physician retention (in general, not just milmed focussed). In this humble FP docs opinion, this is about as big a problem as there is in Milmed Primary Care (maybe as big as extreme understaffing).

The lack of continuity, continual replacement with novice staffing, lost productivity with having to reteach the milmed specific aspects of a clinic (AHLTA, C4 schools, etc) and more.

And realize that Milmeds answer to this problem appears to be getting civilian docs to replace the milmed docs. This at first looks like it is better than nothing, untill you realize that these civilian docs have worse retention than the milmed docs, and thus "poor gasoline" on an already "burning-down" clinic.


http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cach...+problems+physician&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=11&gl=us

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Abstract

It is not just the patients who are sick; so is our healthcare system. Turnover andloss of clinicians is both a manifestation and an etiology of illness. Trends in physicianturnover are examined and juxtaposed with the goal of encouraging clinician retention. Analysis indicates that turnover, by impairing both individual and organizationallearning, is especially detrimental to patient care. A prescription and a treatment plan forturnover are proposed to assist medical care organizations and planners to retainclinicians and thereby improve health care delivery.IntroductionA sad reality of modern medicine is that turnover of physicians and other careproviders is barely noticed. The marginal value of any single individual is consideredminimal. Few medical institutions bother with exit interviews. Care delivery systemssimply accept the loss with a long-suffering sigh as an immutable fact of modern life.But, is it?We challenge the conventional wisdom that physician turnover is inevitable andargue that maximizing physician retention is critically important both to deliver highquality care and to achieve institutional fiscal goals. This paper examines physicianturnover and its consequences, stresses the value of retention, and proposes strategies toenable medical care organizations to retain their clinicians and thereby to improveoutcomes.
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Trends in Clinician TurnoverTurnover and retention problems involving medical practitioners and other careproviders have increased substantially in recent years. [1-3] Turnover—the loss of anemployee, voluntarily or involuntarily, through termination—is calculated as the totalnumber of terminations per unit of time divided by the average number of employees forthat unit of time.Turnover has important negative consequences in the face of adequate staffing:reduced productivity, increased costs and impaired morale. When turnover occurs inunder-staffed circumstances, as is true of most medical institutions, the ability to providecore services may be compromised. In 2001, Congressional Representative NancyJohnson [1] projected a future shortfall of approximately 600,000 registered and licensedpractical nurses. At skilled and assisted living facilities, annual turnover among nursesranges from 29 to 49 percent. [2] Forty percent of physicians over the age of 50 years areplanning early retirement. [3] Ominously, the number of applications to US medicalschools is falling [4] raising the specter of insufficient or inadequate replacementphysicians. No particular US hospital type or size is immune to these trends, [5] andshortage of care providers is a problem not restricted to the USA. The British HeartJournal published a spate of letters related to the departure of young physicians frompractice. They reported an alarming trend where 20% of recent medical graduatesworking in the NHS “regretted becoming a doctor and one-third said they would leavemedicine if possible.” [6]More physicians are leaving, they are doing so earlier, there may be insufficientreplacements, and this turnover-shortage problem is not limited to physicians. Though considerable inferential data exists regarding how and why these decisions are made [7-12], a reliable predictive model of turnover behavior eludes health services researchers.There seems little doubt that shortages at all levels negatively impact quality of care. [13,14]In medical care settings, causal factors for turnover have been studied in physicians[3, 6, 15], nurses [16], allied health personnel [17-19], and hospital chief executiveofficers. [20] Job satisfaction, burnout and excessive work are highly associated withturnover [21-23]; however, turnover behavior is too complex and confusing to beassessed by simple bi-variate analysis. [24] Most researchers agree that compensation isonly a minor determinant of job satisfaction compared to work content, autonomy,environment, and training. [11, 25-26]People remain in jobs for reasons that are not the opposite of why others leave. [9,27-28] Therefore, studying the causes of turnover in order to improve retention may havelimited utility. People often stay on a job due to inertia and the balance of positive andnegative aspects of their internal and external work environments. Health care executivesand managers turnover much less frequently than clinicians probably because managershave more organizational influence, i.e., over policies, processes, structure and systems.They may erroneously commit a fundamental attribution error [29] by assuming thatothers in the organization remain as a result of sharing their vision, values andappreciation for the work climate.In coping with voluntary departures by co-workers, staff who remain often use“egocentric, ego-defensive and attributive” mechanisms [30] to conclude that thosedeparting are different, dissatisfied for unknown reasons, and are better off gone. Some
remaining staff may also cope through withdrawal behavior – they give up emotionally,but remain physically on the job doing the minimum to avoid involuntary termination.They eschew innovation or risk-taking and cannot improve because they do not learn. AsFlowers and Hughes wrote [9], “We have too many people in our organization who areno longer with us.”Retention versus TurnoverRetention—a metric of continued employment—is not the simple inverse ofturnover. [31] Turnover considers a single unit of time whereas retention is ongoing, acontinuous measure. Turnover is a snapshot (giving a single picture) and retention is areal time movie, providing constantly updated images. Retention tracks each person as aunique entity while turnover views groups of people as interchangeable statistics.Retention not only indicates who is leaving and who is staying, but more importantly, itsignifies how long each person stays with an organization. Retention measures what wewant while turnover tracks what we do not want. In sum, retention is a different andvastly superior measure of employee behavior.Mortality can be viewed as a medical analogue of turnover. At steady state, life-versus-death and retention-versus-termination are numerical inverses: together they equal100 percent. Mortality and turnover measure the very thing we do not want – the loss of apatient or an employee. Death and turnover are cheaper than life and retention in theshort term, because it is more expensive to provide on-going care (i.e., compared topatients whose death renders care unnecessary) and senior employees who remaintypically command higher salaries (i.e., compared to departing staff who have not attained the upper echelons of the salary continuum). There are, however, important andinstructive flaws in this analogy.Death and termination have no intermediate gradations, but life and retention do. Asa result, death versus life and turnover versus retention, are not completely dichotomous.A person can live as a paraplegic or without sight just as a physician or nurse can remainemployed by an organization as a “turn-off” [9]. If fiscal impacts are considered over thelong term, death and turnover become more expensive than life or retention. Turnoveroffers a poor fiscal return because physicians and nurses who remain in practice with thesame organization tend to learn, to make fewer errors, and to grow in both efficiency andeffectiveness.Adverse Consequences of TurnoverTurnover is detrimental to organizations because it reduces their ability to add valueto system outputs. Higher costs, lower morale, and organizational disruption lead todiminished efficiency and, in healthcare, to adverse clinical outcomes. Turnover isespecially deleterious in activities, such as medicine, with a high degree of ambiguity anduncertainty. Judgment, adaptability and learning—critical to achieving optimaloutcomes—are impeded by turnover.Financial costs associated with turnover have been estimated in many industries. Inhealthcare, turnover costs have primarily been studied among nurses. [32-36] A recentstudy has calculated the cost of turnover for all types of employees in a single health careorganization. [37] The findings are alarming: employee turnover consumed roughly 5percent of a medical center’s total annual operating budget. This loss, representing more than double the hospital’s profit margin, is hidden: it does not appear on any budgetstatement.In addition to quantifiable costs of turnover, numerous important non-quantifiablecost elements exist. Defensive management—the analog to defensivemedicine—represents time invested by managers that adds no value to institutionalobjectives. Loss of productivity is much worse with involuntary termination. Supervisorsinvest large amounts of time developing the case for termination to avoid personal blameand guard against litigation. Opportunity cost—opportunities foregone due to focusing ondefensive management—is another real, but difficult to quantify dimension of turnover.Though turnover increases costs to the public through higher insurance premiums, acost of greater consequence is in quality and continuity of care. If clinicians–physicians,nurses, technicians or allied health personnel–are constantly leaving a service, churningas it were, it is very difficult to establish cohesive processes that result in self-correctingmechanisms (learning), fewer errors, reduced adverse impacts and optimal quality.The Benefits of RetentionLong-term retention of personnel is critical both to quality care and toorganizational success. Figure 1 displays the downward spiral of outcomes resulting fromlow retention of physicians. When clinicians withdraw, costs escalate as the organizationinvests resources in recruiting, hiring and training new medical staff. New staff is lessproductive than those they replaced, less efficient than they themselves will be, and moreprone to errors. Diminished productivity, coupled with higher operating costs ultimatelylead to budget reductions. In turn, budget decreases lead to terminations and a continuingdownward spiral in outcomes.
