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Only a few years?? That's a pretty long time to be unhappy. I wouldn't be able to take it personally. Though sticking around is probably the smartest move.You have a position now. I wouldn't let that go just because you're a bit homesick. It's only a few years.
Only a few years?? That's a pretty long time to be unhappy. I wouldn't be able to take it personally. Though sticking around is probably the smartest move.
3-5 years of training vs 30-35 years of practice. Yeah, it's only a few years. The location was the issue here. If I were the OP, I'd suck it up as the residency position in the hand is worth two in the bush. There are lots of people that wish they were in the OP's position.
I agree with you that the wisest thing is for the OP to stick around.
I don't know if I would have been able to put up with it though. I'm impatient. I would have been trying to find my way out ASAP. I just couldn't handle 3-5 years in a place I hate. To me that's too long.
It's oftentimes easier just to stay when your complaint is about geography, not your specialty, and not apparently anything about the program specifically either.
Hypothetically- what if it were about the specialty or about the program. Would you suggest leaving then, or sticking it out?
Hypothetically- what if it were about the specialty or about the program. Would you suggest leaving then, or sticking it out?
I've always thought the match process is kind of a ridiculous thing.
I also cannot see how anyone would hold any type of sympathy for any residency program accepting them, as if it is some sort of favor. It's a favor to do high-risk work for less than minimum-wage. Nice favor.
They say the match exists to keep residents from becoming unpaid. I think it exists to stifle market competition and keep them underpaid.
Nevertheless, keep your trap shut about wanting to switch, and don't let go of the branch you have until you've grasped your next first.
It exists because:
med students need residency, and they need to start in july.
Programs need residents, and their residents need to have graduated med school in that year.
There is no other way to fill 20,000 positions in such a short period of time.
If there werent a match, it would be the biggest cluster**** in humanity.
Theres a good freakanomics podcast episode about this actually.
What you say is true to some extent but it doesn't mean the process couldn't be tweaked to be more fair and less evil
What you say is true to some extent but it doesn't mean the process couldn't be tweaked to be more fair and less evil
There is nothing "evil" about the current setup of the Match process. Sure, some people will not get what they want, and some will go unmatched. And some will get what they think they want, be wrong about that, and make a change...most will be successful doing so.How, exactly?
...
Are there winners and losers in this system? Hell yes...
There is nothing "evil" about the current setup of the Match process. Sure, some people will not get what they want, and some will go unmatched. And some will get what they think they want, be wrong about that, and make a change...most will be successful doing so.
Are there winners and losers in this system? Hell yes. But for the most part, the current system puts the overwhelming majority of applicants in a reasonably good place and allows them to become what they want to be. It's not perfect, but it's more than good enough.
If you think you have a better system, by all means skip over telling NRMP about it and just alert the Nobel Committee.
Also, plenty of people are questioning the need for the Match: http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapot...dency-matching-system-for-newly-minted-m-d-s/
I have never seen such a widely accepted nonsensical and harmful system. Steps really need to be taken to get rid of it.
You are not just unlikely to ever work in your desired field ever, the desire of doctors aside they are unlikely to ever work again in SOCIETY'S DESIRED FIELD, PCP gettting people healthier and back to work via primary care fields like FM/IM
Medical students that don't match:
COST: unpaid student loans, worthless medical degree so no care provided
BENEFIT: none
NET VALUE: this is a massive loss to society, probably millions of dollars worth of QALYs when you factor in their suicide and doc shortage of gen pop
However, investing in resident training is the best way to ever get any of the investment put into the med student back
As Perrotfish mentioned (I love that guy, Whedon fan?) the current NRMP process and "all in" and GME funding
results in a collusion where unmatched med students and resigned residents might as well light their MD diploma on fire and die in the flames
what society saves itself by refusing to pay more for GME funding, stopping the collusion so the docs getting trained, is lost by unpaid student loans
I went through all of the above to say what I hate about the system:
No MD with $250K of the taxpayer money blown should worry about
how to pay enough NRMP application and interview costs
to have a residency, a roof, food, medical care
when they are clearly willing to be indentured servants and work for pennies if anyone is willing to pony up a residency slot
What sucks a la this thread regarding NRMP is the collusion that results in such high application costs for anyone that needs to try again for a residency
I couldn't give a **** less about the lack of negotiating power the NRMP gave residents if it meant they could rest assured somewhere would train them without breaking them mentally and physically
I definitely think the Match is not inherently good or evil, but the trend of more and more seniors and AMGs going unmatched every year needs to be resolved in some way. This can, most likely, be done while keeping the Match intact.The fact that a whiney medical student wrote a really poorly thought out editorial for forbes.com is hardly strong evidence that the match is evil.
