What is the purpose of The Match?

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FunnyDocMan1234

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Why don't residency applications function like most other application processes in existence including med school apps - you apply, interview, then get told if you are accepted/waitlisted and choose from the places you were accepted to?

It seems like it would be much simpler to interview at a top choice then if a student gets in they can relax and cancel their other interviews, instead of wasting thousands of dollars and spending several extra months with anxiety about where the lottery system will put them.
 
I remember reading about the match and that it was actually much more pro-applicant.
 
My understanding is that its essentially an automated version of what you are describing anyway.

Imagine if you were applying to med school you said "Ok, Harvard is my first choice so if I get in there I'm going...if not then Rochester is my second choice....and if not that then my state school is my third choice, but I'd still be happy to go there if that's the best I get into."

The match just automatically puts you at the your top preference that is willing to accept you. Its the same thing you would have done manually, but reduces people sitting on a bunch of acceptances while others are pulling their hair out on wait lists.
 
The match is literally there to make sure you get your top pick possible. You rank as many residency programs you want, the residencies rank the students they want. You get into a residency based on the best match in your rank list where the residency PD had you high up enough in their rank list
 
The mathematicians who invented the algorithm for the Match actually won the Nobel Prize. If you are interested there are articles out there explaining how it works and even i could understand some of them!
 
Why don't residency applications function like most other application processes in existence including med school apps - you apply, interview, then get told if you are accepted/waitlisted and choose from the places you were accepted to?

It seems like it would be much simpler to interview at a top choice then if a student gets in they can relax and cancel their other interviews, instead of wasting thousands of dollars and spending several extra months with anxiety about where the lottery system will put them.

Imagine that your dream program, Program A, doesn't interview until November. But in October you get an interview at Program B, which is much less desirable. At the end of the interview, they offer you a place-- but only if you accept it within 2 days. If you don't, you lose your chance with them. You'd be forced to choose between your known acceptance to a place you don't like as much, and holding out for the possibility of your dream program. That is what used to happen, on a much larger scale. The Match prevents that.

Hopefully as you get closer to matching yourself, your school will explain more about how it all works.
 
The wiki article also really answers your question very well in this history section.
 
As nerve-wracking and frustrating as the match can be, it's much better for the vast majority of graduating students than the system it replaced.

True, the very best and most savvy students might have been able to negotiate better before, but a 94%ish match rate is not a bad result.
 
As nerve-wracking and frustrating as the match can be, it's much better for the vast majority of graduating students than the system it replaced.

True, the very best and most savvy students might have been able to negotiate better before, but a 94%ish match rate is not a bad result.
It's only that high if you don't count anyone other than US MD students though...
 
Why don't residency applications function like most other application processes in existence including med school apps - you apply, interview, then get told if you are accepted/waitlisted and choose from the places you were accepted to?

It seems like it would be much simpler to interview at a top choice then if a student gets in they can relax and cancel their other interviews, instead of wasting thousands of dollars and spending several extra months with anxiety about where the lottery system will put them.

The match is an attempt to mitigate the damage done by our residency system.

See, in a normal job hunt you send out applications, you interview, and if you find a job offer you like you accept it. But when you take a job, that's not really the end of the process. You're still on the lookout for a better job. Granted, you're probably looking less actively and rapidly leaving many jobs shortly after being hired is a red flag on any resume, but if the job isn't what was advertised to you or if you realize you have drastically undersold yourself you walk right out the door you came in through and get a better job.

Residencies, though, are allowed to collude to prevent employees that leave/are fired from ever getting hired anywhere ever again. This is flatly illegal in the rest of the corporate world. Residencies are also set up so that, if you don't get a job offer in a very narrow window (your first match after medical school) you are unlikely to ever work in your desired field ever, and you are left with nothing but the ashes of your youth and an insurmountable amount of non-dischargeable debt.

Before the match, malignant residencies would routinely take advantage of this situation by hosting an incredibly dishonest tour and then giving good applicants an offer, on their interview day, that was take it or leave it and good for 24 hours. A normal job would never bother doing that, because an applicant attracted under false pretenses or by high pressure sales tactics would just walk right back out the door as soon as he came to his senses. However a resident is effectively trapped for duration of his/her residency regardless of how poorly he chose is contract, and students were very motivated to accept even a very poor contract because it was better than being left out in the cold. Basically residency programs took on the role of revolutionary era plutocrats, luring medical students into contracts of indentured servitude with false promises of a better life and then breaking them mentally and physically once they were legally bound.