In service delivery even more than manufacturing, error rates increase as retentiondecreases. Care delivery teams cannot capitalize on mutual learning experiences theypreviously enjoyed with stable staffing. Consequently, learning recommences at thebaseline level after each physician departs and is finally replaced. With a low retentionrates, it is difficult to achieve learning synergies that are otherwise possible with teams ofprofessionals who understand the practice predilections of colleagues and trust eachother.As clinical staff leave, the error rate rises because gaps in service materialize frominsufficient staffing (i.e., unfilled positions) and when new staff are eventually recruited,they need to acquire the relevant learning curves of local service delivery. No matter howprofessionally proficient physicians are, they ultimately rely on a diverse set of clinicalsupport staff to deliver excellent medicine. Medicine is a team sport. All it takes is oneweak link in the chain to jeopardize service quality and efficiency.As error rates increase, the organization reacts to prevent or minimize adverseoutcomes. Risk avoidance strategies lead clinical rigidity and to greater restrictions onservice delivery. Delegation that formerly was possible because team membersunderstood and trusted each other becomes impossible. In short, employee empowermentdiminishes as efforts are initiated to reduce risk to the organization. Less empowermentlowers morale and increases job tension. When coupled with budget reductions fromincreased costs and subsequent staffing terminations, morale plummets. Declining retention rates are also accompanied by numerous negative consequenceson the input side as shown in Figure 1. Medical care organizations with a reputation forpoor morale are less competitive in the job market place. This reduces the potentialemployee pool as more capable individuals choose employment elsewhere. In the end,the medical care organization must loosen its hiring standards leading to less selectiverecruitment. Hiring less capable staff then contributes to lower efficiency andeffectiveness resulting in higher termination rates, lower retention rates and more adverseimpacts. A notable aspect of Figure 1 is the descending spiral for outcomes. Once thisspiral begins, it is difficult to return to the point of origin and virtually impossible to raisethe bar. Any financial gains are short-lived and disappear with the next round ofterminations.In sum, low retention increases costs, job tension and service errors while loweringself-actualization, learning and morale. The end result is more mistakes and adverseimpacts, reduced quality of care, and higher operating costs.Retention of clinicians can improve outcomes by both removing the negative andaugmenting the positive. While eliminating errors is a good goal and a current focus ofmedical quality activities, error-free health care does not equal good health. Clinicianswant both the removal of unwanted outcomes and the expansion of desired outcomes; wewant to get better, not just stop being bad.A Radical Prescription and Treatment PlanWe recognize the challenge in changing anything, much less a system as complexand dispersed as healthcare. The recommendations below focus on what institutions cando without waiting for action from Washington. The first prescription is to stop the folly of ignoring or accepting clinician turnover, which compromises patient care and costsmoney. The volume of resources currently being wasted by turnover can be diverted toincreasing retention with its attendant productive consequences.Medical care organizations should be pro-active to increase physician retentioninstead of merely trying to stem physician loss. Rather than addressing reasons whymanagers think physicians leave, attention should focus squarely on the reasonsphysicians and other care givers express for leaving, for example through exit interviews.Medical care organizations need to change those policies and procedures that negativelyimpact clinician satisfaction. This will challenge managers’ thinking about who and whatis important to organizational objectives as well as rethinking the definition of success.Medical care organizations and their managers should make the cultural shift torecognize and support their internal customers. Medical organizations justifiably givesignificant attention to patients and third-party payors. Unfortunately, much less attentionis usually given to staff. Most physicians, nurses and other members of the care deliveryteam feel like fungible commodities: interchangeable, expendable and not valued(forthcoming data).We need to help doctors and nurses BE doctors and nurses. Reduce the non-medicalwork burden that consistently overshadows actual provision of services. Match caregiverauthority with caregiver responsibility at all levels and practice participatory governance.Develop the resource base that the clinicians say they need to deliver optimal health care.(Managers: don’t tell the doctors what they need. They are your customers.) Reconcilethe organization structure with the actual value chain. If medical care organizationscommitted a fraction of the attention currently given to patients and insurers as an investment in their own care delivery team members, the return would be impressive.Sears and Southwest Airlines proved this. [38, 39] At present, organizational loyalty is ata nadir. Dr. V.J. Simone [40], former Chief of the Huntsman Cancer Institute,immortalized this idea by stating, “[Academic medical] institutions don’t love you back.”Create redundancy. Overwork and stress are two primary causal factors cliniciansexpress for the high error rate and for leaving practice. Medicine could learn from themilitary in this case. Both share the problem of dealing with the unknown and theunexpected. One of the coping mechanisms used by the armed forces is redundancy:Have duplicates, spares, and more resources than you think you need, because that extra,that excess, will get you through the surprises ahead. From an efficiency standpoint,redundancy increases expenses in the short term. However, if redundancy reducesoverwork, stress and burnout thereby increasing retention, reducing errors, augmentingmorale and improving care, the better long–run outcomes will more than justify thehigher short-run expenses.Building a learning culture will improve clinician retention. Improvement inmedical outcomes such as lower error rates, better health status, and optimal resourceusage are dependent on both individual and organizational learning, which requires timeon the job. Retention is necessary to facilitate learning and thereby make progress indelivering high quality care at lower cost (these are not mutually exclusive).Medical care organizations need to create alignment between their overtly espousedoutcomes and their incentive structure. One reason for job dissatisfaction and turnover isthe current system of confusing and contradictory incentives. Provider organizations andpayors want to serve more patients and collect more premiums while simultaneously they want to provide fewer services in order to keep as much as possible of the revenue.Clinicians want to provide best care, without considering resource constraints. Thoughoften couched in personal adversarial terms, this dichotomy is not good guy versus badguy, but a design flaw in our system: the way to make money is by discouraging,constraining, or restricting the delivery of health care services. While institutions can andshould make internal adjustments, this problem can only be solved at the federal level. Finally, senior, experienced physicians need to re-think their roles as healers solely to the individual patient. They need to apply the same problem solving, evidence-based passion to sickness in the healthcare system as they do to a patient with heart disease ordiabetes.There is no silver bullet, no magic potion that will suddenly heal the physicianturnover crisis. The problem is complex and not amenable to simple solutions. Nonetheless, the treatment plan prescribed above can assist medical organizations andplanners who are willing to initiate change strategies that improve retention. Theresulting cost-benefit ratio is strongly positive: long-run effects of the proposed treatmentplan far outweigh the trauma of change and the short-term financial costs
 
And realize that Milmeds answer to this problem appears to be getting civilian docs to replace the milmed docs. This at first looks like it is better than nothing, untill you realize that these civilian docs have worse retention than the milmed docs, and thus "poor gasoline" on an already "burning-down" clinic.

