Nurse facing criminal charges for med error

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https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.fo...ckless-homicide-after-woman-s-death/915197156

Short version: nurse was trying to override Versed out of the med dispense cabinet, actually pulled vecuronium, patient died. She is being charged with a felony.

The potential implications for extending this to pharmacists are obvious.

(ISMP has an interesting write up about it, couldn’t figure out how to post that link from my phone)

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Must have been someone powerful enough. That's a shame as that was an honest mistake. I don't necessarily have a problem with revocation for the incident, but criminal charges are completely uncalled for without something else.
 
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CMS Report

I found the CMS document pretty damning. But I don’t agree with the charges.
 
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Must have been someone powerful enough. That's a shame as that was an honest mistake. I don't necessarily have a problem with revocation for the incident, but criminal charges are completely uncalled for without something else.
Honest mistake? She bypassed every security measure and protocol. This is on her. If this happened in a setting with a wooden medicine cabinet, no pharmacist, and no policy that the patient be observed, that’s an honest mistake. This is murder.
 
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Honest mistake? She bypassed every security measure and protocol. This is on her. If this happened in a setting with a wooden medicine cabinet, no pharmacist, and no policy that the patient be observed, that’s an honest mistake. This is murder.

Come on now, murder? Even manslaughter is going too far. All mistake involves bypassing 'every' security measure and protocol. Otherwise there would be no mistakes. Thankfully we usually are not charged with murder every time we make them.

Of course the level of negligence here is astronomically high but do you really want errors to be treated as criminal offenses? It could be you one day getting charged after all...
 
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I could go as far as license suspension or even revoking her license, but criminal litigation is not appropriate imo.

I believe a decade ago I saw news story of a hospital pharmacist who went to jail for a med error that resulted in an infant death
 
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Come on now, murder? Even manslaughter is going too far. All mistake involves bypassing 'every' security measure and protocol. Otherwise there would be no mistakes. Thankfully we usually are not charged with murder every time we make them.

Of course the level of negligence here is astronomically high but do you really want errors to be treated as criminal offenses? It could be you one day getting charged after all...
Not every mistake involves bypassing many security measures. Many occur because the security measures fail or do not exist. And if I bypass many security measures and kill somebody (in one of the most torturous methods imaginable), I’m fine with criminal charges.

What do you think would happen if a pharmacist started dispensing medications without a physician’s order and an allergic patient died?
 
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Honest mistake? She bypassed every security measure and protocol. This is on her. If this happened in a setting with a wooden medicine cabinet, no pharmacist, and no policy that the patient be observed, that’s an honest mistake. This is murder.

I can understand your position, but I've seen quite a number of work environments where you have to override everything to get something done. Think about how you approach DUR's, and seriously, what don't you override? I'm not saying that this was the right behavior, but I can see how you can get to an out of control process.

Now, I think we both consider this nurse extremely negligent, but murder is a bit much for me as I'm pretty sure there was not malicious intent or extreme depravity here. I do agree it is on her, but I can see how she could get here, and I could get there under the right sort of pressure and circumstances. This was a "forced" error more than an unforced one to me. Criminal negligence, within the realm of possibility if a bit harsh, murder, a bit too far.
 
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I could go as far as license suspension or even revoking her license, but criminal litigation is not appropriate imo.

I believe a decade ago I saw news story of a hospital pharmacist who went to jail for a med error that resulted in an infant death
Sounds like you're talking about Eric Cropp? That's the first thing I thought of too.
Ex-pharmacist Eric Cropp found guilty in medication death of Emily Jerry, 2

From what I remember about the case I think he had better reason to avoid criminal charges than this nurse.
 
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its not a good precedent for health care professionals. i dont recall seeing surgeons getting arrested when they operate on thewrong side of the brain, or the patient that had 2 kidneys removed when cancer was misdiagnosed. its a very slippery slope. the civil courts should take care of this not the criminal ones unless they can prove the nurse had premeditated a plan to harm her patient.

as for the eric cropp case, that was a terrible precedent several years ago. and where was the apha to make a statement that this shouldn't have been a criminal case?
 