The match was an attempt to make Residency fairer. Fair in this case meaning that the truly awful indentured contracts could be dumped on lower quality applicants who could be made to feel that they 'deserve' the treatment they're receiving. This resulted in fewer complaints and is therefore widely considered a success
 
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The match is way better than the way AMCAS works. People cant hold 10 offers for months procrastinating on picking 1 and PDs don't have to be at the mercy of the applicant.

PerrotFish what you described is still how finding fellowships works in the some fields: get an invite to interview, show up the same week or lose spot, get an offer you have to accept in 48 hours. I guess there arn't as many malignancies when it comes to fellowships though.
 
The match is way better than the way AMCAS works. People cant hold 10 offers for months procrastinating on picking 1 and PDs don't have to be at the mercy of the applicant.

PerrotFish what you described is still how finding fellowships works in the some fields: get an invite to interview, show up the same week or lose spot, get an offer you have to accept in 48 hours. I guess there arn't as many malignancies when it comes to fellowships though.

Fellowships are a funny middle ground between a normal job and a residency. On the one hand, they can (again) collude to keep you from ever matching again if you walk out on them. On the other hand you're an attending and the absolute worst thing they can do to you is force you to go find a job making hundreds of thousands of dollars a year as an attending physician. So fellows can still walk away from a bad enough job. I imagine that keeps a lot of the malignancy in check.
 
...
Fair in this case meaning that the truly awful indentured contracts could be dumped on lower quality applicants who could be made to feel that they 'deserve' the treatment they're receiving...

while I agree with most of what you've said, some of the people I've seen get really dumped on weren't lower quality applicants at poorly ranked community places. A number of the malignant programs out there actually have brand names and people just opt to put up with crap for the CV value.
 
I'm cynical and don't believe it works in my favor. Especially after my school they had several open spots for my specialty after the match which means they didn't give two shoits about me.
Which is hilarious considering they hired a physician with a horrible reputation for killing patients and being kicked out of multiple hospitals. Pretty sure I'm a better investment than that humongous failure of a physical nicknamed "007" at those hospitals.
 
I'm cynical and don't believe it works in my favor. Especially after my school they had several open spots for my specialty after the match which means they didn't give two shoits about me.
Which is hilarious considering they hired a physician with a horrible reputation for killing patients and being kicked out of multiple hospitals. Pretty sure I'm a better investment than that humongous failure of a physical nicknamed "007" at those hospitals.

The match absolutely works in your favor.

It has nothing to do with whether your home program liked you or not.
 
I'm cynical and don't believe it works in my favor. Especially after my school they had several open spots for my specialty after the match which means they didn't give two shoits about me.
Which is hilarious considering they hired a physician with a horrible reputation for killing patients and being kicked out of multiple hospitals. Pretty sure I'm a better investment than that humongous failure of a physical nicknamed "007" at those hospitals.

The fact that your home program would rather go unfilled and hurt their own service than hire you has nothing to do with the Match. It has everything to do with the participants of the match, i.e. your program and you.
 
I love how the cliche and vague phrase 'it actually works in favor of the applicant' is always used to defend the match and portray it as untouchable.

It comes down to one thing, please try to answer it instead of using your cliche:
If it is such a good system for matching applicants to programs, why does literally no other similar system use it (colleges, med schools, any graduate schools).

Please list one benefit of the match system that a rolling admissions system doesn't include. There is a reason every other type of program uses rolling admissions and wait lists to grant entry into a program. Any benefits of the match are greatly outweighed by the mental health tolls of being forced to wait until March find out where you have to uproot your life and your family's within two months. This is especially difficult for applicants in dual-career relationships. Another huge burden of the match is the financial toll of being forced to apply to an extreme amount of programs 'just-in-case' instead of being able to wait to hear back from top choice programs before applying to more.

Any argument about the history of programs giving applicants hours to respond to an acceptance is ridiculous - a simple statement by the AAMC dissallowing this unreasonable practice solves the problem.
 
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I love how the cliche and vague phrase 'it actually works in favor of the applicant' is always used to defend the match and portray it as untouchable.