What I have seen and what has been posted is that good docs are leaving active duty and staying on as GS employees or contractors earning more and working less. The deployment cycle and workload for the remaining uniformed providers is escalating causing more force attrition.
 
What I have seen and what has been posted is that good docs are leaving active duty and staying on as GS employees or contractors earning more and working less. The deployment cycle and workload for the remaining uniformed providers is escalating causing more force attrition.

That was my experience,and that of other docs around CONUS as well, except I did not see any go GS.

As mentioned in the thread earlier, I did see 100% of civilian DOCS and NURSES quit/resign at my last base

And yes, with fewer and fewer Milmed FPs around, ALL the milmed collaterral duties with find their way into the only remaining milmed docs.

The system is just plain designed to fail.....everyone.👎
 
I enlisted in the Navy in 1994 as a Hospital Corpsman. After boot camp I attended a 3 month long Corpsman training in Great Lakes. IL. I graduated at the top of my class and elected to attend one year of Advance Laboratory School in San Antonio, TX. My first actual duty location was Navy Medical Center, San Diego. I spent the first 6 months working as a phlebotomist and then spent my final 1.5 years there working in Clinical Microbiology Department (my favorite job to date). I was then transferred to Naval Hospital, Lemoore were I finished my 5 year obligation working as both a Laboratory Technician and a Hospital Corpsman. I was discharged in July 1999, where I told myself I would never again volunteer myself.
However, after spending 5 years on active duty and then separating from the military lifestyle, I was like many people, who after discharge, found themselves missing many aspects of the military. Approximately a year after separation, I was raising my right hand for the Air National Guard. Furthermore, after a year in the Guard, my wife had graduated from college and was working as a social worker. We had bought a home, and to make very long story short, circumstances led me to for go my dream of becoming a physician and I switch to the Civil Engineering Program at California State University, Fresno. Again, I came face to face with a Navy recruiter. This time it was for a Civil Engineer Corps Scholarship, which placed me on active duty. My only job was to attend school, and the pay back was only four years….what a deal!

I am currently a Lieutenant, finishing up the last three months of that commitment and will resign my commission in May 2008. I will then take a couple of months off before heading to VCOM in July.

Now that I have given some of my history I would like to share my opinions about the Navy to those who are trying to determine whether or not Navy HPSP is for them. I believe there is more aspects of the Navy, or any other branch of service, that must be taken into consider before taking the oath.
The first thing I think must be addressed is, you will be in the military and you loose some control over your life. You will be an doctor and a military officer, but that doesn’t mean you are exempt from military rules or customs. In a post I recently read, a person was upset that in the military they were considered and officer first and then a doctor. The person whom posted strongly disagreed with this quote because he/she thought the 7 years of training received as a doctor far out weighed the 6 weeks of OIS. I could see the logic, but this is the military and they really believe in their slogans and they don’t really care what you think about it. I see this everyday as a Civil Engineer Corps Officer. We are required to stand Command Duty Officer (CDO), which is a 24 hour watch where you are in charge of the base while the Commanding Officer (CO) is away sleeping. This watch (I could debate whether it is truly needed) severely impacts our abilities to manage our construction contracts efficiently. We address this issue often, and are told our Navy duties come before our actually engineering duties. We also have Wardroom events (which we call mandatory fun) and Physical Training, which also impact our daily jobs, but again it doesn’t matter. I could go on and on with examples, but I am already getting wordy.

I would not change a thing about my past 12 years in the Navy. The Navy, from day one (boot camp) and still today continues to provide the tools necessary to grow as a person, both professionally and personally. The Navy has taught me most of the things I know about medicine and engineering, but most of all it has taught me how to be a leader. At the age of 19, I had responsibilities that I never dreamed of. Every week in the microbiology department I was placed in charge of a microbiology bench (respiratory, urinalysis, ext). Here I was responsible for not only every report generated at the bench, but responsible for teaching new laboratory students all about clinical microbiology. It does not stop there. After graduating from college and OCS, I was immediately place in charge of 20 personnel and a $30 million Base Operating Support Contract. Then after only 2 years of experience I was placed in charge of a four man team and over $110 million dollars in construction contracts. As I finish up my time and reflect on the leadership experiences which have been presented to me, I realize that no where in the civilian sector would I have been given this amount of responsibility so quickly. The Navy does not dink around with you. They do not only give you immediate responsibility, they have a steep learning curve for almost any job, and you are expected to adapt to the curve, learn quickly and perform immediately.

The most enjoyable aspect of military life is not the job or places you live, it is the comradeship that you encounter. In my opinion, there is no other profession in which you can encounter such camaraderie the instant you check into a command and begin working. I met my best friend in 1997 when I was transferred to Lemoore, he now lives in Indiana and I am in Bremerton, WA. We don’t get to see each other as offend as we would like, but our families are very close and we talk to each other several times a month. I have continued to make great friend every where I go and now I have friends all over the United States…what a great feeling!
With all this said, am I signing up for HPSP and staying in the Navy? NO. The reason are simple for me. I am not making this decision based on the direction of Navy Medicine or the amount of money I will make. In fact, if I was concerned about money the smart thing for me to do is stay in the Navy. If I were to do a military residency, I will be making O-3E pay with 12 years of active duty with 18 years for pay purposes. That is approximately $100K and possibly more depending on duty location and BAH. In fact, I even get criticism for not completing my 20 years of service. However, with a wife and two kids I am unable to make another 13 year commitment to the Navy , plus with the added possibility of 6-15 month deployments. Yes, 13 years, not 4, and yes, 15 month deployments. Here is where some of my best advice comes in. When making the decision whether or not to join the military you may want to do all your research and determine all of the worst case scenario‘s and then count on those being part of your duties. If you do not take this advice, you will be like many others who have signed on the dotted line, and only listened to what they wanted to here from the recruiter, and now complain of how they got screwed by their recruiter. I have taken my own advice and applied it in order to make this very difficult decision.
In my worst case scenario I calculated a 13 year commitment; 4 years medical school, 1 year internship (doesn’t count for pay back) 2 years GMO tour, 2 -3 years residency (at least) and 3-4 year pay back. Also, you have to, no matter if there is a war going on or not, be ready to deploy for as long as the government asks. When I signed up for the Civil Engineer Corps, I was told that a one time 6 month deployment to the Seabees would be it. However, we soon learned that there was this little hidden thing called Individual Augmentations (IA) which had many Civil Engineer Corps officers heading to Iraq or Afghanistan. At first it was 6 months volunteer deployments, but soon became anywhere from 6-15 month non-volunteer deployments. Timing prevented me from going, but most of my colleagues have spent at least a year in Iraq or Afghanistan. There is one thing that is certain in the military, they have control and they can pretty much make you do anything they want. I have been willing in the past to serve the Navy and their needs, but now that I have the opportunity to make that choice once more, my family and I have decided that moving every 2-3 years, pulling my children out of school, along with possible deployments, no longer fits our lifestyle. If you have researched the military and the sacrifices you will be making, then I think HPSP is right for you.