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I can understand your position, but I've seen quite a number of work environments where you have to override everything to get something done. Think about how you approach DUR's, and seriously, what don't you override? I'm not saying that this was the right behavior, but I can see how you can get to an out of control process.

Now, I think we both consider this nurse extremely negligent, but murder is a bit much for me as I'm pretty sure there was not malicious intent or extreme depravity here. I do agree it is on her, but I can see how she could get here, and I could get there under the right sort of pressure and circumstances. This was a "forced" error more than an unforced one to me. Criminal negligence, within the realm of possibility if a bit harsh, murder, a bit too far.
I acknowledge 99% of DURs without making an intervention, but they are not “bypassed”. They are evaluated to determine if they should be part of the 1% that leads me to contact the provider, consult the patient, or refuse to fill the Rx.

If her process was justifiable in any way, we could just do away with MARs, barcode scanning, pharmacists, written/computerized orders, and patient observation and save a lot of money. If any reasonable medical professional was asked “What would happen if medications were administered based solely on one nurse telling another what a doctor said and nothing was documented and patients were not observed afterward?” they would say that patients would die. This was a highly predictable outcome.
 
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I'm actually also surprised that the nurse was confident enough to override a controlled substance. Nurses that I encounter at work are very cautious when it comes to pulling controls from the pyxis, let alone override. Why didn't she have another nurse witness her?
 
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worst part of being a healthcare provider. This is worst if you are a pharmacist because chains are trying to get rid of you anyway and fill your position with cheap new grads. 1 error can mean your job.
 
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I think there should be criminal charges. This would be equivalent to me if someone was texting while driving and ran someone over. I wouldn't have sympathy for someone in that case so I have none for this nurse.
 
I'm actually also surprised that the nurse was confident enough to override a controlled substance. Nurses that I encounter at work are very cautious when it comes to pulling controls from the pyxis, let alone override. Why didn't she have another nurse witness her?
She probably didn’t know it was supposed to be a controlled substance, and the ADC obviously didn’t flag it for her.
 
I always thought it was hard to ignore the huge bolded "PARALYZING AGENT" on the top of the vec vial, but I guess not.

That's got to be one of the worst deaths imaginable.
 
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I always thought it was hard to ignore the huge bolded "PARALYZING AGENT" on the top of the vec vial, but I guess not.

That's got to be one of the worst deaths imaginable.

And then that she needed to reconstitute it.

The kicker is that it had been verified for nearly 10 minutes. So for once nursing can’t blame Pharmacy.
 
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Sounds like you're talking about Eric Cropp? That's the first thing I thought of too.
Ex-pharmacist Eric Cropp found guilty in medication death of Emily Jerry, 2

From what I remember about the case I think he had better reason to avoid criminal charges than this nurse.

This story is utilized in many pharmacy institutes as well as the “tech” programs in the DOD dept. Always a debutable discussion (moreso the tech than the consequence of the pharmacist).
 
I think there should be criminal charges. This would be equivalent to me if someone was texting while driving and ran someone over. I wouldn't have sympathy for someone in that case so I have none for this nurse.
No. This is driving and texting in a car where your phone won’t let you text if you’re moving over 30mph, so you disable the GPS, and you had a chauffeur, but abandoned them at a rest stop, and after you hear a sound like you hit someone, you don’t stop.
 
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I first read this report on /r/medicine and I'm surprised how different our forum's responses have been so far. The nurse being charged was not the primary nurse assigned to the patient. This is a rundown of her mistakes:

1) Pulled the medication from a pyxis machine in an ICU area rather than CT scan where the patient was going (where vec would not have been loaded)
2) Pulled the wrong medication by override in a non-emergent situation instead of waiting a few minutes for RPh verification
3) Ignored the PARALYZING AGENT warning on the vialtop
4) Did not verify that she pulled the correct medication, but...
5) ... apparently did read the labeling to reconstitute vecuronium
6) Versed does not need to be reconstituted.
7) Dosing volume difference between what was ordered and actually drawn up and given (IIRC)
8) Did not verify medication at time of administration
9) Did not monitor the patient after administering medication. Patients should absolutely be monitored after administering a benzo.