It comes down to one thing, please try to answer it instead of using your cliche:
If it is such a good system for matching applicants to programs, why does literally no other similar system use it (colleges, med schools, any graduate schools).

Please list one benefit of the match system that a rolling admissions system doesn't include. There is a reason every other type of program uses rolling admissions and wait lists to grant entry into a program. Any benefits of the match are greatly outweighed by the mental health tolls of being forced to wait until March find out where you have to uproot your life and your family's. This is especially difficult for applicants in dual-career relationships. Another huge burden of the match is the financial toll of being forced to apply to an extreme amount of programs 'just-in-case' instead of being able to wait to hear back from top choice programs before applying to more.

Any argument about the history of med schools giving applicants hours to respond to an acceptance is ridiculous - a simple statement by the AAMC dissallowing this unreasonable practice solves the problem.

Many of the benefits of already been repeated above and on other similar threads. The biggest one that immediately comes to mind is the manipulation that would otherwise occur if it was rolling. In the past, you were given maybe 48 hours to take or leave a residency offer. Weaker programs would use this to their advantage and offer interviews and job offers much earlier, snatching up applicants who would otherwise be excellent candidates for stronger programs but may feel uneasy taking the gamble and passing up a sure thing at that point.

Also, it favors the applicant.
 
Like I said, Any argument about the history of programs giving applicants hours to respond to an acceptance is ridiculous - a simple statement by the AAMC dissallowing this unreasonable practice solves the problem.

That is a crazy argument for preservation of this arcane process. Med schools aren't allowed to do give applicants 48 hours to accept when you apply to med school. Law schools can't do it when you apply to law schools. Colleges can't do this when you apply to college. Just because this ridiculous practice was somehow allowed in the past for residency programs doesn't mean the common-sense solution of banning the practice (like in every other comparable application process) can't be done.
 
Uh huh....so there's less mental anguish if you get waitlisted at your programs and are waiting for a spot? And how is this going to work for programs with <3 spots?

The exact same way med school admissions and every other admission system ever works... And yes for the majority of people who got into med school before March 15 there was much less anxiety and interview costs were much less because you could add schools and cancel interviews based on your acceptances. Having a minority of individuals wait until March is much better than forcing everyone to do so. Just like every other admission system ever.
 
The exact same way med school admissions and every other admission system ever works... And yes for the majority of people who got into med school before March 15 there was much less anxiety and interview costs were much less because you could add schools and cancel interviews based on your acceptances. Having a minority of individuals wait until March is much better than forcing everyone to do so. Just like every other admission system ever.

Haha are you kidding? No, just like med school admissions people will be holding onto their acceptances. Except that in small programs with 1-5 spots, basically 10 people in the country will be holding all the acceptances until whatever arbitrary date they have to give them up. Your system only works for gigantic programs in IM/Peds, with a ton of spots per program.
 
Haha are you kidding? No, just like med school admissions people will be holding onto their acceptances. Except that in small programs with 1-5 spots, basically 10 people in the country will be holding all the acceptances until whatever arbitrary date they have to give them up. Your system only works for gigantic programs in IM/Peds, with a ton of spots per program.

So what if people hold onto acceptances? The system will function just like the match in those cases for people on the waitlist - they will find out where they are going at the arbitrary date. The huge difference is that a ton of people WILL find out much earlier and be able to reduce interview costs and anxiety.
 
So what if people hold onto acceptances? The system will function just like the match in those cases for people on the waitlist - they will find out where they are going at the arbitrary date. The huge difference is that a ton of people WILL find out much earlier and be able to reduce interview costs and anxiety.

No, now instead of waiting for match day where the machine spits out where you're going, applicants will be scrambling to send more letters and constantly trying to figure out which of their 15 admissions to take vs what other program might open up that they'd rather go to. Except they now have 24 hrs or whatever to accept that spot or give it up since they can only hold one acceptance. It would be a ****show for weeks where you'd have to be tied to your phone. Which is a time period most of us were done with M4 and on vacation relaxing.

Consider that literally everyone in this thread that has gone through match is saying that it's preferable to any alternative. Including your frankly, rather poorly thought out system, and maybe re-evaluate.
 
You're obviously set in your love for the Match but all I will say is 'my system' is how every other admissions process in the world works. There is a reason med school admissions and every other admission isn't a match-type system. I would assume you are pushing for the adoption of the match in med school admissions as well.
 