The last thing I would like to address, which I see all over these post, is that I agree 110% with the people who say, “DO NOT DO IT FOR THE MONEY”. I have seen this first hand with a current colleague of mine. He literally joined the Civil Engineer Corps Scholarship program so he could have more money while in college. He never thought about the sacrifices and what the job actually entailed. He had no clue of what he was getting into, he just saw $$$. Now he is miserable. Everyday he is severely depressed and complains about his job and the military more than he actually performs. He not only makes himself miserable, but he brings down moral for the entire command. So be CAREFULL don’t fall into this trap….I almost did this time!

Overall, I believe the military and Navy are a great thing. We are serving our country, and because of our service and our armed forces of the past and present, the citizens of the United States enjoys the freedoms of today. I have also seen the extraordinary things our military forces are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the majority of people in those two countries are grateful for our presence. I will miss being on active duty, but I am not leaving the military completely. I will be attending medical school op the Army National Guard STRAP program. The Guard scholarship allows my family and I to settle down and establish some stability, while also allowing me to continue to serve my country and build on my 12 years of service.
I hope this has provide insight for a least one person and if any one has any questions, please send me a message.
 
Thank you for your very insightful and well written advice. You can see by the posts that what seems like a majority of questions come with very little understanding of what the military is really like when it comes to medicine, and surprisingly some of the most fervent posters are medical students who really have no experience with active duty.

Certainly had alot of us had this forum we would have made very different decisions. With a looming deficit in recruitment, and an abominal retainment rate, all the bad things that would not be conducive to a good medical career, are more likely to come true.

Thanks for your service
 
I enlisted in the Navy ............However, after spending 5 years on active duty and then separating from the military lifestyle, I was like many people, who after discharge, found themselves missing many aspects of the military.

me too


In a post I recently read, a person was upset that in the military they were considered and officer first and then a doctor.



This can be a hassel for some (going to a mil meeting that is pretty useless when there is an overflow of pts needing appts etc...but not a major reason family docs are exiting asap


The most enjoyable aspect of military life is not the job or places you live, it is the comradeship that you encounter.

I agree, although part of it is that comradeship flourishes when you share a miserable experience together

With all this said, am I signing up for HPSP and staying in the Navy? NO. The reason are simple for me.

It was simple for me too,although I still miss alot about my FP USAF dreamjob,er..ex-dream

The last thing I would like to address, which I see all over these post, is that I agree 110% with the people who say, "DO NOT DO IT FOR THE MONEY".

while you brought up alot of good points,the kicker for me was the poor patient care and safeguards. I wasnt going to "put my name" on a clinic and a standard of care that was "crap". Its one thing to bust ones *** for a class organization with at least a chance for outstanding results....that is NOT todays USAF Primary Care!
 
Had an interesting convo with the local grand pooba of the Shriner's.

He told me they approached the army when the war started and offered to open up their hospitals... at no charge... to the wounded soldiers, and their families.

Army turned them down. Said they couldn't do it due to no way to bill or transfer costs.

I say bull$hit. They were afraid the Shriners would make them look like the idiots they are in Army Medcom... They could have done as good or better a job and probably 1/2 the cost.

Instead, we got this mess. The malignant narcissists that run this mess are more dangerous than Lung Cancer.
 
Air Force = glioblastoma multiforme. Similar survival rate and everything.
 
The civilian hospitals lack the sugical experience and expertise to effectively manage war trauma. Good for the Army for keeping our guys where they belong, and not farming them out for ineffective care just to save a dime.

Why did you think this would be a good idea?

Actually in the air force, the vast majority of surgeons are not current in trauma, and I have a feeling much is the same in the majority of army hospitals other than major med centers like BAMC, ?WR?

I've posted this before many times, but the joke of training that AF surgeons go through, is a 30 day stint as a PGY2 at Shock Trauma where 90% of trauma is blunt, NOT penetrating. Its done every 2 years, and its supposed to act as a refresher course for those most furthest from their training. Usually however, its the first bodies available that get sent, and not the O-5's and O-6's who are the one's that should be going. Its a joke of a program, and a slap on the face of intelligence to think that allowing a surgeon who has not done trauma for years, will suddenly be able to handle penetrating trauma by doing a 1 month rotation as a resident. Then again we are talking about the military. I know the army and navy have similar programs, but I am not sure if they are treated as as resident, or acutally as attendings.

As far as the Shriner's are concerned, while they may not have surgeons who are current in trauma, they certainly have orthopods who have current experience in reconstructive orthopoedic surgery. Likely alot more than the average orthopod in a crappy tiny army hospital that is not a major med center.
 
The civilian hospitals lack the sugical experience and expertise to effectively manage war trauma. Good for the Army for keeping our guys where they belong, and not farming them out for ineffective care just to save a dime.

Why did you think this would be a good idea?

I dunno, something about 15,000 broke dicks on medical hold when this CF started, clogging the system, delaying care for the actual wounded.

There is supposedly a plan to farm out mass cal military pts returned to CONUS in the event of a large scale conflict anyway. I didn't just think of this myself after a couple of cocktails with a guy wearing a Fez.
 
I've seen war trauma.

A crack ***** in Baltimore, shot 6 times, then set on fire looked close enough to me to resemble an IED.
 
I've seen war trauma.

A crack ***** in Baltimore, shot 6 times, then set on fire looked close enough to me to resemble an IED.


As a pgy2 the closest you'd get to her would be to write the H&P, and change her dressings as you PREROUND for the "team".
 
I dunno, something about 15,000 broke dicks on medical hold when this CF started, clogging the system, delaying care for the actual wounded.

There is supposedly a plan to farm out mass cal military pts returned to CONUS in the event of a large scale conflict anyway. I didn't just think of this myself after a couple of cocktails with a guy wearing a Fez.

Paper dream.

The civilian medical centers would not be prepared to handle anything like a mass influx of war wounded. Many can barely handle what is going on in their own communities as it is.
 
Then actually, you know jack about military trauma.

There are significant differences between the PVT fresh back from Iraq and the gang-banger who got capped in a deal gone back. Infectious issues, surgical timing, psychological/brain injury complications, priorities of care.

If you had any experience caring for these guys, you'd know that Shriners (with only Ortho and Plastics, no Neurosurg, Psych, Infectious Diseases, General Surgery, or TBI) was the last place to put our injured troops.

Go back to spouting off about your "tip of the spear" stuff. You know nothing about this topic.

Why are you telling me this ? Why don't you tell your boss. That's the plan, and been the plan since 1945 in the event of another high level, protracted war.

You're talking about a mature theature. When this freaken mess started, they were ill prepared. They were using drills out of the motor pool to do brain surgery in Iraq.

You experts had your shot planning and executing this mess. Why you'd slam somebody that is at least offering to help amazes me, because none of the remaining civilian population gives **** one.

That's why you're on this thing. That's why you're getting screwed, that's why you'll keep getting screwed... your own ego.

don't know how the folks on 9/11, Oklahoma City ever got by w/o your expert help though, but you're right a truck load of explosives probably doesn't do nearly as much to a body as a motor sgt with chronic low back pain due to DDD. I think outside agencies can handle that kind of ankle biting crap
 
The average orthopod in a crappy tiny army hospital isn't doing the major reconstructive work. That's being done at WRAMC, BAMC, NNMC, and the like.

As far as your comments on trauma training: First of all, the trauma we see in CONUS is not fresh trauma. That's being done in theatre by guys who are better at it than anyone anywhere else in the world. Second, there's a reason war casualties aren't going to AF facilities. That alone ought to tell you that the level of experience in the Army and Navy facilities is quite a bit different than what you see.