Becoming a doctor takes time, but those outside of medicine do not always realize how convoluted the process can be. Central to the perversion is the National Resident Matching Program (or “the Match”).
After college and the two years of classroom-based training in medical school, students are ushered into clinical training through predetermined core rotations. In the spring of their third year, students must decide on their career specialty, often without rotating in their chosen specialty yet if it was not a “core” rotation of third year.
During their senior year, students spend the first few months completing from zero to three month-long ‘away rotations’ at potential residencies. In mid-September they apply to all residency programs that interest them, sometimes over a hundred programs, submitting a fee for each.
Starting in October, students interview around the country for three to four months, incurring significant travel costs and missing much of their senior year due. In late February, students and residencies both submit a “rank list” of one another for the NRMP algorithm to optimize.
Results of this optimization are released on Match day in late-March, when medical students around the country find out the residency program at which they “Matched”, bound to the program and bound to a non-negotiable contract shown to them months prior. Many students either do not match at all or do not match at their first choice program; nonetheless their fate is sealed by the ivory tower algorithm of the Match.
This year, 5.6% of US allopathic (MD) seniors did not match, and 22.3% of US osteopathic (DO) seniors did not match. On the whole, 25.0% of applicants in the NRMP Match did not match – with a 25% unemployment rate, how successful is the Match, really?
This system is highly wasteful. It incurs massive costs for hospitals and students through the interview process, precludes contract negotiations that could optimize value for both parties and results in depressed wages for young physicians. Additionally, it incurs significant opportunity cost in trading interviews for educational senior year curricula, causes undue duress for applicants and their families and contributes to decreased quality of care in physicians unsatisfied with results of the Match.
The Match was established in 1952 when available resident positions vastly exceeded the number of graduating medical students. As a way to secure top students as residents, hospitals were: 1. Offering positions earlier and earlier, sometimes even prior to a student’s clinical years; 2. “Exploding” offers and demanding a acceptance or rejection of an offer within minutes.
The first problem was remedied by an agreement among medical schools to embargo student records until a specified date in fourth year. The latter was remedied by the Match.
Medical education today is nothing like it was 60 years ago. Today, many specialties have more US medical graduates than residency positions, and international medical graduates and physicians reapplying for residency also compete in the match. Medical schools continue to increase, as have the birth of osteopathic schools and Caribbean schools.
Medicare, which funds residencies, is continually threatened. Medical education debt is rising while post-residency earning potential is declining and training time is increasingly extended with required fellowships
The misbalance between residencies and students is no longer; and resources are tighter than ever, yet the archaic Match system continues to waste time and funds of students and applicants alike in the name of ‘tradition’.
Financially, the Match is devastating. Assume a student applies for 35 programs in one specialty, receives 20 interview offers and accepts 12; these are conservative estimates in competitive specialties, in applicants ‘couples-matching’ with a spouse and in specialties requiring a separate ‘preliminary’ internship.
In application fees, this student will spend $465. The 12 interviews, each requiring a $50 motel, a $50 car rental and a $300 flight, cost this student $4,800. All in, this student has spent $5,265 on the Match, against $250,000 in existing student debt. Assuming a Federal Stafford Loan with 6.8% interest paid in 10 years, $5,265 becomes $7,470.76.
With a 15% tax rate, $7,470.76 becomes $8,789.13 in pre-tax income. With 34,270 active applicants in the Match in 2014, $302 million is wasted annually, in the setting of tight graduate medical education funding, increasing student debt and decreasing physician reimbursement.
