This article in Forbes has been discussed in other threads. But we'll go through it here, again.
Becoming a doctor takes time, but those outside of medicine do not always realize how convoluted the process can be. Central to the perversion is the National Resident Matching Program (or “the Match”).
The very first sentence points out that this article is a very partisan view. The author calls the match a "perversion" and we haven't even discussed it yet.
After college and the two years of classroom-based training in medical school, students are ushered into clinical training through predetermined core rotations. In the spring of their third year, students must decide on their career specialty, often without rotating in their chosen specialty yet if it was not a “core” rotation of third year.
Many medical schools have changed their curricula such that you get one or more electives in the 3rd year, and one of the cores gets moved to the 4th. In any case, this has nothing to do with the match. If the author's point is that students don't get enough exposure to fields before they have to choose, then the solution is to push the entire application process forward in time (or change med school curricula)
During their senior year, students spend the first few months completing from zero to three month-long ‘away rotations’ at potential residencies. In mid-September they apply to all residency programs that interest them, sometimes over a hundred programs, submitting a fee for each.
This is wrong. In most fields, away rotations are not needed. Only the most competitive fields with very small numbers of spots will. US students apply to programs, but hardly 100's -- again, only if applying to Derm or Ortho might a US student do this. But this has nothing to do with the match. These fields are competitive.
Starting in October, students interview around the country for three to four months, incurring significant travel costs and missing much of their senior year due. In late February, students and residencies both submit a “rank list” of one another for the NRMP algorithm to optimize.
Students are going to need to interview for spots. That will take time. Only if the author (or someone else) suggests a system by which you could go on less interviews, would it make any difference. Plus, the match creates a situation that it doesn't matter when in those 3-4 months you interview. Whether you are on the first or last interview day, no spots have been given away yet so you have the same chances.
Results of this optimization are released on Match day in late-March, when medical students around the country find out the residency program at which they “Matched”, bound to the program and bound to a non-negotiable contract shown to them months prior. Many students either do not match at all or do not match at their first choice program; nonetheless their fate is sealed by the ivory tower algorithm of the Match.
Most US grads match (more on that later). Some do not get their 1st choice. Welcome to life. Not everyone can get their first choice. Life doesn't work that way. Any system other than the match will still result in many people not getting their 1st choice.
This year, 5.6% of US allopathic (MD) seniors did not match, and 22.3% of US osteopathic (DO) seniors did not match. On the whole, 25.0% of applicants in the NRMP Match did not match – with a
25% unemployment rate, how successful is the Match, really?
This is the paragraph that makes me the most angry. This is plain wrong. About 5% of US MD's don't match. Many of those get spots in SOAP, so ultimately get a spot. Some of them are very focused on a specific field and decide to take another year, doing research, etc, to apply again rather than take a spot in another field. Since there are more applicants that want Derm than Derm spots, some people are not getting a Derm spot no matter what system you use. Unless we change the way training works and let as many people train in each field (by completely changing the way we do training).
Now let's be serious for a second. 25% of US MD and DO grads are not unemployed. That is completely ridiculous. Why? Because about 20% of DO's fail to match in the NRMP (this ignores those that match AOA and are withdrawn). BUT YOU CAN'T ADD 5% of MD AND 20% OF DO GRADS AND GET 25%. There are many less DO grads. In 2014, there were 976 unmatched US MD (5.6% of the total US MD applicants) and 611 unmatched DO's (20% of the total DO applicants). Combining both of those yields 7.9% unmatched MD+DO. But again this ignores post-match spots (of which there are many in the AOA match also). So ultimately the "unemployment rate" is well below 5%. There are at least 20% more spots than US MD+Do grads -- almost everyone can get a spot, if they are willing to be flexible.
This system is highly wasteful. It incurs massive costs for hospitals and students through the interview process, precludes contract negotiations that could optimize value for both parties and results in depressed wages for young physicians. Additionally, it incurs significant opportunity cost in trading interviews for educational senior year curricula, causes undue duress for applicants and their families and contributes to decreased quality of care in physicians unsatisfied with results of the Match.
1. We only decrease interview costs if a different system yields less interviews. There is no guarantee that a new system will yield less interviews. In fact, a "free for all" system would encourage students to interview as early and quickly as possible -- possibly costing more in travel costs etc. Note that "negotiations .... depressed wages for young physicians" actually would increase costs for the "system" (i.e. the hospitals), but as I've mentioned elsewhere the match really isn't the problem with resident wages. Any system other than the match could yield worse results.
The Match was established in 1952 when available resident positions vastly exceeded the number of graduating medical students. As a way to secure top students as residents, hospitals were: 1. Offering positions earlier and earlier, sometimes even prior to a student’s clinical years; 2. “Exploding” offers and demanding a acceptance or rejection of an offer within minutes.
The first problem was remedied by an agreement among medical schools to embargo student records until a specified date in fourth year. The latter was remedied by the Match.
This is correct.
Medical education today is nothing like it was 60 years ago. Today, many specialties have more US medical graduates than residency positions, and international medical graduates and physicians reapplying for residency also compete in the match. Medical schools continue to increase, as have the birth of osteopathic schools and Caribbean schools.