You better hope we keep picking fights like this then, because when the war started, they were sending the f/u surgeries to whom ever could take them all over conus. Besides, nobody was suggesting the civilians take the fresh stuff, just the less intense stuff. We contract so much crap to civilian hospitals now, like Korea, Germany... nobody is crying about it.

If your bragging on Army Psych dept, please, they're hacks for the command and everybody has known that for a very long time. They got a P.R. problem for good reason.
 
Then actually, you know jack about military trauma.

Good thing you guys kept your skills up before the war doing boob jobs on every freaken nurse in the hosptial.
 
The average orthopod in a crappy tiny army hospital isn't doing the major reconstructive work. That's being done at WRAMC, BAMC, NNMC, and the like.

As far as your comments on trauma training: First of all, the trauma we see in CONUS is not fresh trauma. That's being done in theatre by guys who are better at it than anyone anywhere else in the world. Second, there's a reason war casualties aren't going to AF facilities. That alone ought to tell you that the level of experience in the Army and Navy facilities is quite a bit different than what you see.

Sorry, but unless you have first hand experience you are talking out of your ***. Most of the army guys in theater are reservists who DO NOT practice trauma on a regular basis. I know of TWO American soldiers that were allowed to DIE because these "army" surgeons did not know what they were doing in a trauma situation. Also, for the last year or more, the entire operation in Balad has been taken over by the USAF from the Army, surely because of the thinning supply of bodies to do the job.

While things may have changed in the last year, and I doubt it, the most experienced trauma surgeons are NOT in the military, and NOT in Iraq.
 
Sorry, but unless you have first hand experience you are talking out of your ***. Most of the army guys in theater are reservists who DO NOT practice trauma on a regular basis. I know of TWO American soldiers that were allowed to DIE because these "army" surgeons did not know what they were doing in a trauma situation.

I haven't been deployed (obviously not since i'm still a resident), but I know that all of the surgeons in my particular field who've gone to Iraq over the past several years have been active duty. Although it's still quite conceivable that active duty guys that were relatively new to their 6 month deployment made some pretty big mistakes. Especially if you consider that they may not have even been given a year after finishing residency.

Also, for the last year or more, the entire operation in Balad has been taken over by the USAF from the Army, surely because of the thinning supply of bodies to do the job.
It has nothing to do with thinning supply of bodies (although we could obviously use more), it's just a standard rotation. The Army has been supplying most surgeons to Iraq for the past several years. Now it's air force's turn, and after that it'll be navy, then back to army.
 
I haven't been deployed (obviously not since i'm still a resident), but I know that all of the surgeons in my particular field who've gone to Iraq over the past several years have been active duty. Although it's still quite conceivable that active duty guys that were relatively new to their 6 month deployment made some pretty big mistakes. Especially if you consider that they may not have even been given a year after finishing residency.


Well, we agree on something. Not only are some of the deploying docs not current in trauma, alot of them are just out of residency!!! I remember speaking on one last year that was totally uncomfortable in the situation he had been placed in.


It has nothing to do with thinning supply of bodies (although we could obviously use more), it's just a standard rotation. The Army has been supplying most surgeons to Iraq for the past several years. Now it's air force's turn, and after that it'll be navy, then back to army.

This has been a while now, (over a year). I don't think the Navy will rotate to Balad. Last I heard, the AF is still there.
 
discussion. I like it. I'll suffer the slings and arrows of the egomaniacs. I'm just interested in the truth.

Seems as if we have several people looking at the same Piccaso here and seeing several different images in the same painting
 
Sure, open the Shriners to guys covered in acinetobacter and infect all the kids. Have the civilian Orthopods practice early fracture fixation and watch the soldiers die of sepsis. Give the head trauma to civilian neurosurgeons who don't know how to do a craniotomy. And yeah, I have seen these patients, because every time an inexperienced reservist surgeon rotates through Landstuhl, we end up cleaning up their messes, or packaging up their dead bodies. The "help" you advocate would kill more people than it would save.

Have you spent even one day in the OR or ICU with these guys? Do you possess the education or experience to make any comments on surgical management of anything? Your point here is a joke, just like most of your posts. You think a little time in the sand makes you an expert on medicine, but once again your ignorance comes shining through.

You're kissing the wrong person's ***. Instead of patting yourself on the back and sucking up to your senior rater, you should be buying these Shriner guys a drink.

They may be totally off the mark, but they're leaders in their respective communites, very, very politically connected, and they've got a GREAT P.R. image and the money rolls in.

Can YOUR outfit say that ?
 
As far as your comments on trauma training: First of all, the trauma we see in CONUS is not fresh trauma. That's being done in theatre by guys who are better at it than anyone anywhere else in the world. Second, there's a reason war casualties aren't going to AF facilities. That alone ought to tell you that the level of experience in the Army and Navy facilities is quite a bit different than what you see.

Sorry, but unless you have first hand experience you are talking out of your ***. Most of the army guys in theater are reservists who DO NOT practice trauma on a regular basis.

Go back to spouting off about your "tip of the spear" stuff. You know nothing about this topic.


As someone who has firsthand experience operating in Iraq, let me say that none of the above generalizations about trauma care really describe the situation. So before you all continue to make yourselves look foolish, let me share with you some more nuanced observations on the state of trauma care in the military.

1. The AF has run the CSH at Balad, one of the two busiest hospitals in Iraq, for the last three years and will continue to do so for the forseeable future. The Army helps out with staffing at Balad and runs the CSH in the "Green Zone" which is the largest and busiest. The Navy runs their own operation out west. There are other smaller hospitals scattered throughout the AOR run by all three services. Surgical competence is indistinguishable across the three services. To state otherwise is just a bunch of junior-level interservice rivalry.

2. No one should be chest-thumping about how talented their trauma surgeons are. The constant turnover for both deployment and people entering/leaving the military assures that most surgeons are on the steep part of the learning curve when it comes to trauma.

3. The military has no monopoly on complicated trauma. I learned most of what I know about complex trauma as an attending at Ben Taub in Houston--not in Iraq, not at WRAMC, and certainly not at any AF hospital. And in reality most in-theater management of blast trauma is remarkably simple--stop bleeding, limit contamination, Ex-fix fractures, debride dead tissue, move to next level of care.

4. Competence of in-theater surgeons is a decidedly mixed bag. Some reservists, some people from small bases, some more experienced guys, some carreerists with zero skills who are just punching a ticket. There is no effort to match the assignment to recent trauma experience. Sugeons are a number and are not differentiated based on trauma experience. For instance, both our ENT and Neurosurgeon in Iraq (Army) were straight out of civilian practices where they had done zero trauma for many years (like...20 years in one case). "best in the world" is probably an exaggeration, although they were certainly fine.

Honestly, I think it's silly to be arguing over who is the best at taking care of trauma. Most well-trained surgeons, civilian or military, can do a decent job most of the time and that's all that the services are interested in.

And as an aside, it's really easy to spot the trauma surgery poseurs. They're the one's hyping how fabulous their deployment experience was and how "rewarding" taking care of trauma is. People who actually saw the bad sh** rarely discuss it.
 
Excellent synopsis, thanks for describing an up to date scenario of trauma care in Iraq.

Do you know if CSTARS has been changed, or is it still a month of torture being a PGY-2 with no restriction on the amount of useless scut to be done, and really a very poor operative experience?
 
The air force ran a CSTARS program at my medical school (St. Louis University) and when we were on the trauma service we worked closely with them. Many reservists from all specialties rotated through, and specialty (more than anything) determind what one did.

