AVOID MILITARY MEDICINE if possible

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As far as surgical cases go, all I can say is what the program directors told me. Portsmouth General Surg says they do about 1000 cases, which they say is basically average. With the influx of OIF/OEF to Bethesda, General Surg says their chiefs will have about 1500 cases, and Bethesda Ortho says their chiefs will all have over 2000 cases by the end of the year, which is well above average. Certainly there are some concerns about the types of cases they're doing (lots of washouts), but they do meet all the minimums for types of cases, which is something. I don't know anything about Primary Care (and I really don't want to), so of course I have to defer to your knowledge on that.

Program directors are like recruiters. They want all the good people to rank their program high and will shade the truth accordingly. There are all sorts of smoke and mirrors tactics to pad the case numbers. Like doing a lot of off-site rotations; counting all those wound washouts (which are MS III level cases); counting C-scopes; having residents doing hundreds of low-level cases like appy's and lap choles; counting cases where the resident just stood and held a retractor, etc. I've worked with the Bethesda GS residents, and there is NOT a high volume of index cases there. There just isn't.

I don't know about the other programs you mention, but take a look at the size of the hospitals and overall volume of complex cases. Walter Reed, one of the largest hospitals in the DoD, can deal with a maximum inpatient census of around 200. This would be considered a small to medium-sized community hospital on the civilian side. Plus, many Navy and AF facilities are actively denying care to those over 65 and eligible for Medicare. Will an adequate number and variety of complex general surgery cases be generated at a 100-bed community hospital that is actively trying to avoid seeing any patients over 65? Of course not.

It's very difficult for a med student to judge these programs. What seems like a great case and a big service as a student may not look so neat as a PGY 4 or 5 senior resident. And even if you talk to the residents, they may not have experience at any other place. Talk to the general surgery chairman or program director at your med school and ask him/her what top-quality programs he/she recommends for you. It won't be a military program, I can virtually guarantee it. (unless of course you are at USUHS or are non-competitive applicant for some reason).

On a recent ACGME review, my surgical program at a major DoD facility received only a two-year accreditation (5 being standard) with major citations for lack of case volume, lack of administrative support, and too many staff deployments. The problems are real--don't be fooled by hype from a PD who is desparately trying to save his sinking residency.
 
Program directors are like recruiters. They want all the good people to rank their program high and will shade the truth accordingly. There are all sorts of smoke and mirrors tactics to pad the case numbers...

It's very difficult for a med student to judge these programs. What seems like a great case and a big service as a student may not look so neat as a PGY 4 or 5 senior resident...

The problems are real--don't be fooled by hype from a PD who is desparately trying to save his sinking residency.

I didn't do any General Surgery, just interviewed. I gather from your previous posts that this is your specialty? Can't much argue with that.

My experience with the Orthopods was decidedly positive. The residents were all very enthusiastic about their programs (although they did enjoy trash-talking the other MTFs), and of course so were the PDs.

For me the issue is moot. I have my spot, I like the locale, and I enjoyed the month with my program.

But were I not already in, this board would present a very difficult dilemma. The PDs have numbers in front of them, full accredidation (at the sites I went through), and residents who speak enthusiastically about the program. You're telling me they're exagerating to attract my application.

A common mantra on this site is, "Talk to other military doctors and those who got out." But of course I've done that. My home school/state has a ton of retired military doctors, and I have sought them out. The complaints I have heard from them revolve around military bureaucracy and deployments. The complaints on this site revolve around poor staffing, substandard care, and minimal numbers of cases. That is a dramatic difference, and I have no idea how to resolve it in my own mind.

Of course my inclination is get all "rah-rah" for my service and program, but I'm trying not to do that, because I recognize that I won't really know until I'm there. I hope you recognize, however, that the opinions students hear from residents, staff, and PDs do not jive with what is said here. I suppose they could all be lying to me, but from my perspective it is very difficult to discern what is true and what isn't.

I gather, from the other heated discussions on this site, that I'm not the only one with that problem.
 
I didn't do any General Surgery, just interviewed. I gather from your previous posts that this is your specialty? Can't much argue with that.

My experience with the Orthopods was decidedly positive. The residents were all very enthusiastic about their programs (although they did enjoy trash-talking the other MTFs), and of course so were the PDs.

