Is science a fad?

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sure, I'm all about the ideal. the pure essence of an idea existent independent of my comprehension or attempt to realize it. I believe things REALLY exist.

Science is not one of these. It has no essential characteristics that can properly identify it, or demarcate it, from non-science. There are characteristics commonly associated with science, but these characteristics belong equally to other ideas: skepticism, testing, empiricism, inference, peer-review, etc. could be attributed to a discipline we all consider non-scientific, such as Intelligent Design or the dark arts or homeopathy. For Popper it was Freud's psychoanalysis. The ideal cannot be realized because it is not a defined ideal.

Really, you sound like a metaphysical realist, which is why I think we're closer than either one realizes.

I don't believe this is true... can you give an example?
 
the paper's on my side, brochacha. I've been on board with it since you linked it.

then you link to a intellectually curious article

perhaps I am misinterpreting your meaning behind "intellectually curious"? when I use phrases like that it is because I don't want to just come out and say "it went full ******"

and, honestly I don't believe the paper is on your side. upon quick glance, they don't seem to make any attempt to question the validity of science, but only discuss the issue in determining whether or not something is scientific. Nobody is arguing that there is not an issue there.
 
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I guess I'm inquiring as to what, even theoretically, science is in its pure, uncorrupted state

Science is, in essence, the practice of basing conclusions on evidence.

The 'scientific method' is an attempt to outline a series of steps that, when taken, will help to ensure that you are reaching conclusions without making assumptions that your evidence does not support. It may not be perfect, it may not be universally applied, but those sorts of errors are intrinsic to the specific method being used or described, and do not in any way change or diminish the actual definition of 'science'.

Scientists can be wrong, yes...one of the hardest aspects of science is that you must change your conclusions to fit all available evidence, even if new data is uncovered. This is how our knowledge grows and evolves. If scientists were never wrong, then they would in fact not be scientists, because humans are not infallible, new evidence is always being uncovered, and cherry-picking data to fit the conclusion you wish to support is anathema to science.

This is pretty basic stuff. It's harder to put clearly into words than it is to grasp (and I apologize for my inept descriptions), but come on...you can't use evidence to debunk science...you can use it to debunk the work of specific scientists, or specific theories, but by using evidence to support your conclusion you are actively participating in scientific thought.
 
Science is, in essence, the practice of basing conclusions on evidence.

The 'scientific method' is an attempt to outline a series of steps that, when taken, will help to ensure that you are reaching conclusions without making assumptions that your evidence does not support. It may not be perfect, it may not be universally applied, but those sorts of errors are intrinsic to the specific method being used or described, and do not in any way change or diminish the actual definition of 'science'.

Scientists can be wrong, yes...one of the hardest aspects of science is that you must change your conclusions to fit all available evidence, even if new data is uncovered. This is how our knowledge grows and evolves. If scientists were never wrong, then they would in fact not be scientists, because humans are not infallible, new evidence is always being uncovered, and cherry-picking data to fit the conclusion you wish to support is anathema to science.

This is pretty basic stuff. It's harder to put clearly into words than it is to grasp (and I apologize for my inept descriptions), but come on...you can't use evidence to debunk science...you can use it to debunk the work of specific scientists, or specific theories, but by using evidence to support your conclusion you are actively participating in scientific thought.
yes yes and yes
 
so you are getting hung up on the fact that the metrics used to establish scientific from non-scientific are intangible? .

I disagree that it is not a defined ideal. It is pretty simple at a very high level. The confusion arises when we take individual terms of the definition and ask "well, realistically, what does that MEAN?"

Science: the intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behaviour of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment

ok, so we need to know what constitutes "systematic" and what constitutes "experiment". When am I systematic enough?

Experiment: A test under controlled conditions that is made to demonstrate a known truth, examine the validity of a hypothesis, or determine the efficacy of something previously untried.

well crap.... how controlled is "controlled"? how valid is "valid"?

These are the issues that arise.... Nobody is debating that there is not gray area about whether or not something is scientific. But it is inappropriate to replace the term "scientific" with "science" and suddenly question the validity of science itself, i.e. the practice of objectively testing hypotheses under controlled circumstances. By simple definition alone the concept of "science", again, at a very high level, is completely infallible because the definition includes several lofty concepts.

to put it another way, there is certainly debate about whether something is scientific or "of good science". However, this is an internal reflection about how well the work adheres to the core principles of the ideal. "how much of the ideal", if you will. We can tell when something is faster or slower than something else, but when is something "fast" or when is it "slow". We can only compare to an ideal (speed of light, for this example) but the arbitrary line of scientific/fast unscientific/slow is arrived at through mutual agreement. In the same way, things can be clearly assessed in comparison as more or less scientific than another work, and therein lies the accepted value of the work.