In my opinion this absolutely does fall under criminal negligence.
 
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What I don’t get is why do we give nurses the authorization to override this type of thing in the first place? A lot of times a nurse won’t even enter an order until he/she has already administered it. I’m like, why do you need a pharmacist to even verify anything then?
 
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What I don’t get is why do we give nurses the authorization to override this type of thing in the first place? A lot of times a nurse won’t even enter an order until he/she has already administered it. I’m like, why do you need a pharmacist to even verify anything then?
You need to have some sort of compromise. For example, many facilities restrict the products that can be overridden. In one facility, injectable opioids can be pulled for emergencies, but oral tablet opioids can’t. The reasoning is that if you have the time to wait for a Percocet to dissolve, it’s not an emergency. If you try to wield ultimate authority via Pyxis, nurses will just grab what they think they will need for the day when they first access a drug at the beginning of their shift. Lab coat pockets make for a dangerous, but very convenient “dispensing cabinet”.
 
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Being charged is different from being convicted. You'll always see frivolous prosecuters every now and then. Nothing to worry about, yet!
 
Remember that the nurse pulled the vecuronium from the ICU Pyxis. I can see a case for that being available for override in the ICU.

It is frustrating when someone seemingly goes out of their way to bypass or break any safety measure you employ. No matter how rock solid your system is, someone will find a way around it. I wonder why this particular nurse felt the need to bypass so many safety steps and make so many egregious mistakes? Was it a case of individual wrecklessness? Fear of an MD who mistreats staff? A culture that allows nurses to operate like it's the wild west? It'll be interesting to see how the case plays out.
 
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Horrible. Yes, look at the culture but for Pete's sake, how many workarounds can one person do? Terrifying. The only meds urgent enough for workarounds are found in the crash cart. If you can't justify cracking the crash cart, then you can't justify bypassing multiple safety measures.
 
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We keep approaching the problem from the aspect of what a nurse should be allowed to do. We could also approach the issue from a technology point of view. At places I’ve seen (small sample size), I can enter orders with either the brand or generic name. For example, if I don’t know that Versed is the brand for midazolam, I can enter Versed and it pulls up all the midazolam entries. However, if I walk to the floor and look in the Omnicell (as a nurse would), it is only searchable with generic names (not sure if this is everywhere, or just where I work). The ability to toggle between brand and generic in a search might have prevented this.
 
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That's a pretty huge screwup, so I could certainly understand losing her license or a liability suit. Criminal charges seem unnecessarily draconian though.
 
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2 year community college degree. I don't see how this could have occurred.
 
2 year community college degree. I don't see how this could have occurred.
I’ve met quite a few foolish pharmacists and physicians, too. This is not an education issue.
 
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2 year community college degree. I don't see how this could have occurred.

I know plenty of RNs who are way smarter than some PharmDs.
 
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Our Safety Pharmacist went over this case with the inpatient team yesterday. I have to admit that I now believe there are two victims. Here is a summary of what we covered:
•75 yo woman w/ intracranial hematoma admitted to Neuro ICU

•Two days later she was alert /oriented & in the Stepdown unit waiting on bed on regular floor

•Sent to Radiology department for total body PET scan where she told staff she was claustrophobic – physician ordered Versed 2 mg IV for sedation – radiology staff requested a nurse from Neuro administer the Versed because their nurses would not be able to perform monitoring of the patient

•Nurse in Neuro ICU (‘help all’ nurse) was going to ER to do a swallowing study and was asked to give this before she went to the ER

•Nurse looked in profile on Neuro ICU ADC for Versed and could not find it. She then used the override function to search for it. She talking to an orientee about the swallow study while entering the first two letters “VE” and selected the first med on the list. She did not notice that she selected vecuronium instead of Versed. She did look at how to reconstitute it and got a pt sticker, flushes, swabs and needle and put it all in a baggie with “PET scan, Versed 1-2 mg” on it and went to Radiology.