All the surgeons who rotated through operated pretty consistently (especially on the night shift). Then they participated in trauma rounds. The FP's and such stayed on the floor with the interns and managed the scut. St. Louis (as one would imagine) sees a good amount of violent trauma and the reservist surgeons consistently stated that it was a good refresher course for trauma (most having not done it since residency).
 
Fine, send the civilians to Iraq. The question is who is best at managing things here (hence the Shriners angle, unless our resident PITA PA was suggesting moving Shriners Houston to Balad). And my point continues to be that, if you think military trauma and civilian trauma are managed the same way, then you are the one talking out your ***.

I guess you missed mitchconnie's post above. I hope you pay more attention during your residency training, cause here you don't seem to get it.
 
How typical of you: Take one conversation, divert it to another as an excuse to bash milmed. Toss in a little lame condescension. Lather, rinse, repeat.

A cheerleader is born and does not even know it. I'm not even sure what your reason for posting is. The theme of this thread is to AVOID MILITARY MEDICINE. WE are presenting reasons why this should be done. What argument are you putting forth to tell people they should not avoid military medicine?? That surgical training is supreme, that you get to do the best trauma, that there are no problems. Its when *****s like you become blind cheerleaders that people really ought to be able to see the many problems that mil med faces, and the nameless idiots that will continue the problem.

When you get deployed or are in an operational situation as the attending in charge, let people know your experience. Belive it or not, (you likely will not), you are still shielded somewhat from the problems as a resident. But soon you will not. Good luck.
 
Galo, please tell us of your first hand deployment experience. As I remember you have none, and as far as I can tell you ETS's before OIF. Am I in error.

MitchConnie - thanks for an excellent post.
 
Galo, please tell us of your first hand deployment experience. As I remember you have none, and as far as I can tell you ETS's before OIF. Am I in error.

MitchConnie - thanks for an excellent post.


I figured you would not be far behind. I have posted my experience before. Myself, none, my partners, two deployed to Afghanistan, one did one case in 6 months, the other two. Iraq, three deployed. One sat by as Army reservists were the primary intake for trauma, and in this case, they were not current, and two americans died. The others went to Balad as the AF took over, and they were busy with just the scenario mitchconnie described, stop bleeding, debrid, transfer. I have no reason to believe my partners lied. Passing on their experience is just what it is. I think the person who's been there the most recent gave an excellent example of what its like now.

What's your experience been? Or is that a secret amongst your others?
 
Fine, send the civilians to Iraq. The question is who is best at managing things here (hence the Shriners angle, unless our resident PITA PA was suggesting moving Shriners Houston to Balad). And my point continues to be that, if you think military trauma and civilian trauma are managed the same way, then you are the one talking out your ***.

That's why I never put too much back sweat into H&Ps for Surgeons. They never read them and obviously you don't read posts either before you run your pie hole, damn you are a surgeon.

I was a surgical PA for many years. Yeah, that doesn't make me a surgeon, but apparently, putting you in a uniform doesn't make you a soldier either.
 
grabbed a few of the last posts of Part I (http://forums.studentdoctor.net/showthread.php?t=203316). feel free to continue here until we once again get to the 1k limit.

--your friendly neighborhood rules enforcing caveman

Didnt realize SDN had limits to thread responses. Anyways, its has been an interesting 3 years since my first thread (when I discovered SDN). Civilian med continues to be alot of work, but thats fine. At least now,I have some control over the quality of care that bears my name and my responsibility.

Below is a copy of that first entry.
Best wishes to all those still in the USAF Primary Care "meat grinder".

AVOID MILITARY MEDICINE if possible

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

below are just a few notes from a thread that bear repeating, and repeating again. For those doubters,just speak to other docs and bases for similar stories. I have been to several military conferences and spoke with docs from 10+ bases and it's all the same,and its bad.

Originally Posted by USAFdoc
the afpc believes they can continue to minimally staff our clinics at a rate just barely enough to keep them open; and unfortunately, they are probably correct,because there will be just enough HPSPers that have no idea on what waits "on the other side" to keep the doors open. The afpc is not about taking care of patients or staff; its about money and metrics. This perversion of medicine continues because the clinic physician has absolutely no power in this system (except to separate at DOS.)

I have been working in various fields for 22 years and in many organizations; the current state of primary care med in the USAF is unquestionably the worst I have ever seen. Avoid at all cost.



This post basically sums up why many of us that are on AD post. We see how broken the military medical system is, and we realize that we had no clue what we were getting into when we were 22 to 24 year-old pre-med students. The problem is that the continual influx of clueless pre-meds who sign up for USUHS/HPSP allows the military to perpetuate the horrible system because physicians are not empowered to make changes or to even to get out and work somewhere else. Probably the only way that the system could possibly change for the better is if there were a significant drop-off in med student applications and therefore forcing the higher-ups to address these critical issues out of necessity.

But that is but a pipe dream for many of us, as we continue to watch inherently naive pre-meds zealously defend their reasoning about why military medicine is so great, in spite of what scores of active duty docs say on this board to the contrary. Meanwhile, military medicine is allowed to limp along in its current sad state, because there still enough poorly informed pre-meds who are willing to sign up. a few of 100's of examples I could give you to describe a broken system:

1) I have the chart available to me at the time of the patient visit only 10-40% of the time.
2) Our clinic should have 31 people (docs + techs) fully manned; this week we mustered 7 each morning, a little lower than normal but not unusual.
3) I have seen 100's of abnormal labs, imaging results etc that were never acted upon, some years old. When brought up with the patient, they had no idea.
4) I have seen men at their retirement physical who went 20 years with untreated hypertensiion, they were seen 20-40 times over their career with blood pressures taken, and never even a mention of being offerred a medicine.
5) Using brand new PAs to function as physicians, with no supervision, seeing Internal Medicine patients.
6) Referral results making it back to the physician no more than 40% of the time (this was quoted at our PCO USAF course) and I beleive it.
7) Overworked (although that is no excuse) admin techs caught throwing away piles of patient notes rather that take the time to file them (I know proof positive of at least 2 bases this has occurred on).
8) The CHCSII and PGUI computer programs that sap physician-patient face-to-face time with no additional appointment time given to account for this.
9) Clinic meeting that have ZERO physician attendance yet that is where all local decisions are made. Complete disregard for our input. Held during clinic appointment times, run 100% by nurses. All clinic commanders but 1 being nurses.
10) Let me know if you need 90 more. Perhaps you are not a pprimary care doc and have not witnessed the above first hand.
 
Regardless of the thread theme, I couldn't let the "Give the injured to Shriners" pass by unchallenged. I have spent every day of the last seven months caring for these guys. There are substantial differences between civilian trauma and military trauma, not in terms of fresh-off-the-battlefield work in theater, but in the longer-term management of weeks to months post-injury. The idea of a bunch of civilian surgeons, even those as talented as Shriners (where I did several rotations as a student), is ridiculous.




I'll be with the Corps by the end of the summer, and likely somewhere in the OIF/OEF theater within a year after that. I'm not above eating my words when I'm wrong, and I will continue to post here.

Of course, if I'm not railing against all things military by then, I'm sure you will be here to establish some new arbitrary bar of experience I have to pass before I'm "allowed" to speak.