The only reason I am harping on the word choice and the nuance is because you seem to want to turn and go upstream with the line of logic and I interpret this as a misunderstanding of meaning.

Okay, I really like the first few paragraphs here. I believe an understanding is nigh. Thanks for sticking around, as I enjoy thinking about this. Didn't mean to be a boor earlier if I came off that way.

I pretty much agree entirely with your thought process to the point where you ask what is sufficient control and validity. I also think you come close to the crux of my argument when you speak of science itself being lofty because of the lofty concepts that make it up. I imagine these concepts--truth, knowledge, reason--to supersede science as fundamental principles. They are "ideal," in that we can distinguish true from false (the most certain), knowledge from ignorance (a little less certain), reason from faith (the least certain). When I say "most certain" I do not mean "the most certain for us to realize," but instead the "most certainly known to exist essentially and distinctly." These ideals surpass the concept of science because the concept is impossible without truth, knowledge, and reason existing a priori. Also implicit in your definition of science--the intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behavior of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment--is the belief that a) the physical or natural world is real, b) the physical or natural world has truth value, and c) we can acquire knowledge of it through our faculties. Again, superior concepts are needed to justify arriving at this starting point of "metaphysical realism." I don't think this trio of beliefs is in any way given--there's a faith aspect to it ("cogito ergo sum"), but that seems another discussion.

So a belief in truth, knowledge, and reason--I might even argue blind faith--has gotten us to the point where we can say that the world is there and that I can learn something about it. I must believe this, and it must be true, if this whole science thing isn't to be a waste of time. But notice that I haven't used "science," or at least your working definition of science, to understand this truth. I've acquired a superior knowledge of the governing dynamics of a reality necessary for science without using science.

Now here's where I think we chart different courses. If I went no further than this knowledge I would have no use for science. Haven't I demonstrated above that higher concepts lead me to this state without the aid of the "intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behavior of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment"? I could play the ascetic and sit in my cave and contemplate the force behind this knowledge--maybe it's God or Gaia or Brahman or who/whatever--without ever needing to come in on a Saturday to check my cell culture. But let's say, for funsies, we want knowledge of this physical world. Do you believe there is an optimal way to acquire this knowledge? Here we go!

Before we move on, however, would you not agree that these higher questions of life--whether truth exists, whether I exist, why I exist, what is existence, whether morality exists, etc.--are properly deliberated without ever invoking the concept of science (or, again, at least your definition of it)? No sensory data from the physical world is needed. This right here already heads off many claims that people who claim to practice science typically have no problem making in light of any new discovery about physical phenomena. Simply, there are truths science can't touch, chiefly because they are truths that must be if the concept of science (intellectual and practical...) is to have any meaning in theory, never mind in the concrete. Methinks Orwell does a nice job covering the particulars of that. This view kind of informs my belief that people who pledge fealty to science need to realize its limitations, or its stunted view of reality.

Your definition of science can exist ideally, yeah? I don't think I'd argue that. It's possible that someone (probably a Terminator) can pursue the "intellectual and practical activity..." to the highest ideal standard. So, yes, if your definition of science can be pursued ideally, it makes sense for you to believe that the concept of science is ideal. What I would argue is that your definition is capable, even if human beings were to practice it ideally, of introducing known falsehoods about the physical world into the canon. These falsehoods have nothing to do with a lack of information, i.e. you cannot correct these falsehoods by more experimentation or peer review. It's built-in to the method in theory, forget about the feasibility of carrying it out in practice. I'd contend that these falsehoods come to be due to the insufficiency of the definition (which is a very good one, IMO)--your ideal concept of science carried out ideally produces truths and falsehoods about the physical world, never mind its inability to weigh in on the truth of the metaphysical world. This is the ballyhooed problem of demarcation. What do I mean by "falsehoods"? I should probably amend my definition a little bit: it's not so much that these ideas are falsehoods as much as it is that they are impossible to prove false. One popular example is Freud's psychoanalysis. Another could be Intelligent Design. Or solipsism. Some try to throw climate change in. If I were to apply your definition (intellectual and practical...) to each theory, each could definitely claim to be "scientific." Are you prepared to stamp a theory like ID with the scientific seal of approval? I ain't. That's why I got amped up when I first read Popper's whole spiel on falsification. Science is the testing of theories that can be falsified. Easy, right?

