Hmm. I'll try to find some time to read the paper. It's not really in my specialty. If the paper describes something different than an applicant proposing system in which each applicant matches to a program in order of preference provided that a program has not already matched with a more preferred candidate, then it might be out of date (or the ASHP website is full of lies 🙂 )
That is the overall goal, but the implementation is something where candidates (and programs) do not really understand that it's a global, not a local fit. This is the trick about the linear programming.
(Explicit) Rule 1: Candidates: Do not rank a program that you wouldn't want to go to. Programs, do not rank candidates that you would not take.
Everyone knows the consequences when a party violates this.
(Implicit) Rule 2: ONLY Candidates (Selectivity bias rule): If you know that interviews are very few (or that the candidates they rank are few), ONLY interview if you absolutely know when you want to go there. If questionable, DO NOT interview.
Example:
Jane Doe ranks:
1: Harborview
2: VA Beacon Hill
Harborview Ranks (3 slots):
1: Not Jane Doe
2: Not Jane Doe
3: Jane Doe
VA Beacon Hill Ranks (3 slots):
1. Jane Doe
2 and below don't matter
Where does Jane Doe match? VA Beacon Hill as the rank preference is lower for Harborview.
Here is why I give that warning about interviewing.
Crap Example:
Jane Doe ranks:
1: Harborview
2: VA Beacon Hill
Harborview Ranks (3 slots):
1: Not Jane Doe
2: Jane Doe
3: Not Jane Doe
4: Not Jane Doe
5: Not Jane Doe
VA Beacon Hill Ranks (3 slots):
1. Not Jane Doe
2. Not Jane Doe
3. Jane Doe
Where does Jane Doe match? VA Beacon Hill again EVEN THOUGH the rank preference is lower for VA Beacon Hill and the candidate locally. This is why:
In the case of Harborview, even if Jane Doe is not picked up, Harborview has a deeper roster. VA Beacon Hill if Jane Doe is NOT taken, loses the spot completely.
The National Match Program considers this a fault, so even though both candidate and program rank lower, the match happens with that not best because it is a scenario where more slots are filled while the more permissive program "loses" a better candidate, they are filled with someone that they are supposedly ok with too.
This happens! It's a result of programs being very selective of who they end up ranking.
(Implicit) Rule 3: (ONLY Programs: Same example as above) When there are more great candidates than they are slots, programs should be more selective about ranking anyone. Paradoxically, for weak programs, they should consider rolling the dice and picking selectively as if they are more selective than a popular, promiscuous in terms of selection program, their likelihood is greater of matching. I also think that weak programs have more to lose from selecting weak candidates, while strong programs can weather those crisis residents.
By the way, a candidate being selective does not work in the same way as the program. The program's "advantage" depends on them having to declare the number of slots open and having to accept for those slots.
Now, that is the static analysis, there is a more complicated dynamic analysis, but because there is normally a geographically correlated market, this is not usually a problem for pharmacy residency. For medical residency, it's reasonable to interview geographically and rank somewhere in the 10s or so. Pharmacy is now competitive, but it still has nothing on medicine with respect to the outcomes. Do you think ASHP really knows how this algorithm works? Not really. Neither does ACGME for that matter. They left all the linear programming to the economists, which gives you the solution that it does. The Health Economists and the Informaticists collectively go when they are shown the actual algorithm implementation was:
"The *$(#! This *()%ing algorithm decided my fate and I didn't even know the real rules of the match."