OK, so are you now saying military (army) surgeons are good at rehab medicine?? OK, that's not what any of the surgeons I know do or would want to do. Taking care of long term abdominal wounds, fistula's etc, been there, done that, not uncommon in an urban trauma situation. I am not sure how well the idea of "shriner" surgeons would work, only for logistic purposes. But your statement somewhat denigrates them. Like mitchconnie said earlier, (you could not have missed that post), well let me summarize it for you:

surgical competence fairly even across the board some good, some bad

bragging is for poseurs...by end of rotation, all on same curve

complicated trauma, (and aftercare) NOT EXCLUSIVE to Iraq

I am not sure why this shriner thing got your panties in such a wad. Seems there are lots of soldiers waiting long time for aftercare while some other services staff sit and do nothing.

I doubt, (could be wrong) that they'll wait a year to deploy you. But by all means, whatever you get experience with post it. I can only call you on what I know is exagerated or just plain wrong.

I do hope the best for you, and that you are able to care for our soldiers to the best of your ability. I'm sure I'll be on this forum when your military time is up, and will be interested to see what has happened to milmed in the coming years.
 
I don't know where anybody got the idea I meant sending civilians to Iraq. What I was talking about was taking some of the load off in CONUS.

BTW, I agree 100%, the way they're using fresh grad PAs is wrong.. but you know, they like it that way. A 2LT is too scared to speak up or defend the pt. an old green to gold CPT on his last tour before retirement is something they try to avoid.

this whole thing is about compliance, not ability.
 
Tired you'll be happy to know that I managed to succesfully stumble through the Tropical Med course while you were still in medical school.

You new guys really kill me. You always seem to think you invented the army and the rest of us have just been propping up tent poles for the last 25 years.
 
I just don't know how I could be any clearer than I have been:

1) There is fresh-from-the-battlefield trauma that gets done in theatre. This is the controlling bleeding, ex lap with splenectomy, etc. This lasts a couple days at most, usually from what I've seen less than 24hrs. Yes, I understand that this is basic stuff. Fine, I defer to the surgeons who have been there recently on the level of expertise of the surgeons in theatre. My argument has nothing to do with this type of care.

2) There is intermediate treatment at Landstuhl. Ex fix of fractures, washouts of abdominal wounds. This lasts a couple more days. Also relatively simple, except when the surgeons make poor choices (definitive fracture fixation, failure to washout abdominal wounds). My argument has nothing to do with this type of care either.

3) Then there is acute surgical management back in CONUS, which is where the real expertise is required. Management of infections and sepsis, neurosurgical optimization, management of complex extremity wounds, treatment of psychological complications of battle injury. This is what I have been doing all year. It is not simple. It is not the same as managing civilian trauma. It lasts weeks to months. And it is a hell of a lot more than the "rehab" you write it off as. The last five years have taught us a lot about what works and what doesn't specific to battlefield trauma, and most of it isn't published in the literature and isn't well-known in civilian world. This is the crux of my argument.

I'm rapidly realizing that you have never spent any time dealing with this type of care, and you have no idea what I'm talking about. If you had, you would recognize why it is so ridiculous to toss battle injuries out to civilian hospitals, especially those that lack the vital surgical services necessary to manage the myriad of injuries I get see every day.
a couple points. most major (esp urban) trauma centers act the same way. 1st surg: control of bleeding, ex lap, etc
2nd: ex fix, washouts etc
3rd: sepsis, care of complicated wounds etc....

dont know what "special" stuff goes down in the military hosp vs civ, but clinical procedure is the same (ex lap, washout, ex-fix). in regards to know what works and doesn't, why hasn't it beed published, if its effective?

secondly, i would argue that shock trauma in baltimore could handle all this and more....they are considered the tops when its comes to trauma management.

ill be honest, it is possible something is new, b/c alot of the way trauma is handled across the board, came out of WWII, korean war, vietnam war, but i dont like the implication that civ hospitals are totally inept and the military hospital is the only place where pt's with severe trauma get top notch treatment....
 
😴 Pretty much the same post every time . . .

You asked. I answered. You wanted to know my exp. and credentials. What the **** else do you want, my dd 214 ?

You don't get it....

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1713485,00.html

You guys got a problems. you got PR problems, you got talent problems. this case got farmed out to a 3rd tier facility at Knox. Please no more smoke about BAMC, WRAMC. I was doing this too freakin long to buy your company man jive.

BTW, the guy in the article was from my home town. These are real people, they actually exsist, and they're not fodder to pimp your ego or your career.

In response to the other post, I worked across the parking lot from Baltimore Shock Trauma. They can handle it, and besides, I was in a reserve unit that had a lot of the docs from University pulling their time. I was working accross the street handing out methadone as a part time job.

You wanna rap about methadone now ?
 
You asked. I answered. You wanted to know my exp. and credentials. What the **** else do you want, my dd 214 ?

You don't get it....

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1713485,00.html

You guys got a problems. you got PR problems, you got talent problems. this case got farmed out to a 3rd tier facility at Knox. Please no more smoke about BAMC, WRAMC. I was doing this too freakin long to buy your company man jive.

BTW, the guy in the article was from my home town. These are real people, they actually exsist, and they're not fodder to pimp your ego or your career.

In response to the other post, I worked across the parking lot from Baltimore Shock Trauma. They can handle it, and besides, I was in a reserve unit that had a lot of the docs from University pulling their time. I was working accross the street handing out methadone as a part time job.

You wanna rap about methadone now ?

wow that article reminds me of the Wash post's series on walter reed....so many soldiers slip through the cracks....

and if anyone said that these guys are exceptions, the are idiots.....simply put no soldier deserves to be treated like this!
 
by the way if tired makes the claim that only military hosp can handle the trauma of iraqi war, the article has a great pt regarding that even the army has not yet set up facilities dedicated to TBI....

"Now the Army is rushing to catch up, setting up screening tools and treatment plans to deal with TBI and a "center of excellence" dedicated to the challenge."
 
wow that article reminds me of the Wash post's series on walter reed....so many soldiers slip through the cracks....

and if anyone said that these guys are exceptions, the are idiots.....simply put no soldier deserves to be treated like this!

Treated like what? I tried reading that article, but I never got to a point that stated what he died from other than "the army killed him." (nice unbiased piece btw).

Would he have received different headache care from a civilian? There are some HA specialists, but it seems like other than migraines, they usually just treat with narcotics too. TBI's are horrible injuries, but I'm not sure what we should have done differently here (maybe I stopped reading the article too soon). However, I do know from civilian experience that pain management patients are extremely difficult to treat, and that it's not at all uncommon for patients to overdose on prescribed narcotics. Sad stories like this happen in the civilian world too, but if it happens to a soldier it has political implications so it ends up in TIME.
 
Treated like what? I tried reading that article, but I never got to a point that stated what he died from other than "the army killed him." (nice unbiased piece btw).

Would he have received different headache care from a civilian? There are some HA specialists, but it seems like other than migraines, they usually just treat with narcotics too. TBI's are horrible injuries, but I'm not sure what we should have done differently here (maybe I stopped reading the article too soon). However, I do know from civilian experience that pain management patients are extremely difficult to treat, and that it's not at all uncommon for patients to overdose on prescribed narcotics. Sad stories like this happen in the civilian world too, but if it happens to a soldier it has political implications so it ends up in TIME.


someone with ptsd and tbi needs more supervision.

I wasn't using the article to advocate for no military healthcare, but to say that people are slipping thru the cracks and that is unacceptable. it might be biased, but it is still unacceptable. The military knew about tbi injuries for since the IED became the defining device of this war. the article clearly points out that the military put together these wsu to give soldiers a place, however, they are not regularly staffed (and often soldiers dont show up).

if you are trying to argue that it was ok for one or two to slip thru the cracks and that this would happen in the civ world too, i hope you are never my doctor!
 