•In radiology, she found the patient, reconstituted the med and gave it, then left the PET scan area. She did not remember the exact dose but thought she gave 1 ml. The leftover med was placed in a baggie and given to another nurse. The nurse did not monitor the patient after administration.

•Order for Versed was entered at 1447 and verified by a pharmacist at 1449, but never dispensed from the ADC. Vecuronium was dispensed at 1459 via override.

•The nurse did not document the administration of the med because she was told the new system would capture in the MAR

•The patient was placed in an injection room where she first got a radioactive tracer, followed by what was thought to be Versed.

•After the nurse gave the injection, patient was moved to a patient room where they were expected to wait for up to an hour for the tracer to circulate. Techs could monitor via camera that room & noted her eyes were closed but resolution is not good enough to detect breathing.

•About 30 minutes after injection, patient was found unresponsive. CPR was started, patient was intubated and heartbeat was restored. The patient was brought back to the Neuro ICU (without ever getting the scan).

•At that time, a second nurse asked the first nurse if the med in the baggie was what had been given the patient and when she answered yes, it was then found that it wasn’t Versed, but vecuronium.

•The patient was placed on comfort care and died the following day after being removed from life support

•VUMC did report the death to the medical examiner within 40 minutes…but before there was a ‘definitive conclusion’ about the cause of death

•Provider stated death was due to bleeding, and not medical error

•When the full facts came out, VUMC was threatened with losing CMS status

•Nurse was terminated about a week after the incident

•Nurse was subsequently charged with reckless homicide & impaired adult abuse

Among the Hospital/Medication system issues:

•Bedside barcode verification had not been implemented in Radiology (it was ‘pending’) – it was next on the list. This may have contributed to confusion on med documentation.

•Overrides should not be used in non-emergent situations, such as this
•Independent double check
•Messaging on ADC during removal – there was a red box warning that vecuronium was only for stat orders but no warning that pt should be intubated or about to be intubated
•NMBs should only be kept in areas where truly needed (OR, ICU, ER) and not stored as floorstock or in ADC on other units

•NMBs should be kept segregated from other meds in lidded containers or RSI kits or in ADCs in separate lidded pockets

•Inadequate monitoring of patient after administration of what they thought was a sedative. Even discounting the administration of vecuronium, there should have been monitoring for a patient given Versed – at least pulseox and EKG.

•Inadequate assessment of patient prior to the scan – prior to scan, the patient’s claustrophobia should have been identified when an oral agent could have been administered.

•Search issues with ADC – this ADC defaulted to generic names and the nurse would have to switch to brand name search to find Versed.

•Inadequate transport plan – it could have been noted who would accompany patient and monitor after the administration of the sedative

•Inadequate communication between staff – the PET scan staff recognized the need for monitoring the patient after sedation which is why they asked for someone to come down from Neuro ICU to give the med. But it’s not clear if this was ever conveyed to the nurse that went down with the med.

•Warning labels on the med – the vial DID have a red top with “Warning: Paralyzing Agent” message but it still did not attract the nurse’s attention.

•Multitasking – nurse was CLEARLY multitasking. When she was asked to do this, she was already on her way down to ER to do another test and she was explaining the test to an “orientee” while removing the med. She had to ask for directions to get to the PET scan and then left to go to the ER and do the other study.

•Not the patient’s primary nurse – this nurse was a ‘help-all’ nurse and so may have had little interaction or information on the patient before going to Radiology

•Time pressures – PET unit had a full schedule that day and it had been noted that if the Neuro staff could not come down to give the med, the patient would have to be sent back and the scan rescheduled. This may have contributed to a sense of urgency.

After reviewing the facts, I can see how this could have happened to any nurse. I'm not absolving her of any blame, but it was an honest mistake. It was not her intent to kill the patient. Furthermore, the one person likely to never again make this error was fired. VUMC lost an opportunity to have a person intimately involved to tell the story and describe its effects to staff. I don't see how criminal charges are justified nor do I see how safety will be improved by criminal action.
 