For me the issue is moot. I have my spot, I like the locale, and I enjoyed the month with my program.

But were I not already in, this board would present a very difficult dilemma. The PDs have numbers in front of them, full accredidation (at the sites I went through), and residents who speak enthusiastically about the program. You're telling me they're exagerating to attract my application.

A common mantra on this site is, "Talk to other military doctors and those who got out." But of course I've done that. My home school/state has a ton of retired military doctors, and I have sought them out. The complaints I have heard from them revolve around military bureaucracy and deployments. The complaints on this site revolve around poor staffing, substandard care, and minimal numbers of cases. That is a dramatic difference, and I have no idea how to resolve it in my own mind.

Of course my inclination is get all "rah-rah" for my service and program, but I'm trying not to do that, because I recognize that I won't really know until I'm there. I hope you recognize, however, that the opinions students hear from residents, staff, and PDs do not jive with what is said here. I suppose they could all be lying to me, but from my perspective it is very difficult to discern what is true and what isn't.


Tired, you're going to be fine. You may or may not be happy, but you're going in with both eyes open, not blinded by one side's opinion. Whether what is said on this board is what it's like, or whether it's your overall impression with your program thus far remains to be seen. It's probably somewhere in the middle and because of that you're at least prepared.

I wasn't prepared for how difficult it's been at my base. I think at a larger base with more support, my attitude would have been somewhat different. I certainly have more challenges simply because of my MTF and hopefully that won't be your lot.

Your open minded approach is the best way to go in. I wish I had had your knowledge when I entered.

Best of luck to you.
 
Of course my inclination is get all "rah-rah" for my service and program, but I'm trying not to do that, because I recognize that I won't really know until I'm there. I hope you recognize, however, that the opinions students hear from residents, staff, and PDs do not jive with what is said here. I suppose they could all be lying to me, but from my perspective it is very difficult to discern what is true and what isn't

I totally agree that there is a huge disconnect somewhere. I see it myself all the time and it's frustrating. If I talk candidly to people involved with military GME in General Surgery--staff, PD's, senior residents--there is just this palpable sense of impending doom. Everyone seems to have tremendous pessimism about maintaining GME. And yet the public face of the programs, presented to the hospital brass, prospective students, etc. is 180 degrees different--everything's great, we have the best program in the country, it's better than the Mayo Clinic, blah, blah, blah.

I think it's partly because the top people in military GME have a different vision of what constitutes a good surgery training program. Take Ft. Bragg as an example. The Army was convinced that Ft. Bragg (Womack AMC) was a good place to start a new Surgery residency--even though by civilian standards it is a relatively small community hospital which would never support a residency. Of course, Womack completely failed the initial RRC site visit and will not be allowed to set up the residency.

The real bottom line, as resxn said, is that you will be fine. All programs do meet minimum standards and are accredited. Nearly all are better than the worst civilian programs. And if the training is marginal, you can always do a civilian fellowship after your commitment is over.
 
I totally agree that there is a huge disconnect somewhere. I see it myself all the time and it's frustrating. If I talk candidly to people involved with military GME in General Surgery--staff, PD's, senior residents--there is just this palpable sense of impending doom. Everyone seems to have tremendous pessimism about maintaining GME. And yet the public face of the programs, presented to the hospital brass, prospective students, etc. is 180 degrees different--everything's great, we have the best program in the country, it's better than the Mayo Clinic, blah, blah, blah.

I think it's partly because the top people in military GME have a different vision of what constitutes a good surgery training program. Take Ft. Bragg as an example. The Army was convinced that Ft. Bragg (Womack AMC) was a good place to start a new Surgery residency--even though by civilian standards it is a relatively small community hospital which would never support a residency. Of course, Womack completely failed the initial RRC site visit and will not be allowed to set up the residency.

The real bottom line, as resxn said, is that you will be fine. All programs do meet minimum standards and are accredited. Nearly all are better than the worst civilian programs. And if the training is marginal, you can always do a civilian fellowship after your commitment is over.