Alas! It's not so. Off the bat, one realizes the theory of falsification cannot itself be falsified. This theory of science is non-scientific even by its own criteria. Then if we cast a weary eye back to the scientific discoveries of the past we realize that if they had subscribed to an "ideal" method, or conception, of science there wouldn't have actually been any "scientific" discovery (Feyerabend was keen on this).

So if we're undoubtably discovering things about the world, but we have no consistent method to do so, what is it that we're actually doing? I'd argue the act of discovery involves a hodgepodge of reason, intuition, systematic experimentation, etc., which are all concepts commonly associated with what you'd call "science." But these concepts allow in ideas that you and I would both balk at, chiefly because these ideas could never be falsified. But it turns out falsification has problems, too. What am I getting at? Simply there is no scientific ideal. It doesn't exist. I cannot even define what it might be. We justify our discoveries using higher concepts and the notion of science is superfluous. Scientists should really be called "reasoners," or "intuitors," or simply "experimenters," because there is no justifiably distinct entity known as "science."

http://orwell.ru/library/articles/science/english/e_scien
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Feyerabend#Philosophy_of_science
 
Okay, I really like the first few paragraphs here. I believe an understanding is nigh. Thanks for sticking around, as I enjoy thinking about this. Didn't mean to be a boor earlier if I came off that way.
Well, if I am being honest, I just realized that I mis-read the 34C comment between looking up from pathology notes. I mistook it for a legitimate post from another thread and so a game of "kick the troll" ensued. my bad 😳👍

I pretty much agree entirely with your thought process to the point where you ask what is sufficient control and validity.
That was like 5% of the way into my post :laugh:

I also think you come close to the crux of my argument when you speak of science itself being lofty because of the lofty concepts that make it up. I imagine these concepts--truth, knowledge, reason--to supersede science as fundamental principles. They are "ideal," in that we can distinguish true from false (the most certain), knowledge from ignorance (a little less certain), reason from faith (the least certain). When I say "most certain" I do not mean "the most certain for us to realize," but instead the "most certainly known to exist essentially and distinctly." These ideals surpass the concept of science because the concept is impossible without truth, knowledge, and reason existing a priori.
Again I have to disagree. Not with your statement, exactly, but with the meaning you try to extract. Sure, abstract ideas of "truth" ect.... supersede and/or are not unique to "science". So what? This has been my argument all along. It is essentially an extension of reverse reductio ad absurdum - you start with things that are 1)known truths or 2) intentionally too generalized to be found false, and then begin reducing while assessing and criticizing any assumptions that are made. Just as the employment of the scientific does not undermine the principles of science, so do the principles of science not undermine the ideals of truth and whatever. Something need not be the pinnacle of "idealistic" in order to be protected from technical scrutiny. The point is to remember that anything that is established at a high level (if you are unfamiliar with this use that phrase, it basically means to state something simply in undeniable terms, ignoring the convolution that occurs with real world application), it is, by definition, truth. This is because tangible examples are not yet attached which may undermine the intent.


Also implicit in your definition of science--the intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behavior of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment--is the belief that a) the physical or natural world is real, b) the physical or natural world has truth value, and c) we can acquire knowledge of it through our faculties. Again, superior concepts are needed to justify arriving at this starting point of "metaphysical realism." I don't think this trio of beliefs is in any way given--there's a faith aspect to it ("cogito ergo sum"), but that seems another discussion.
I agree, but this is what I was attempting to avoid earlier when i said I didnt want to "wax overly philosophic". If we get into a bare-knuckled "well what is real????" debate we are doomed to simply spin tires. I think William Clinton said it best when he asked "Well that depends on what the meaning of 'is' is" 😀

So a belief in truth, knowledge, and reason--I might even argue blind faith--has gotten us to the point where we can say that the world is there and that I can learn something about it. I must believe this, and it must be true, if this whole science thing isn't to be a waste of time. But notice that I haven't used "science," or at least your working definition of science, to understand this truth. I've acquired a superior knowledge of the governing dynamics of a reality necessary for science without using science.
Again, this is all overly philosophic and deviates from the original question. I don't think anyone is denying that there isn't a faith element involved in science. Much of what we do is based on yet unproven theory that just hasnt exploded on us yet.

However, if we want to engage in a completely philosophical discussion on it:

I still say it is a non issue. If we are worried about whether or not there world actually "is", and that truth actually "is" and if our perception is actually "true", we are already guilty of a circular equation which cannot be solved. Basically, defining "truth" from the point of view of a non-observer has no meaning. Because it is we who are asking and we who will observe and we who will learn, the entire experience exists within a closed system. As long as the questions and observations intend to illuminate the rules by which we are bound to exist by, there is no issue where the "blind faith" poses a real obstacle.