What is the difference between waiting until march or february? Either way you dont finish school until may and residency starts in july. What if you had to wait until july before you were accepted? Would that be preferable to march? The match ensures the most efficient outcome for both applicants and programs. The applicant is favored because they choose where to apply and their preferences are considered first. No one forces anyone to apply to many programs. Thats an unfortunate adverse effect of the increasing competitiveness required to match well.

Also, the aamc does not govern residency programs, it's the acgme.
 
So what if people hold onto acceptances? The system will function just like the match in those cases for people on the waitlist - they will find out where they are going at the arbitrary date. The huge difference is that a ton of people WILL find out much earlier and be able to reduce interview costs and anxiety.

When you go through the match and see what its like, then you can decide if something else is better. You'd be wrong, but at least you'd be able to have some knowledge to make a better educated decision...
 
You're obviously set in your love for the Match but all I will say is 'my system' is how every other admissions process in the world works. There is a reason med school admissions and every other admission isn't a match-type system. I would assume you are pushing for the adoption of the match in med school admissions as well.

No Im not advocating that because of every ****ing reason I posted earlier, jesus christ
 
You keep saying "every other admissions process" like the beginning of residency is similar to the beginning of medical/graduate school or undergrad or jobs. It's not. No other process comes close to the regulation and oversight involved with accreditation, federal funding of positions, etc. It has to be systematic and the match makes it so. Your idea makes it easier for maybe 1/3 of applicants and absolute hell for the rest. It costs money to interview for anything so I don't understand the complaint about that. The other complaint was applicant anxiety which would actually be prolonged and worse for those waiting for spots which would be the majority of applicants since the top quartile would be holding onto most of them.
 
You're obviously set in your love for the Match but all I will say is 'my system' is how every other admissions process in the world works. There is a reason med school admissions and every other admission isn't a match-type system. I would assume you are pushing for the adoption of the match in med school admissions as well.

Competing organizations such as National Matching Services operates a number of matches other than for allopathic medicine (https://natmatch.com/home/home.htm), including psychology internships, dental residencies, and pharmacy residencies. New York City and Boston Public Schools both use a matching algorithm that is also based on Gale, Shapley, and Roth's Nobel-winning groundwork (http://economics.mit.edu/files/3024 and http://web.stanford.edu/~alroth/papers/bostonAEAPP.pdf).

Check yourself before your wreck yourself.
 
Don't forget that you essentially HAVE to complete a residency to practice medicine (a few places might let you practice as a GP, but I think you still need an internship).

Architects (who also need to complete an internship) do things the way FunnyDocMan mentions, and it's a pretty big #*(&-show. Everyone but the top applicants is really anxious and worried--there's no centralized application process (you have to just find a firm that will take you on your own), apply/interview at these places, and then face the prospect of the bird in the hand vs two in the bush. So a lot of architecture grads end up in miserable places.

With ERAS and the Match, everything is nice and easy for us. You get to interview at every program willing to interview you, and then take your time to decide where to rank programs. You're not allowed to cheat/bribe the system (nor can programs) that can and does occur when rolling admissions. Then you find out in March (which is actually 3 months before you start--few programs start before mid-June) where you matched.

I didn't find it stressful at all. I found it quite comforting--knowing I just had to complete one application, interview at programs, come up with my list (and take my time), and then just sit back and wait. It was much less stressful than applying to medical school. Quite a bit more fun to...
 
Like I said, Any argument about the history of programs giving applicants hours to respond to an acceptance is ridiculous - a simple statement by the AAMC dissallowing this unreasonable practice solves the problem.

That is a crazy argument for preservation of this arcane process. Med schools aren't allowed to do give applicants 48 hours to accept when you apply to med school. Law schools can't do it when you apply to law schools. Colleges can't do this when you apply to college. Just because this ridiculous practice was somehow allowed in the past for residency programs doesn't mean the common-sense solution of banning the practice (like in every other comparable application process) can't be done.

Add me to the growing number of residents in this thread who think the match is the best way to go about this.

In addition to all the concerns raised earlier, the system you are proposing would be unprecedented in any job market. Where else do you agree to take a job in a non-binding fashion with the option to just walk away in March (presumably months later in many cases) no questions asked and without consequence?