I agree with the above, with the additions

1) People are discouraged from speaking up. If the SG asks a local commander how things are going, he/she will "water down" the truth on all the negatives. The SG himself will then do the same thing when he speaks before congress.
2) In the military, the practicing physicians have virtually NO INFLUENCE on promoting positive change. In the civilian world they have ALOT of influence because if the are unhappy with the status of things, they will leave, and then the ADMIN people have no reason to have a job either.
3)The military ABSOLUTELY does a tremendous amount of false advertising in regards to soliciting for doctors.

Let me add, that EVERY ASPECT of military PRIMARY CARE is worse than civilian. In the military my support staff was insufficient and those I did have, underqualified. Pay was less, and hours much more. Treatment of staff was worse, equipment availability worse, problems getting CME approved, problems getting vacation/leave approved, problems even getting your pay approved (bonus stipends), problems with referrals (TRICARE) etc.....

anybody that tells you that military primary care isn't in big trouble is flat out lying or completely misinformed.

but for those of you already committed; do your best, serve your time and at least your future civilian job will seem like "vacation" after your military time.
 
I didn't do any General Surgery, just interviewed. I gather from your previous posts that this is your specialty? Can't much argue with that.

My experience with the Orthopods was decidedly positive. The residents were all very enthusiastic about their programs (although they did enjoy trash-talking the other MTFs), and of course so were the PDs.

For me the issue is moot. I have my spot, I like the locale, and I enjoyed the month with my program.

But were I not already in, this board would present a very difficult dilemma. The PDs have numbers in front of them, full accredidation (at the sites I went through), and residents who speak enthusiastically about the program. You're telling me they're exagerating to attract my application.

A common mantra on this site is, "Talk to other military doctors and those who got out." But of course I've done that. My home school/state has a ton of retired military doctors, and I have sought them out. The complaints I have heard from them revolve around military bureaucracy and deployments. The complaints on this site revolve around poor staffing, substandard care, and minimal numbers of cases. That is a dramatic difference, and I have no idea how to resolve it in my own mind.

Of course my inclination is get all "rah-rah" for my service and program, but I'm trying not to do that, because I recognize that I won't really know until I'm there. I hope you recognize, however, that the opinions students hear from residents, staff, and PDs do not jive with what is said here. I suppose they could all be lying to me, but from my perspective it is very difficult to discern what is true and what isn't.

I gather, from the other heated discussions on this site, that I'm not the only one with that problem.

Well said! 👍
 
I didn't do any General Surgery, just interviewed. I gather from your previous posts that this is your specialty? Can't much argue with that.

My experience with the Orthopods was decidedly positive. The residents were all very enthusiastic about their programs (although they did enjoy trash-talking the other MTFs), and of course so were the PDs.

For me the issue is moot. I have my spot, I like the locale, and I enjoyed the month with my program.

But were I not already in, this board would present a very difficult dilemma. The PDs have numbers in front of them, full accredidation (at the sites I went through), and residents who speak enthusiastically about the program. You're telling me they're exagerating to attract my application.

A common mantra on this site is, "Talk to other military doctors and those who got out." But of course I've done that. My home school/state has a ton of retired military doctors, and I have sought them out. The complaints I have heard from them revolve around military bureaucracy and deployments. The complaints on this site revolve around poor staffing, substandard care, and minimal numbers of cases. That is a dramatic difference, and I have no idea how to resolve it in my own mind.

Of course my inclination is get all "rah-rah" for my service and program, but I'm trying not to do that, because I recognize that I won't really know until I'm there. I hope you recognize, however, that the opinions students hear from residents, staff, and PDs do not jive with what is said here. I suppose they could all be lying to me, but from my perspective it is very difficult to discern what is true and what isn't.

I gather, from the other heated discussions on this site, that I'm not the only one with that problem.


I do not know of any ORTHO docs on this site. I completely beleive what you are saying, and if everybody (docs and residents alike) is telling you good things about the ortho program, you are probably in good shape.
 
I do not know of any ORTHO docs on this site. I completely beleive what you are saying, and if everybody (docs and residents alike) is telling you good things about the ortho program, you are probably in good shape.


I'm a lab tech in the Army, and can speak from experience about what I've seen regarding military medicine, if you'd like to hear specific examples etc. Don't PM, I rarely log in here, but you can email me at [email protected] .


This is directed at Tired, not USAFdoc.
 