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Our Safety Pharmacist went over this case with the inpatient team yesterday. I have to admit that I now believe there are two victims. Here is a summary of what we covered:
•75 yo woman w/ intracranial hematoma admitted to Neuro ICU

•Two days later she was alert /oriented & in the Stepdown unit waiting on bed on regular floor

•Sent to Radiology department for total body PET scan where she told staff she was claustrophobic – physician ordered Versed 2 mg IV for sedation – radiology staff requested a nurse from Neuro administer the Versed because their nurses would not be able to perform monitoring of the patient

•Nurse in Neuro ICU (‘help all’ nurse) was going to ER to do a swallowing study and was asked to give this before she went to the ER

•Nurse looked in profile on Neuro ICU ADC for Versed and could not find it. She then used the override function to search for it. She talking to an orientee about the swallow study while entering the first two letters “VE” and selected the first med on the list. She did not notice that she selected vecuronium instead of Versed. She did look at how to reconstitute it and got a pt sticker, flushes, swabs and needle and put it all in a baggie with “PET scan, Versed 1-2 mg” on it and went to Radiology.

•In radiology, she found the patient, reconstituted the med and gave it, then left the PET scan area. She did not remember the exact dose but thought she gave 1 ml. The leftover med was placed in a baggie and given to another nurse. The nurse did not monitor the patient after administration.

•Order for Versed was entered at 1447 and verified by a pharmacist at 1449, but never dispensed from the ADC. Vecuronium was dispensed at 1459 via override.

•The nurse did not document the administration of the med because she was told the new system would capture in the MAR

•The patient was placed in an injection room where she first got a radioactive tracer, followed by what was thought to be Versed.

•After the nurse gave the injection, patient was moved to a patient room where they were expected to wait for up to an hour for the tracer to circulate. Techs could monitor via camera that room & noted her eyes were closed but resolution is not good enough to detect breathing.

•About 30 minutes after injection, patient was found unresponsive. CPR was started, patient was intubated and heartbeat was restored. The patient was brought back to the Neuro ICU (without ever getting the scan).

•At that time, a second nurse asked the first nurse if the med in the baggie was what had been given the patient and when she answered yes, it was then found that it wasn’t Versed, but vecuronium.

•The patient was placed on comfort care and died the following day after being removed from life support

•VUMC did report the death to the medical examiner within 40 minutes…but before there was a ‘definitive conclusion’ about the cause of death

•Provider stated death was due to bleeding, and not medical error

•When the full facts came out, VUMC was threatened with losing CMS status

•Nurse was terminated about a week after the incident

•Nurse was subsequently charged with reckless homicide & impaired adult abuse

Among the Hospital/Medication system issues:

•Bedside barcode verification had not been implemented in Radiology (it was ‘pending’) – it was next on the list. This may have contributed to confusion on med documentation.

•Overrides should not be used in non-emergent situations, such as this
•Independent double check
•Messaging on ADC during removal – there was a red box warning that vecuronium was only for stat orders but no warning that pt should be intubated or about to be intubated
•NMBs should only be kept in areas where truly needed (OR, ICU, ER) and not stored as floorstock or in ADC on other units

•NMBs should be kept segregated from other meds in lidded containers or RSI kits or in ADCs in separate lidded pockets

•Inadequate monitoring of patient after administration of what they thought was a sedative. Even discounting the administration of vecuronium, there should have been monitoring for a patient given Versed – at least pulseox and EKG.

•Inadequate assessment of patient prior to the scan – prior to scan, the patient’s claustrophobia should have been identified when an oral agent could have been administered.

•Search issues with ADC – this ADC defaulted to generic names and the nurse would have to switch to brand name search to find Versed.

•Inadequate transport plan – it could have been noted who would accompany patient and monitor after the administration of the sedative

•Inadequate communication between staff – the PET scan staff recognized the need for monitoring the patient after sedation which is why they asked for someone to come down from Neuro ICU to give the med. But it’s not clear if this was ever conveyed to the nurse that went down with the med.

•Warning labels on the med – the vial DID have a red top with “Warning: Paralyzing Agent” message but it still did not attract the nurse’s attention.