In addition, the Match precludes an applicant from negotiating their salary or contract in any way. Dual degrees (MD/JD, MD/MBA, MD/MPH) are ever-increasing and many applicants will bring additional value to their hospital, yet are unable to be compensated for it. Additionally, it precludes less competitive applicants from accepting lower salary or early offers in exchange for a position.
Jung v. AAMC in 2003 challenged the Match on antitrust grounds, claiming that the collusion of hospitals within the Match artificially depressed wages. In response, Congress passed an explicit exemption for NRMP through the Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, making legal challenges moot.
Nonetheless, labor statistics are daunting. Per the 2012 US Census, mean earnings for 25-34 year olds with a doctorate or professional degree are $74,626 or $86,440 respectively. The AAMC mean first-year resident salary was $50,765 for 2013-2014.
NRMP dodged the legal attack in Jung, but numbers don’t lie and a $23,861-$35,675 difference in salary is robbery.
Assume that the double-binding match is the most efficient mechanism for filling the residency labor market (which, notably, was not the intent of the Match).
For hundreds of students a year, the Match means a change in career, as students who do not match in their preferred specialty are often forced into an alternate career specialty if they would like to practice as a physician. It also means a change in life circumstance, notably, for those with preferred location given family situations or with spouses unable to find a new job in the short two-three months between Match day and residency start dates in June.
Ultimately, the Match translates into thousands of physicians training in an undesired specialty, in an undesired city and in an undesired situation split from their families. These physicians, lives forced by the Match, cannot be assumed to perform at the same quality as those that matched into their ‘dream job’.
Of this population, do they end up leaving the profession prematurely? Are their career trajectories as successful? Are their satisfaction rates the same? What about their suicide rates, addiction rates and wellness?
Legislation exonerated the Match from legal attacks in Jung v. AAMC, but that does not prove it is good policy. Economist Dr. Alvin Roth won a Nobel Prize in economics for his theory in a double-binding labor market match underlying the NRMP — but notably, academic economists like Dr. Roth himself acquire their positions on the free market, not through a match.
Few other professions utilize this double-binding match, and in explaining the Match to those unfamiliar with medical training, the closest relatable comparison is sorority rush. However, the stakes are a bit higher than selecting Greek letters, and we are physicians, not teenagers. For the good of our profession, our patients, and our future protégés, it’s about time to trash the Match.
Your primary complaint seems to be the number of available spots then, not the way they're distributed. That's a completely different argument.So you addressed the one line which was a link in my post, mostly nitpicked numbers, and missed the spirit of my message, and my own post below it.
It's a far more expensive and difficult process than getting into med school was for poor kids (at least for me)
And tell me, the ones that don't get a spot scrambling, then what happens when they try next year?
It's around 5,000-10,000 a year you want to try to get a slot, nevermind chances dwindle each year, and I'm not talking derm, I'm talking this primary care we supposedly need so much of
This article in Forbes has been discussed in other threads. But we'll go through it here, again.
All of this is based on nothing.
Your primary complaint seems to be the number of available spots then, not the way they're distributed. That's a completely different argument.
This article in Forbes has been discussed in other threads. But we'll go through it here, again.
The very first sentence points out that this article is a very partisan view. The author calls the match a "perversion" and we haven't even discussed it yet.
Many medical schools have changed their curricula such that you get one or more electives in the 3rd year, and one of the cores gets moved to the 4th. In any case, this has nothing to do with the match. If the author's point is that students don't get enough exposure to fields before they have to choose, then the solution is to push the entire application process forward in time (or change med school curricula)
This is wrong. In most fields, away rotations are not needed. Only the most competitive fields with very small numbers of spots will. US students apply to programs, but hardly 100's -- again, only if applying to Derm or Ortho might a US student do this. But this has nothing to do with the match. These fields are competitive.
Students are going to need to interview for spots. That will take time. Only if the author (or someone else) suggests a system by which you could go on less interviews, would it make any difference. Plus, the match creates a situation that it doesn't matter when in those 3-4 months you interview. Whether you are on the first or last interview day, no spots have been given away yet so you have the same chances.