And just to clarify that last statement, what I am implying is that "science" as the set of ideals, is not intended to convey truth when wielded. Instead, it provides architecture for progress towards truth. This progress may even be asymptotic, and never truly yielding "truth", but that still isn't really the point. There was an important omission from my previous definition of science: {all that other junk} in order to explain our experience. Could there be a separate reality which plays by a different set of rules? yes (probably). But the game of science is about employing these principles in a manner that is not internally contradictory, and therefore by definition cannot be false.

Now here's where I think we chart different courses. If I went no further than this knowledge I would have no use for science. Haven't I demonstrated above that higher concepts lead me to this state without the aid of the "intellectual and practical activity encompassing the systematic study of the structure and behavior of the physical and natural world through observation and experiment"? I could play the ascetic and sit in my cave and contemplate the force behind this knowledge--maybe it's God or Gaia or Brahman or who/whatever--without ever needing to come in on a Saturday to check my cell culture. But let's say, for funsies, we want knowledge of this physical world. Do you believe there is an optimal way to acquire this knowledge? Here we go!
I am still struggling with the relevance here..... I think you are again mixing and matching the meanings of science and scientific. If we take a "true to me and my experience" approach.... yes, this is true of science and of all manner of finding knowledge. The major difference with science is the expectation that conclusions be non falsifiable and that all other conceivable possibilities are ruled out. That is what "science demands", those works which are "scientific" attempt to do this and along the progressive architecture set forth by science, meet a minimum criteria (which is arbitrarily set) and are considered to be "true enough" to allow for further expansion. But nowhere is it stated that "scientific" is infallible.

Before we move on, however, would you not agree that these higher questions of life--whether truth exists, whether I exist, why I exist, what is existence, whether morality exists, etc.--are properly deliberated without ever invoking the concept of science (or, again, at least your definition of it)? No sensory data from the physical world is needed. This right here already heads off many claims that people who claim to practice science typically have no problem making in light of any new discovery about physical phenomena. Simply, there are truths science can't touch, chiefly because they are truths that must be if the concept of science (intellectual and practical...) is to have any meaning in theory, never mind in the concrete. Methinks Orwell does a nice job covering the particulars of that. This view kind of informs my belief that people who pledge fealty to science need to realize its limitations, or its stunted view of reality.
I can go to the store in a car, or I can go to a store on my bike. Just because I choose the bike doesn't mean that I didn't really get to the store. Likewise, just because a personal truth can be conjured via one mechanism doesn't detract from the truth of another....

However, I think the key difference is that "science" establishes rules to establish validity pertaining to the physical world. Metaphysics really doesn't apply (see earlier argument concerning closed system observation). Whether or not you or I really exist, whether or not truth is really true in an expanded sense has no impact on this closed system which is only concerned with the observable rules which we are bound to physically. Now, you can ask "if you compress me to critical mass, will I really explode? Will the explosion be simply a manifestation of neuronal impulses conjuring the illusion of experience? Will I really cease to exist? Will it even matter because did I even really exist to begin with? Will that tree in the forest hear it?", and none of that matters because the principle being established is that anything compressed in such a manner will go boom and this boom can be observed. This is a step forward with established a simple truth. There may or may not be lower level truths (deeper), but that still isn't the point at this juncture.


Your definition of science can exist ideally, yeah? I don't think I'd argue that. It's possible that someone (probably a Terminator) can pursue the "intellectual and practical activity..." to the highest ideal standard. So, yes, if your definition of science can be pursued ideally, it makes sense for you to believe that the concept of science is ideal. What I would argue is that your definition is capable, even if human beings were to practice it ideally, of introducing known falsehoods about the physical world into the canon. These falsehoods have nothing to do with a lack of information, i.e. you cannot correct these falsehoods by more experimentation or peer review. It's built-in to the method in theory, forget about the feasibility of carrying it out in practice. I'd contend that these falsehoods come to be due to the insufficiency of the definition (which is a very good one, IMO)--your ideal concept of science carried out ideally produces truths and falsehoods about the physical world, never mind its inability to weigh in on the truth of the metaphysical world.
I would need examples.... I believe that there are several falsehoods that we cannot address within our current capacity. However such a belief does not imply metaphysical impossibility.

I guess if your major issue is with sciences inability to measure the metaphysical then I have no counterpoint. That is true. Personally i don't find that relevant. Even metaphysics cannot measure the metaphysical :laugh:. At that level of philosophical involvement all possible statements hop into the box with Schroedinger's cat.