Also in your fantasy system what happens when a hospital ends up with TOO MANY residents? There's only so much funding to go around. Does everyone else take a pay cut? When this happens in SCHOOL (where you pay them) it's not that big of a deal.

The article you posted (which if you notice was written by a med student who presumably didn't get her first choice in the match but hadn't started at her program so doesn't realize that it's not that big of a deal and she still ended up somewhere awesome) mentions salary negotiations. Ever thought how that would change the culture of residency? One of the reasons residency works is precisely because we're all making the same salary. Did you (or the author) consider that residents with less flexibility would be financially penalized? What about hospitals more interested in pocketing the Medicare funding paying IMGs a $20k salary instead of $50k?
 
My fellowship process was rolling admissions. Trust me, you want the match system for residency.

I ended up getting a position where I wanted to go for fellowship and I can still say that.

Think about it...rolling admissions puts the advantage to the programs. East Podunk residency program could offer a spot to you. You then have a few days to answer. You have no other acceptance offers so you take that spot. Two days later you get an II from Harvard. Too bad, so sad. Off to east Podunk you go.

And imo sitting on a professional offer for more than about a week is sorta unprofessional.
 
It's good to have discussions like this. Just because we have a match doesn't mean it's the best system. Or perhaps it can be improved.

As has already been mentioned, the residency job market is somewhat different than other job markets. The number of spots is slightly higher than the number of US grads. Each program can only take an exact number of interns -- one extra isn't allowed. Residency defines your career and specialty.

Every system has it's pluses and minuses. Let's assume we're comparing the current match process to a free market system. The possible benefits of a free market system are: 1) less interviews (and expenses) for those applicants who know what they want, interview early, and get an early position - more time to move, cheaper, etc, and 2) salary negotiation by residents as part of the application process.

#1 is a definite possibility for some people. For those candidates who are very competitive for the spots they are applying to, and are certain that they know where they want to go, or for applicants whom only care about their field (i.e. want orthopedics, and don't care at all about where they go), then it might work out better this way. The very obvious example is the student who wants to stay at their home institution -- they could save lots of time and money if an early interview and agreement was made. The problem is that there are many negatives to this solution:

A. Any applicant who is less competitive is likely to get no offers early. Programs will offer to the more competitive candidates first. Less competitive candidates will wait and wait, without any clear endpoint.
B. Students will have difficulty applying to two different fields. Applying to both Ortho and Gen Surgery, for example. What would you do if you get a Gen Surgery spot offered early, but want to wait for a possible ortho spot, but don't want to lose the Gen Surgery spot?
C. In this system, it becomes critical to interview as early as possible. The later you interview, the worse your chances. This could be mitigated by a date before which programs cannot offer spots, but in that case candidates would need to continue interviewing so would limit the cost/hassle benefits of a free market system.
D. You could "accept" the Gen surgery spot, then wait to see if something better comes along, and "drop" it if so. But residency is a JOB, not a school. When you sign an employment contract, that's a legally binding decision. I stop looking for people to fill your spot because you have accepted it, and I start the process of getting you licensed and credentialed. Although walking away from a job a WalMart or the local ice cream shop may be "OK", this is the world of professional medicine. Once you've signed an employment contract you need to hold up your end of the deal, or the contract will state what the costs (to you) are -- usually the costs of hiring a new person, plus the additional cost of hiring someone temporarily to fill the vacancy. My point is that this is an unrealistic option -- you can't do this like you might have done with your medical school application process.

#2 simply isn't true, or has nothing to do with the match. Resident salaries are set by the GME office. I have no control over them. I guess it's possible that the GME office will simply give me a salary budget and let me divide it however I want -- but this creates so many downstream problems it is simply not worth it. Plus there would be a financial incentive for me to offer less to candidates up front, to save money to get people at the end. If residents are interested in improving their salaries, then unions are probably more effective than individual salary negotiation (but come with their own set of problems).