Most US grads match (more on that later). Some do not get their 1st choice. Welcome to life. Not everyone can get their first choice. Life doesn't work that way. Any system other than the match will still result in many people not getting their 1st choice.
This is the paragraph that makes me the most angry. This is plain wrong. About 5% of US MD's don't match. Many of those get spots in SOAP, so ultimately get a spot. Some of them are very focused on a specific field and decide to take another year, doing research, etc, to apply again rather than take a spot in another field. Since there are more applicants that want Derm than Derm spots, some people are not getting a Derm spot no matter what system you use. Unless we change the way training works and let as many people train in each field (by completely changing the way we do training).
Now let's be serious for a second. 25% of US MD and DO grads are not unemployed. That is completely ridiculous. Why? Because about 20% of DO's fail to match in the NRMP (this ignores those that match AOA and are withdrawn). BUT YOU CAN'T ADD 5% of MD AND 20% OF DO GRADS AND GET 25%. There are many less DO grads. In 2014, there were 976 unmatched US MD (5.6% of the total US MD applicants) and 611 unmatched DO's (20% of the total DO applicants). Combining both of those yields 7.9% unmatched MD+DO. But again this ignores post-match spots (of which there are many in the AOA match also). So ultimately the "unemployment rate" is well below 5%. There are at least 20% more spots than US MD+Do grads -- almost everyone can get a spot, if they are willing to be flexible.
1. We only decrease interview costs if a different system yields less interviews. There is no guarantee that a new system will yield less interviews. In fact, a "free for all" system would encourage students to interview as early and quickly as possible -- possibly costing more in travel costs etc. Note that "negotiations .... depressed wages for young physicians" actually would increase costs for the "system" (i.e. the hospitals), but as I've mentioned elsewhere the match really isn't the problem with resident wages. Any system other than the match could yield worse results.
This is correct.
Although the number of US grads has increased, so have the number of spots. At present, there's about 1.5 spots for every US grad in the match. This ratio has varied between 2 and 1.2 over the last few decades, but the current ratio is no worse than much of the past.
The funding of medicare is a topic of other threads. What it has to do with the match, I have no idea. Debt is increasing, also has nothing to do with the match. Fellowships are not required in most fields.
As mentioned, there is no "misbalance" and it is no different than in the past.
The author suggests that, given a different system, students might go on less interviews. This is like suggesting that you should have only gone on one medical school interview, the school you ultimately attended. Sounds great, except it clearly doesn't work. Students will need to apply to a bunch of residency programs, just like medical schools. However, not every interview costs a $300 flight. Many students could interview in one geographic area for much less than this.
I'm not paying an MD/JD anything more. I don't need a lawyer. I'm training a physician. As I'm mentioned on other threads, resident salaries are not really affected by the match. The medicine fellowships were not in a match for many years, and salaries didn't improve. The last sentence should be terrifying. Some people are willing to work for nothing. Are you?
Of course, most of those other people with a doctorate or prof degree will not make $200K+ 5 years out from graduation. But, sure, it's robbery.
I can't speak to what the initial founders of the match wanted, but at the present time, the match (IMHO) is the most efficient mechanism for filling the residency labor market.
There are more people who want a Derm spot than Derm spots. Whether we use a match, or any other system, some people are not getting a spot. That's life. This has nothing to do with the match. I'd argue that the match INCREASES the chances of you matching to your desired specialty or geography.
Good questions. Too bad you don't have any answers.
All of this is based on nothing.
Step exam expense, prep, and any associated interviews are not included in cost of attendance (I understand the reasoning why it is not, but the reality is still rough) so no Federal loans for this. Family and private loans don't always cut it.
The lack of slots, AOA and ACGME merger, (nevermind the AOA merger, that won't be for a while), increase in med school class sizes, is part of the distribution problem.
I think that anyone wanting primary care fields should have enough slots for anyone wanting to match.
I think some programs should be allowed to have some slots set aside or offered outside of match or have a few slots computer designed to give some preference to less desirable candidates seeking to re-enter.