•Multitasking – nurse was CLEARLY multitasking. When she was asked to do this, she was already on her way down to ER to do another test and she was explaining the test to an “orientee” while removing the med. She had to ask for directions to get to the PET scan and then left to go to the ER and do the other study.

•Not the patient’s primary nurse – this nurse was a ‘help-all’ nurse and so may have had little interaction or information on the patient before going to Radiology

•Time pressures – PET unit had a full schedule that day and it had been noted that if the Neuro staff could not come down to give the med, the patient would have to be sent back and the scan rescheduled. This may have contributed to a sense of urgency.

After reviewing the facts, I can see how this could have happened to any nurse. I'm not absolving her of any blame, but it was an honest mistake. It was not her intent to kill the patient. Furthermore, the one person likely to never again make this error was fired. VUMC lost an opportunity to have a person intimately involved to tell the story and describe its effects to staff. I don't see how criminal charges are justified nor do I see how safety will be improved by criminal action.

Strong 2nd post by a 10 year member.

Thank you for the detailed post... it was extremely helpful. I hope you post more in the future.
 
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lol, I've been lurking for 10 years. I felt compelled to post because of all the blame being thrown around. Hopefully I'll be more of a contributor in the future.
 
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I’ve met quite a few foolish pharmacists and physicians, too. This is not an education issue.
So if you were to do a root cause analysis what would be outcome?
 
Our Safety Pharmacist went over this case with the inpatient team yesterday. I have to admit that I now believe there are two victims. Here is a summary of what we covered:
•75 yo woman w/ intracranial hematoma admitted to Neuro ICU

•Two days later she was alert /oriented & in the Stepdown unit waiting on bed on regular floor

•Sent to Radiology department for total body PET scan where she told staff she was claustrophobic – physician ordered Versed 2 mg IV for sedation – radiology staff requested a nurse from Neuro administer the Versed because their nurses would not be able to perform monitoring of the patient

•Nurse in Neuro ICU (‘help all’ nurse) was going to ER to do a swallowing study and was asked to give this before she went to the ER

•Nurse looked in profile on Neuro ICU ADC for Versed and could not find it. She then used the override function to search for it. She talking to an orientee about the swallow study while entering the first two letters “VE” and selected the first med on the list. She did not notice that she selected vecuronium instead of Versed. She did look at how to reconstitute it and got a pt sticker, flushes, swabs and needle and put it all in a baggie with “PET scan, Versed 1-2 mg” on it and went to Radiology.

•In radiology, she found the patient, reconstituted the med and gave it, then left the PET scan area. She did not remember the exact dose but thought she gave 1 ml. The leftover med was placed in a baggie and given to another nurse. The nurse did not monitor the patient after administration.

•Order for Versed was entered at 1447 and verified by a pharmacist at 1449, but never dispensed from the ADC. Vecuronium was dispensed at 1459 via override.

•The nurse did not document the administration of the med because she was told the new system would capture in the MAR

•The patient was placed in an injection room where she first got a radioactive tracer, followed by what was thought to be Versed.

•After the nurse gave the injection, patient was moved to a patient room where they were expected to wait for up to an hour for the tracer to circulate. Techs could monitor via camera that room & noted her eyes were closed but resolution is not good enough to detect breathing.

•About 30 minutes after injection, patient was found unresponsive. CPR was started, patient was intubated and heartbeat was restored. The patient was brought back to the Neuro ICU (without ever getting the scan).

•At that time, a second nurse asked the first nurse if the med in the baggie was what had been given the patient and when she answered yes, it was then found that it wasn’t Versed, but vecuronium.

•The patient was placed on comfort care and died the following day after being removed from life support

•VUMC did report the death to the medical examiner within 40 minutes…but before there was a ‘definitive conclusion’ about the cause of death

•Provider stated death was due to bleeding, and not medical error

•When the full facts came out, VUMC was threatened with losing CMS status

•Nurse was terminated about a week after the incident

•Nurse was subsequently charged with reckless homicide & impaired adult abuse

Among the Hospital/Medication system issues:

•Bedside barcode verification had not been implemented in Radiology (it was ‘pending’) – it was next on the list. This may have contributed to confusion on med documentation.