As for the match "favoring candidates", that's complicated. From a mathematical / algorithm standpoint, the match favors applicants by deciding all ties in their favor. However, this happens a vast minority of the time, so really is of little practical value. As above, the match process minimizes the amount of "unknowns" in the process -- you know exactly what day you find out where you are going, don't need to worry about when you interview, can interview at several types of programs, etc. The match gives the best "mathematical" outcome. The problem is that the match doesn't necessarily give you the best "emotional" outcome. For example, if there was a match in the medical school application process, you interviewed at 10 schools, ranked all 10, and then matched at your #10. Compare that to interviewing at 10 schools, getting into your least favorite (at some unclear date), and slowly getting 9 rejections. Both are exactly the same outcome. But many would say that the latter would "feel better". Much depends on whether you want all of the emotional process lumped together into one single moment, or spread out.

I do agree that there has been "application inflation" in the residency application process. Every year I get more and more applications -- because people are applying to more places. The average number of applications per field is published, and no one wants to be below average. That just makes the next year average higher, and up it goes. So it becomes harder to know who really wants to come to us, and who is "just applying to see what happens".

There are plenty of horror stories about what it was like before a match. The IM fellowship match is new (for many fields), and before the match it had all of the above problems. One of my residents was interested in an IM fellowship, and they wanted to stay locally. They interviewed somewhere else first, and on the drive home the PD called them to offer them the spot. They wanted an answer on the phone. He negotiated for 24 hours, to talk to his wife about the move. He called the PD at our program and told him the situation. Was interviewed the next day (before any interviews were actually scheduled) and offered the spot. We only had one spot, so the fellowship PD contacted everyone scheduled for an interview, told them the position was filled, sorry. All of those people lost any money they spent on plane tickets (or had to pay for rebooking fees), and they all panicked calling programs to try to get earlier interview dates. This could have been avoided if the fellowship PD had talked to the resident involved and simply offered him a spot before, but we saw this exact issue push the fellowship application process earlier and earlier. Just before the match was put in place, some IM fellowships were asking for applications at the end of the intern year, a full 2 years prior to when fellowship starts. And it was becoming more likely that programs would just take only candidates from within their own programs, as anything else was crazy.

Can we make the match better? Maybe. Perhaps some sort of "early decision" like college, where you only can apply to a single program. But that just shuffles the winner/loser deck again. Students would need to decide which was the "right" program to apply early to, to avoid "wasting" their chance.
 
It's good to have discussions like this. Just because we have a match doesn't mean it's the best system. Or perhaps it can be improved.

As has already been mentioned, the residency job market is somewhat different than other job markets. The number of spots is slightly higher than the number of US grads. Each program can only take an exact number of interns -- one extra isn't allowed. Residency defines your career and specialty.

Every system has it's pluses and minuses. Let's assume we're comparing the current match process to a free market system. The possible benefits of a free market system are: 1) less interviews (and expenses) for those applicants who know what they want, interview early, and get an early position - more time to move, cheaper, etc, and 2) salary negotiation by residents as part of the application process.

#1 is a definite possibility for some people. For those candidates who are very competitive for the spots they are applying to, and are certain that they know where they want to go, or for applicants whom only care about their field (i.e. want orthopedics, and don't care at all about where they go), then it might work out better this way. The very obvious example is the student who wants to stay at their home institution -- they could save lots of time and money if an early interview and agreement was made. The problem is that there are many negatives to this solution:

A. Any applicant who is less competitive is likely to get no offers early. Programs will offer to the more competitive candidates first. Less competitive candidates will wait and wait, without any clear endpoint.
B. Students will have difficulty applying to two different fields. Applying to both Ortho and Gen Surgery, for example. What would you do if you get a Gen Surgery spot offered early, but want to wait for a possible ortho spot, but don't want to lose the Gen Surgery spot?
C. In this system, it becomes critical to interview as early as possible. The later you interview, the worse your chances. This could be mitigated by a date before which programs cannot offer spots, but in that case candidates would need to continue interviewing so would limit the cost/hassle benefits of a free market system.
D. You could "accept" the Gen surgery spot, then wait to see if something better comes along, and "drop" it if so. But residency is a JOB, not a school. When you sign an employment contract, that's a legally binding decision. I stop looking for people to fill your spot because you have accepted it, and I start the process of getting you licensed and credentialed. Although walking away from a job a WalMart or the local ice cream shop may be "OK", this is the world of professional medicine. Once you've signed an employment contract you need to hold up your end of the deal, or the contract will state what the costs (to you) are -- usually the costs of hiring a new person, plus the additional cost of hiring someone temporarily to fill the vacancy. My point is that this is an unrealistic option -- you can't do this like you might have done with your medical school application process.