Although the number of US grads has increased, so have the number of spots. At present, there's about 1.5 spots for every US grad in the match. This ratio has varied between 2 and 1.2 over the last few decades, but the current ratio is no worse than much of the past.
Medicare, which funds residencies, is continually threatened. Medical education debt is rising while post-residency earning potential is declining and training time is increasingly extended with required fellowships
The funding of medicare is a topic of other threads. What it has to do with the match, I have no idea. Debt is increasing, also has nothing to do with the match. Fellowships are not required in most fields.
The misbalance between residencies and students is no longer; and resources are tighter than ever, yet the archaic Match system continues to waste time and funds of students and applicants alike in the name of ‘tradition’.
As mentioned, there is no "misbalance" and it is no different than in the past.
Financially, the Match is devastating. Assume a student applies for 35 programs in one specialty, receives 20 interview offers and accepts 12; these are conservative estimates in competitive specialties, in applicants ‘couples-matching’ with a spouse and in specialties requiring a separate ‘preliminary’ internship.
In application fees, this student will spend $465. The 12 interviews, each requiring a $50 motel, a $50 car rental and a $300 flight, cost this student $4,800. All in, this student has spent $5,265 on the Match, against $250,000 in existing student debt. Assuming a Federal Stafford Loan with 6.8% interest paid in 10 years, $5,265 becomes $7,470.76.
With a 15% tax rate, $7,470.76 becomes $8,789.13 in pre-tax income. With 34,270 active applicants in the Match in 2014, $302 million is wasted annually, in the setting of tight graduate medical education funding, increasing student debt and decreasing physician reimbursement.
The author suggests that, given a different system, students might go on less interviews. This is like suggesting that you should have only gone on one medical school interview, the school you ultimately attended. Sounds great, except it clearly doesn't work. Students will need to apply to a bunch of residency programs, just like medical schools. However, not every interview costs a $300 flight. Many students could interview in one geographic area for much less than this.
In addition, the Match precludes an applicant from negotiating their salary or contract in any way. Dual degrees (MD/JD, MD/MBA, MD/MPH) are ever-increasing and many applicants will bring additional value to their hospital, yet are unable to be compensated for it. Additionally, it precludes less competitive applicants from accepting lower salary or early offers in exchange for a position.
I'm not paying an MD/JD anything more. I don't need a lawyer. I'm training a physician. As I'm mentioned on other threads, resident salaries are not really affected by the match. The medicine fellowships were not in a match for many years, and salaries didn't improve. The last sentence should be terrifying. Some people are willing to work for nothing. Are you?
Jung v. AAMC in 2003 challenged the Match on antitrust grounds, claiming that the collusion of hospitals within the Match artificially depressed wages. In response, Congress passed an explicit exemption for NRMP through the Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, making legal challenges moot.
Nonetheless, labor statistics are daunting. Per the 2012 US Census, mean earnings for 25-34 year olds with a doctorate or professional degree are $74,626 or $86,440 respectively. The AAMC mean first-year resident salary was $50,765 for 2013-2014.
NRMP dodged the legal attack in Jung, but numbers don’t lie and a $23,861-$35,675 difference in salary is robbery.
Of course, most of those other people with a doctorate or prof degree will not make $200K+ 5 years out from graduation. But, sure, it's robbery.
Assume that the double-binding match is the most efficient mechanism for filling the residency labor market (which, notably, was not the intent of the Match).
I can't speak to what the initial founders of the match wanted, but at the present time, the match (IMHO) is the most efficient mechanism for filling the residency labor market.
For hundreds of students a year, the Match means a change in career, as students who do not match in their preferred specialty are often forced into an alternate career specialty if they would like to practice as a physician. It also means a change in life circumstance, notably, for those with preferred location given family situations or with spouses unable to find a new job in the short two-three months between Match day and residency start dates in June.
Ultimately, the Match translates into thousands of physicians training in an undesired specialty, in an undesired city and in an undesired situation split from their families. These physicians, lives forced by the Match, cannot be assumed to perform at the same quality as those that matched into their ‘dream job’.
There are more people who want a Derm spot than Derm spots. Whether we use a match, or any other system, some people are not getting a spot. That's life. This has nothing to do with the match. I'd argue that the match INCREASES the chances of you matching to your desired specialty or geography.
Of this population, do they end up leaving the profession prematurely? Are their career trajectories as successful? Are their satisfaction rates the same? What about their suicide rates, addiction rates and wellness?
Good questions. Too bad you don't have any answers.
Legislation exonerated the Match from legal attacks in Jung v. AAMC, but that does not prove it is good policy. Economist Dr. Alvin Roth won a Nobel Prize in economics for his theory in a double-binding labor market match underlying the NRMP — but notably, academic economists like Dr. Roth himself acquire their positions on the free market, not through a match.
Few other professions utilize this double-binding match, and in explaining the Match to those unfamiliar with medical training, the closest relatable comparison is sorority rush. However, the stakes are a bit higher than selecting Greek letters, and we are physicians, not teenagers. For the good of our profession, our patients, and our future protégés, it’s about time to trash the Match.
All of this is based on nothing.