•Overrides should not be used in non-emergent situations, such as this
•Independent double check
•Messaging on ADC during removal – there was a red box warning that vecuronium was only for stat orders but no warning that pt should be intubated or about to be intubated
•NMBs should only be kept in areas where truly needed (OR, ICU, ER) and not stored as floorstock or in ADC on other units

•NMBs should be kept segregated from other meds in lidded containers or RSI kits or in ADCs in separate lidded pockets

•Inadequate monitoring of patient after administration of what they thought was a sedative. Even discounting the administration of vecuronium, there should have been monitoring for a patient given Versed – at least pulseox and EKG.

•Inadequate assessment of patient prior to the scan – prior to scan, the patient’s claustrophobia should have been identified when an oral agent could have been administered.

•Search issues with ADC – this ADC defaulted to generic names and the nurse would have to switch to brand name search to find Versed.

•Inadequate transport plan – it could have been noted who would accompany patient and monitor after the administration of the sedative

•Inadequate communication between staff – the PET scan staff recognized the need for monitoring the patient after sedation which is why they asked for someone to come down from Neuro ICU to give the med. But it’s not clear if this was ever conveyed to the nurse that went down with the med.

•Warning labels on the med – the vial DID have a red top with “Warning: Paralyzing Agent” message but it still did not attract the nurse’s attention.

•Multitasking – nurse was CLEARLY multitasking. When she was asked to do this, she was already on her way down to ER to do another test and she was explaining the test to an “orientee” while removing the med. She had to ask for directions to get to the PET scan and then left to go to the ER and do the other study.

•Not the patient’s primary nurse – this nurse was a ‘help-all’ nurse and so may have had little interaction or information on the patient before going to Radiology

•Time pressures – PET unit had a full schedule that day and it had been noted that if the Neuro staff could not come down to give the med, the patient would have to be sent back and the scan rescheduled. This may have contributed to a sense of urgency.

After reviewing the facts, I can see how this could have happened to any nurse. I'm not absolving her of any blame, but it was an honest mistake. It was not her intent to kill the patient. Furthermore, the one person likely to never again make this error was fired. VUMC lost an opportunity to have a person intimately involved to tell the story and describe its effects to staff. I don't see how criminal charges are justified nor do I see how safety will be improved by criminal action.
I agree it was a time pressure issue but who in healthcare doesn't have that issue. Work faster with less of a workforce. That is the 21st century labor model. If someone makes a mistake make sure corporate has the liability insurance and blame the employee but not the company policies and procedures. I feel sorry for this woman but did corporate fail her or did she fail herself. I'm sure millions will be spent decifering the details.
 
So if you were to do a root cause analysis what would be outcome?
This person acted as recklessly as possible (short of doing all of this blindfolded). That is not affected by level of education.
 
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Our Safety Pharmacist went over this case with the inpatient team yesterday. I have to admit that I now believe there are two victims. Here is a summary of what we covered:
•75 yo woman w/ intracranial hematoma admitted to Neuro ICU

•Two days later she was alert /oriented & in the Stepdown unit waiting on bed on regular floor

•Sent to Radiology department for total body PET scan where she told staff she was claustrophobic – physician ordered Versed 2 mg IV for sedation – radiology staff requested a nurse from Neuro administer the Versed because their nurses would not be able to perform monitoring of the patient

•Nurse in Neuro ICU (‘help all’ nurse) was going to ER to do a swallowing study and was asked to give this before she went to the ER

•Nurse looked in profile on Neuro ICU ADC for Versed and could not find it. She then used the override function to search for it. She talking to an orientee about the swallow study while entering the first two letters “VE” and selected the first med on the list. She did not notice that she selected vecuronium instead of Versed. She did look at how to reconstitute it and got a pt sticker, flushes, swabs and needle and put it all in a baggie with “PET scan, Versed 1-2 mg” on it and went to Radiology.

•In radiology, she found the patient, reconstituted the med and gave it, then left the PET scan area. She did not remember the exact dose but thought she gave 1 ml. The leftover med was placed in a baggie and given to another nurse. The nurse did not monitor the patient after administration.