#2 simply isn't true, or has nothing to do with the match. Resident salaries are set by the GME office. I have no control over them. I guess it's possible that the GME office will simply give me a salary budget and let me divide it however I want -- but this creates so many downstream problems it is simply not worth it. Plus there would be a financial incentive for me to offer less to candidates up front, to save money to get people at the end. If residents are interested in improving their salaries, then unions are probably more effective than individual salary negotiation (but come with their own set of problems).

As for the match "favoring candidates", that's complicated. From a mathematical / algorithm standpoint, the match favors applicants by deciding all ties in their favor. However, this happens a vast minority of the time, so really is of little practical value. As above, the match process minimizes the amount of "unknowns" in the process -- you know exactly what day you find out where you are going, don't need to worry about when you interview, can interview at several types of programs, etc. The match gives the best "mathematical" outcome. The problem is that the match doesn't necessarily give you the best "emotional" outcome. For example, if there was a match in the medical school application process, you interviewed at 10 schools, ranked all 10, and then matched at your #10. Compare that to interviewing at 10 schools, getting into your least favorite (at some unclear date), and slowly getting 9 rejections. Both are exactly the same outcome. But many would say that the latter would "feel better". Much depends on whether you want all of the emotional process lumped together into one single moment, or spread out.

I do agree that there has been "application inflation" in the residency application process. Every year I get more and more applications -- because people are applying to more places. The average number of applications per field is published, and no one wants to be below average. That just makes the next year average higher, and up it goes. So it becomes harder to know who really wants to come to us, and who is "just applying to see what happens".

There are plenty of horror stories about what it was like before a match. The IM fellowship match is new (for many fields), and before the match it had all of the above problems. One of my residents was interested in an IM fellowship, and they wanted to stay locally. They interviewed somewhere else first, and on the drive home the PD called them to offer them the spot. They wanted an answer on the phone. He negotiated for 24 hours, to talk to his wife about the move. He called the PD at our program and told him the situation. Was interviewed the next day (before any interviews were actually scheduled) and offered the spot. We only had one spot, so the fellowship PD contacted everyone scheduled for an interview, told them the position was filled, sorry. All of those people lost any money they spent on plane tickets (or had to pay for rebooking fees), and they all panicked calling programs to try to get earlier interview dates. This could have been avoided if the fellowship PD had talked to the resident involved and simply offered him a spot before, but we saw this exact issue push the fellowship application process earlier and earlier. Just before the match was put in place, some IM fellowships were asking for applications at the end of the intern year, a full 2 years prior to when fellowship starts. And it was becoming more likely that programs would just take only candidates from within their own programs, as anything else was crazy.

Can we make the match better? Maybe. Perhaps some sort of "early decision" like college, where you only can apply to a single program. But that just shuffles the winner/loser deck again. Students would need to decide which was the "right" program to apply early to, to avoid "wasting" their chance.

Ok this was very insightful and I am less against the match now. I do agree that an early decision option might be a good idea and would greatly help some applicants.
 
Ok this was very insightful and I am less against the match now. I do agree that an early decision option might be a good idea and would greatly help some applicants.

As with college admissions this would just push the application process earlier. There would be no penalty for applying earlier so everyone would do it. You'd then end up with a suboptimal match as people would be hedging their bets or trying to play the game or outsmart the system somehow.

When IM fellowships switched over to a match it was initially held during second year of residency simply because that's how early the process had started. Luckily it has now moved to a more appropriate time (3rd year) because they realized there was no reason to do it that early and it had been pushed there artificially by a broken system.
 
The match gives the best "mathematical" outcome. The problem is that the match doesn't necessarily give you the best "emotional" outcome. For example, if there was a match in the medical school application process, you interviewed at 10 schools, ranked all 10, and then matched at your #10. Compare that to interviewing at 10 schools, getting into your least favorite (at some unclear date), and slowly getting 9 rejections. Both are exactly the same outcome. But many would say that the latter would "feel better". Much depends on whether you want all of the emotional process lumped together into one single moment, or spread out.

That is a remarkable insight. The Match can really polarize emotions. You find out everything so suddenly. Then half of applicants get their #1 choice but tough nuggets for the other half.
 
The match actually is a way for hospitals to severely underpay residents by avoiding salary negotiations on an individual basis. True or false?
 
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