This is the ballyhooed problem of demarcation.
If this is what demarcation is actually trying to discuss (which is not what I got from it) then it is attempting to mix water and oil.

What do I mean by "falsehoods"? I should probably amend my definition a little bit: it's not so much that these ideas are falsehoods as much as it is that they are impossible to prove false. One popular example is Freud's psychoanalysis. Another could be Intelligent Design. Or solipsism. Some try to throw climate change in. If I were to apply your definition (intellectual and practical...) to each theory, each could definitely claim to be "scientific." Are you prepared to stamp a theory like ID with the scientific seal of approval? I ain't. That's why I got amped up when I first read Popper's whole spiel on falsification. Science is the testing of theories that can be falsified. Easy, right?

Alas! It's not so. Off the bat, one realizes the theory of falsification cannot itself be falsified. This theory of science is non-scientific even by its own criteria. Then if we cast a weary eye back to the scientific discoveries of the past we realize that if they had subscribed to an "ideal" method, or conception, of science there wouldn't have actually been any "scientific" discovery (Feyerabend was keen on this).

Again, I see no conflict here. All things "scientific" do have a margin of error. But this is not what was proposed when you were asking "what determines if something is or is not scientific".

I also don't agree with your last statements here.... the "theory of falsification" is not a theory. It is a protocol. There are assumptions made after the fact, but simply testing falsifiable theories is not somehow unscientific. Remember, as I stated earlier, "science" is the architecture by where we do things that are scientific. You are now using the words a little more closely to the way I described in previous arguments.

It appears that the issue arises, again because of a convolution between what is "science" and what is "scientific". The major pitfall being the preoccupation with things that fall short of ideal, but IMO that is already missing the point.
So if we're undoubtably discovering things about the world, but we have no consistent method to do so, what is it that we're actually doing? I'd argue the act of discovery involves a hodgepodge of reason, intuition, systematic experimentation, etc., which are all concepts commonly associated with what you'd call "science." But these concepts allow in ideas that you and I would both balk at, chiefly because these ideas could never be falsified. But it turns out falsification has problems, too. What am I getting at? Simply there is no scientific ideal. It doesn't exist. I cannot even define what it might be. We justify our discoveries using higher concepts and the notion of science is superfluous. Scientists should really be called "reasoners," or "intuitors," or simply "experimenters," because there is no justifiably distinct entity known as "science."

http://orwell.ru/library/articles/science/english/e_scien
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Feyerabend#Philosophy_of_science

again I have to disagree. You seem to want to negate "scientific acts" because they involve a subjective side. If we take a step back and just think about what an ideal is, and forget for a moment how this system breaks in the real world, it is a little easier to acknowledge an ideal for what it is.

Science is the systematic collection of understanding of the physical world through experimentation.

Any and all practical attempts to do this become "scientific acts" which attain a level of this. Basically your hangup strikes me as saying "well.. .the sky isn't blue because "blue" is just an english word which we use to describe the subjective sensation we experience when our eyes are exposed to this stimulus"..... but.... who cares? The point in things which are scientific is to say "the vast majority of us can point to blue object X, and identify it as having a similar attribute as blue object Y regardless of all definitions of personal experience (i.e. whether you see pink and I see green in some greater-truth cosmic coloring book), the point is not to get bogged down in metaphysical reality when it can be easily subtracted as a common variable and the objective observation still persists :idea:
 
So r u guys friends yet or what? ^_^
 
Everything sinuous sausage has said so far...

You're overthinking it, and perhaps we're creating needlessly complex definitions of science.

At this point, I can only reiterate: science is the practice of basing your conclusions on all available evidence.

Scientists often fall short of the ideal in science, either by failing to collect enough data, by misinterpreting it due to bias, or some other means, but the basic process of attempting to construct a valid argument/conclusion with supporting data IS science in its essence.

Your debates on this topic demonstrate scientific thinking, as they consist primarily of you trying to find a definition of the word 'science' which fits in with all of the examples you have seen.

Yeah, the debate itself is interesting, but you detract from that by insisting that you're in some way disproving the utility of 'science' or changing its definition. It's not interesting to debate when you're so fixated on proving a controversial point that you ignore some arguments and only choose to focus on complicated definitions where you can quibble about the phrasing and detail without ever actually addressing the heart of the issue.

Science = basing conclusions on evidence. The rest is just semantics and methodology. Until you address THAT point, you are just chasing your tail to feel like you've proven something.
 
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