•Order for Versed was entered at 1447 and verified by a pharmacist at 1449, but never dispensed from the ADC. Vecuronium was dispensed at 1459 via override.

•The nurse did not document the administration of the med because she was told the new system would capture in the MAR

•The patient was placed in an injection room where she first got a radioactive tracer, followed by what was thought to be Versed.

•After the nurse gave the injection, patient was moved to a patient room where they were expected to wait for up to an hour for the tracer to circulate. Techs could monitor via camera that room & noted her eyes were closed but resolution is not good enough to detect breathing.

•About 30 minutes after injection, patient was found unresponsive. CPR was started, patient was intubated and heartbeat was restored. The patient was brought back to the Neuro ICU (without ever getting the scan).

•At that time, a second nurse asked the first nurse if the med in the baggie was what had been given the patient and when she answered yes, it was then found that it wasn’t Versed, but vecuronium.

•The patient was placed on comfort care and died the following day after being removed from life support

•VUMC did report the death to the medical examiner within 40 minutes…but before there was a ‘definitive conclusion’ about the cause of death

•Provider stated death was due to bleeding, and not medical error

•When the full facts came out, VUMC was threatened with losing CMS status

•Nurse was terminated about a week after the incident

•Nurse was subsequently charged with reckless homicide & impaired adult abuse

Among the Hospital/Medication system issues:

•Bedside barcode verification had not been implemented in Radiology (it was ‘pending’) – it was next on the list. This may have contributed to confusion on med documentation.

•Overrides should not be used in non-emergent situations, such as this
•Independent double check
•Messaging on ADC during removal – there was a red box warning that vecuronium was only for stat orders but no warning that pt should be intubated or about to be intubated
•NMBs should only be kept in areas where truly needed (OR, ICU, ER) and not stored as floorstock or in ADC on other units

•NMBs should be kept segregated from other meds in lidded containers or RSI kits or in ADCs in separate lidded pockets

•Inadequate monitoring of patient after administration of what they thought was a sedative. Even discounting the administration of vecuronium, there should have been monitoring for a patient given Versed – at least pulseox and EKG.

•Inadequate assessment of patient prior to the scan – prior to scan, the patient’s claustrophobia should have been identified when an oral agent could have been administered.

•Search issues with ADC – this ADC defaulted to generic names and the nurse would have to switch to brand name search to find Versed.

•Inadequate transport plan – it could have been noted who would accompany patient and monitor after the administration of the sedative

•Inadequate communication between staff – the PET scan staff recognized the need for monitoring the patient after sedation which is why they asked for someone to come down from Neuro ICU to give the med. But it’s not clear if this was ever conveyed to the nurse that went down with the med.

•Warning labels on the med – the vial DID have a red top with “Warning: Paralyzing Agent” message but it still did not attract the nurse’s attention.

•Multitasking – nurse was CLEARLY multitasking. When she was asked to do this, she was already on her way down to ER to do another test and she was explaining the test to an “orientee” while removing the med. She had to ask for directions to get to the PET scan and then left to go to the ER and do the other study.

•Not the patient’s primary nurse – this nurse was a ‘help-all’ nurse and so may have had little interaction or information on the patient before going to Radiology

•Time pressures – PET unit had a full schedule that day and it had been noted that if the Neuro staff could not come down to give the med, the patient would have to be sent back and the scan rescheduled. This may have contributed to a sense of urgency.

After reviewing the facts, I can see how this could have happened to any nurse. I'm not absolving her of any blame, but it was an honest mistake. It was not her intent to kill the patient. Furthermore, the one person likely to never again make this error was fired. VUMC lost an opportunity to have a person intimately involved to tell the story and describe its effects to staff. I don't see how criminal charges are justified nor do I see how safety will be improved by criminal action.
Thumbs up coz you took an hour to write that sh1t.
 
I'm just trying to figure out why was she searching for Versed instead of midazolam? Aren't meds supposed to be listed by generic name in the Pyxis?
Usage of some brand names simply won’t die.
 
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