Interesting site with some good hard to find info on the status of Milmed. Some "lowlights"........almost all USUHS spots DECLINED when offered to prospective USAF applicants.

He also discussed the concerns in the Air Force when 43 of 51 selectees for USUHS next year declined the positions. Interviews of those declining did not reveal any specific pattern but the war was an obvious factor in some of the decisions. Maj Gen George Anderson USAF MC (Ret), AMSUS Executive Director spoke of the role of SMCAF in recruiting efforts. He emphasized the importance of quality of life issues and benefits.

http://www.smcaf.org/Newsletters.htm
 
someone with ptsd and tbi needs more supervision.

Well that describes practically every soldier injured in the war.

I wasn't using the article to advocate for no military healthcare, but to say that people are slipping thru the cracks and that is unacceptable. it might be biased, but it is still unacceptable. The military knew about tbi injuries for since the IED became the defining device of this war. the article clearly points out that the military put together these wsu to give soldiers a place, however, they are not regularly staffed (and often soldiers dont show up).

Yeah, you're right about often soldiers not showing up. BTW, there are people with TBI's and pysch issues in the civlian world. What resources do they have the military personel do not?

And regardless, it seems to me like this soldier simply died from an overdose of pain meds. That's unfortunate, but it's pretty damn common. So to use this as some sort of smoking gun to write up an entire article about is fairly over the top.

if you are trying to argue that it was ok for one or two to slip thru the cracks and that this would happen in the civ world too, i hope you are never my doctor!

I may come across as insensitive here, but that's just b/c experience has taught me that this article "example," is both non-exotic and non-military specific. Sure, lets design a system where nobody ever again OD's on prescribed narcotics? It's easier said than done . . . we can't monitor everybody 24/7!
 
What resources do they have the military personel do not?

And regardless, it seems to me like this soldier simply died from an overdose of pain meds. That's unfortunate, but it's pretty damn common. So to use this as some sort of smoking gun to write up an entire article about is fairly over the top.

I may come across as insensitive here, but that's just b/c experience has taught me that this article "example," is both non-exotic and non-military specific. Sure, lets design a system where nobody ever again OD's on prescribed narcotics? It's easier said than done . . . we can't monitor everybody 24/7!

a couple points: 1) big civ instituions have more resources than the military for healthcare, but I think pts should go where they get the best care (if thats civ, then its civ, if its mil, then mil).

And while he might have died from a simple OD, its unacceptable. TBI and PTSD put a soldier at increased risk of depression and suicide. A MD give that soldier a poss lethal cocktail, and the command openly admits that his WSU was not functioning appropriately. That's a recipe for disaster. Now maybe not article worthy, but if an article makes positive changes then its worth it!
 
Ok, so I've never been to Mayo, but I used to send a lot of pts there. They all loved it. Effecient system, they gotta hotel there they tell me.

I can't see how Knox was going to exceed that, or even meet it.

I don't care if you build a military center for treatment that includes gold plated toilet seats... the same bunch of career *******s will eventually colonize it, homestead it, and run it right into the ground.

Until there is a cultural shift, throwing money at this will be the same as pouring it down a dry well.
 
Well that describes practically every soldier injured in the war.


I may come across as insensitive here, but that's just b/c experience has taught me that this article "example," is both non-exotic and non-military specific. Sure, lets design a system where nobody ever again OD's on prescribed narcotics? It's easier said than done . . . we can't monitor everybody 24/7!


Tell that to group of officers and NCOs at Ft. Hood that are being UCMJed for not hand holding a nerd with a cell phone that died on the landnav course from heat.

We got an army full of Mr. Rodger's Alumni. They were raised by hovering helicopter parents ( at least the ones that know who their daddy actually was) and if something happens to their little prince or princess, there's hell to pay.
 
Ok, so I've never been to Mayo, but I used to send a lot of pts there. They all loved it. Effecient system, they gotta hotel there they tell me.

I can't see how Knox was going to exceed that, or even meet it.

I don't care if you build a military center for treatment that includes gold plated toilet seats... the same bunch of career *******s will eventually colonize it, homestead it, and run it right into the ground.

Until there is a cultural shift, throwing money at this will be the same as pouring it down a dry well.

Speaking to Primary Care; both the MilMed kind and Civilian kind:

both have extreme challenges nowadays, but in comparison, MilMed Primary Care is "weighed down" and sinking like a rock because it suffers from many of the same challenges that I see in the Civilian practice, but additionally;

1) Most all "providers" are novices
2) Many support staff are novices
3) Most Admin are concerned with Politics more than medical Care
4) Most Admin are constantly changing jobs
5) Lack of continuity on almost every level.
6) Admin wield the "power" in a clinic, and docs wield "only" the responsibility
7) Tricare is as bad or worse than the worst Civilian HMO
8) MilMed has many higher priorities other than "clinic medical care"
9) No matter how bad a clinic gets,the patients, docs and staff arent going anywhere (at least until DOS for the doc....and death for the patient)
10) The Milmed advancement system and poor retention ensure that for the most part only those docs that "agree" with the politics/substandardness of Milmed stay in. Those that refuse to be a part of a piss-poor med system will leave. The system perpetuates itself. And for those idealists that think they can "change the system" you will find that "resistance is futile". Hey ,I'm all for doing all you can to make a difference for your patients as best you can, just realize that your own Admin will be doing their best to hamstring your efforts and in the big picture, you as the doc are not much more to them than another metric.
 
I've lingered around this forum for a while now because I am a pre-med interested in milmed, but I've never posted. However, as I read the last 10 or so posts about the guy who died at Ft. Knox, I felt like I should say something because my family just experienced this exact event. I know you aren't supposed to give away a lot of info about yourself on these forums, but this is a sort of a new perspective on the subject. My brother spent 6 months in Iraq last year as a truck driver. His truck was hit by an IED in September but he was able to escape with seemingly minor injuries. He had complained of some back pain and so his doctor decided to have him do physical therapy, thinking that he had muscle soreness. After about a week, they told him he had to go out on another mission. For a second time, his truck was hit by an IED. This time his back pain was exponentially increased, he lost his hearing, and awoke the next morning with blood coming from his ears. He continued to go out on missions even though he obviously needed more medical treatment. Finally in November when his back pain had not subsided and he was still having headaches, he was sent to Germany to be treated. When he got there they did an X-ray on his back and discovered that he had 2 fractured vertebrae which were probably made worse by the "physical therapy" and the missions that he was sent on. When they discovered this, he was sent to Ft. Benning, Ga. He stuck around there for a while being fed pain pills by the dozens rather than getting real treatment. They said he would probably need surgery but they told him that they would schedule it at a later date along with an MRI for the headaches. He took leave for Christmas because his MRI got delayed until January. He was home for a couple of weeks and went back to Georgia in early January. He had his MRI (finally) about a week after he got there. They found evidence of TBI and again said he would meet with a surgeon at another time. In the mean time he was prescribed more pain meds. Less than a week later he died at his friend's house on base of an accidental overdose. He had been prescribed 9 different medications and he didn't know how dangerous they were when mixed or taken in large quantities. You cannot imagine how disheartening it is to find out about something like this after hoping and praying he made it back from Iraq in one piece.


Having said that, I know that my brother's death was not a direct result of medical negligence. However, I'm fairly certain that it was an indirect one. The really sad thing is that the Captain assigned to aiding our family in the funeral process told us that this happens 2 or 3 times per month on that base alone.
 
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