Don't PM, I rarely log in here, but you can email me at [email protected]
Prepare to get spammed. I'd strongly recommend removing your email address from a public forum, or else the spiders will find it and you'll be getting dozens of emails a day about penis enlargemenet, online pharmacies and mail order brides.
 
I'm a lab tech in the Army, and can speak from experience about what I've seen regarding military medicine, if you'd like to hear specific examples etc. Don't PM, I rarely log in here, but you can email me

Thanks for the offer, but I think the physicians here give me more than enough to think about (ie - brood obsessively over).

And yeah, I'd definetely pull down the email, although I guess if you don't log in here a lot, it'll probably be a while before you see these posts. Well, at least you didn't put your amed address up . . .
 
1) People are discouraged from speaking up. If the SG asks a local commander how things are going, he/she will "water down" the truth on all the negatives. The SG himself will then do the same thing when he speaks before congress.

I think a lot of the times when our leaders speak they are giving pep talks. Maybe part of their job is to be positive and give hope. What if your favorite NFL team's coach called out the team repeatedly during press conferences and said there was no chance for success? He would become an X-coach. The question for me is what are they doing behind closed doors to fix the problems.
 
I think a lot of the times when our leaders speak they are giving pep talks. Maybe part of their job is to be positive and give hope. What if your favorite NFL team's coach called out the team repeatedly during press conferences and said there was no chance for success? He would become an X-coach. The question for me is what are they doing behind closed doors to fix the problems.

good point. However, I suspect the "behind closed doors" talks do not happen.

and I still think that congress could be approached with openly disclosing the positives and the negatives. For exampe, a future USAF SG Congressional could go like....." I want all of congress to know that we have some of the finest young physicians etc....despite increases in patient panel sizes, going from 700pt/doc to over 2-3 thousand patients per doc due to deployments etc, our docs continue to provide good care, however, we absolutely need additional funding, manning and support as the burnout rate has been high with these prolonged uptempo ops, and we are seeing unprecedentedly low retention rates etc."

I have never seen the SG publically state what everyone within the system knows to be obvious.
 
good point. However, I suspect the "behind closed doors" talks do not happen.

and I still think that congress could be approached with openly disclosing the positives and the negatives. For exampe, a future USAF SG Congressional could go like....." I want all of congress to know that we have some of the finest young physicians etc....despite increases in patient panel sizes, going from 700pt/doc to over 2-3 thousand patients per doc due to deployments etc, our docs continue to provide good care, however, we absolutely need additional funding, manning and support as the burnout rate has been high with these prolonged uptempo ops, and we are seeing unprecedentedly low retention rates etc."


To which the response will be: "well, if you've still got 'some of the finest young physicians' providing 'good care' despite all the problems, JUST CARRY ON!!!!!!!" Retention rates have always been low for docs, and everyone knows it; it's just not a big attention getter.

Government only works in crisis response mode; Nobody never got nothin' by saying "we're still doing good."


X-RMD, Doin' great as a civvie
 
To which the response will be: "well, if you've still got 'some of the finest young physicians' providing 'good care' despite all the problems, JUST CARRY ON!!!!!!!" Retention rates have always been low for docs, and everyone knows it; it's just not a big attention getter.

Government only works in crisis response mode; Nobody never got nothin' by saying "we're still doing good."


X-RMD, Doin' great as a civvie

my impromtu example was not to be taken literally; just an example.

and as for civilian life. My employer just gave me a $36,000 raise effective Jan 1st. So as a Family Doc I am getting 156K, working 4.5 days a week, clinic only, virtually no call, and no hospital work, great staff, nice benefits, and a professional atmosphere. And the $$ is before any incentive pay. I have a say, rather, I have THE SAY, in hires and fires, equipment etc.

Basically I went from what I strongly believe is/was the WORST FP job in the USA (USAF stateside USAF Clinic) to one of the best. For those of you still active duty, hang in there, it gets way better when you get out, in EVERY WAY.😍
 
FYI: new info on the decision NOT to merge all of the different (medical)services.

Rejected Medical Command
Tom Philpott | December 16, 2006
Army-Navy Plan for Unified Medical Command Rejected

Air Force opposition has scuttled Army and Navy plans to merge the three services' large medical bureaucracies, led now by three surgeons general, into a single Unified Medical Command.

Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England decided this month not to endorse such a major streamlining of the military health care system given that Air Force leaders are so strongly against it.

Instead, England approved a more modest "new governance plan" for the health care system that directs joint oversight over four "key functional areas." Dr. William Winkenwerder, assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, explained England's "conceptual framework" in a phone interview Tuesday [Dec. 12].

Areas targeted for joint oversight are:

Medical research. The Army Medical Research and Material Command, headquartered at Fort Detrick, Md., would oversee all military medical research. Winkenwerder said a process would be established "to ensure that the interests and equities of all three services are represented in setting priorities and ensuring that appropriate research gets done."

Medical education and training. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure legislation already directs creation of a joint center for enlisted medical training at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio. England embraces that change and wants more common training, standards and approaches. At the same time, said Winkenwerder, England recognizes that certain aspects of medical training will have to remain service unique.

Health care delivery in major military markets. Starting with San Antonio and Washington D.C., the services are to shift toward a single service being in charge of care delivery in areas where there are large beneficiary populations and multiple hospitals.

Shared support services. The services are to consolidate certain support services including information management and technology, facilities' construction, contracting and procurement, and perhaps some logistical and financial functions.

Whatever entity is created to oversee shared support services it will report directly to his office, Winkenwerder said. But just as the Army will control medical research, a single service will be responsible for medical education and training, and for health care delivery in major markets.

The details are left to a transition team that soon will be named to review options and recommend steps to implement England's concept. Winkenwerder said he doesn't know yet who will be on that team. He predicts it will require a minimum of two years to implement the changes.

The TRICARE Management Activity will remain but will focus on health insurance, support contractor management and benefit delivery. TMA will lose other joint support responsibilities such as information technology. Those duties will shift to the new shared support services organization.

Though the course that England has set is less ambitious than a unified medical command, it still "needs to be planned and implemented in a very careful, detailed, thoughtful way," said Winkenwerder.

Everyone recognizes, he added, that the military health care system delivers care anywhere in the world, achieves "incredible results" in saving lives and treating wounded and provides "a benefit highly prized by beneficiaries." Therefore, "an underlying theme in all of this is we did not want break anything that was working well."

Army and Navy plans for a Unified Medical Command seemed to gain momentum in September after receiving a vigorous endorsement from the Defense Business Board, a group of business leaders who advise the secretary and deputy secretary of defense. Economists with the CNA, a think tank that does a lot of Navy work, had projected savings of at least $500 million a year and the business board said that was conservative.

How much England's revised plan will save isn't known. But Winkenwerder said it will "create greater efficiencies and cost savings, improve coordination of medical care, improve support to our war fighters, better leverage medical research and create greater ‘jointness' and standardization in our training and education of…medical personnel."

Lt. Gen. James G. Roudebush, Air Force surgeon general, had argued against a unified command on the grounds that service missions and cultures were just too different and those differences justify keeping separate medical staffs and resources. In an interview Wednesday, Roudebush was gracious in victory, saying the debate had been important for military medicine.

The Air Force, Roudebush said, "has its medical support intertwined and woven into the mission and the line of the Air Force" and "is something we feel very strongly contributes to our ability to support the joint war fight."

Vice Adm. Donald C. Arthur, Navy surgeon general, conceded he had "a different concept" for the future of military medicine. But it came down to "what could realistically get done without a lot of disruption to the system."

"The point was to get us talking about what are things we could be doing together" to achieve "more collaborative, more interoperable combat service support. I think the new construct that the deputy secretary of defense has signed out…does get us talking about common logistics, common information management and information technology and doing some things together that get us to be more interoperable…That's a good thing."

Many hurdles remain. The new guidance to streamline care delivery in major markets, for example, "challenges us to do things uniformly without a uniformed command," Arthur said. It can be managed, Arthur suggested, but the medical departments clearly have a lot negotiation ahead of them.

http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,120543,00.html
 
FYI: new info on the decision NOT to merge all of the different (medical)services.

Rejected Medical Command
Tom Philpott | December 16, 2006
Army-Navy Plan for Unified Medical Command Rejected

Air Force opposition has scuttled Army and Navy plans to merge the three services' large medical bureaucracies, led now by three surgeons general, into a single Unified Medical Command.

Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England decided this month not to endorse such a major streamlining of the military health care system given that Air Force leaders are so strongly against it.

Instead, England approved a more modest "new governance plan" for the health care system that directs joint oversight over four "key functional areas." Dr. William Winkenwerder, assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, explained England's "conceptual framework" in a phone interview Tuesday [Dec. 12].

Areas targeted for joint oversight are:

Medical research. The Army Medical Research and Material Command, headquartered at Fort Detrick, Md., would oversee all military medical research. Winkenwerder said a process would be established "to ensure that the interests and equities of all three services are represented in setting priorities and ensuring that appropriate research gets done."

Medical education and training. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure legislation already directs creation of a joint center for enlisted medical training at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio. England embraces that change and wants more common training, standards and approaches. At the same time, said Winkenwerder, England recognizes that certain aspects of medical training will have to remain service unique.

Health care delivery in major military markets. Starting with San Antonio and Washington D.C., the services are to shift toward a single service being in charge of care delivery in areas where there are large beneficiary populations and multiple hospitals.

Shared support services. The services are to consolidate certain support services including information management and technology, facilities' construction, contracting and procurement, and perhaps some logistical and financial functions.

Whatever entity is created to oversee shared support services it will report directly to his office, Winkenwerder said. But just as the Army will control medical research, a single service will be responsible for medical education and training, and for health care delivery in major markets.

The details are left to a transition team that soon will be named to review options and recommend steps to implement England's concept. Winkenwerder said he doesn't know yet who will be on that team. He predicts it will require a minimum of two years to implement the changes.

The TRICARE Management Activity will remain but will focus on health insurance, support contractor management and benefit delivery. TMA will lose other joint support responsibilities such as information technology. Those duties will shift to the new shared support services organization.

Though the course that England has set is less ambitious than a unified medical command, it still "needs to be planned and implemented in a very careful, detailed, thoughtful way," said Winkenwerder.

Everyone recognizes, he added, that the military health care system delivers care anywhere in the world, achieves "incredible results" in saving lives and treating wounded and provides "a benefit highly prized by beneficiaries." Therefore, "an underlying theme in all of this is we did not want break anything that was working well."

Army and Navy plans for a Unified Medical Command seemed to gain momentum in September after receiving a vigorous endorsement from the Defense Business Board, a group of business leaders who advise the secretary and deputy secretary of defense. Economists with the CNA, a think tank that does a lot of Navy work, had projected savings of at least $500 million a year and the business board said that was conservative.

How much England's revised plan will save isn't known. But Winkenwerder said it will "create greater efficiencies and cost savings, improve coordination of medical care, improve support to our war fighters, better leverage medical research and create greater ‘jointness' and standardization in our training and education of…medical personnel."

Lt. Gen. James G. Roudebush, Air Force surgeon general, had argued against a unified command on the grounds that service missions and cultures were just too different and those differences justify keeping separate medical staffs and resources. In an interview Wednesday, Roudebush was gracious in victory, saying the debate had been important for military medicine.

The Air Force, Roudebush said, "has its medical support intertwined and woven into the mission and the line of the Air Force" and "is something we feel very strongly contributes to our ability to support the joint war fight."

Vice Adm. Donald C. Arthur, Navy surgeon general, conceded he had "a different concept" for the future of military medicine. But it came down to "what could realistically get done without a lot of disruption to the system."

"The point was to get us talking about what are things we could be doing together" to achieve "more collaborative, more interoperable combat service support. I think the new construct that the deputy secretary of defense has signed out…does get us talking about common logistics, common information management and information technology and doing some things together that get us to be more interoperable…That's a good thing."

Many hurdles remain. The new guidance to streamline care delivery in major markets, for example, "challenges us to do things uniformly without a uniformed command," Arthur said. It can be managed, Arthur suggested, but the medical departments clearly have a lot negotiation ahead of them.

http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,120543,00.html
 
FYI: new info on the decision NOT to merge all of the different (medical)services.

Rejected Medical Command
Tom Philpott | December 16, 2006
Army-Navy Plan for Unified Medical Command Rejected

Air Force opposition has scuttled Army and Navy plans to merge the three services' large medical bureaucracies, led now by three surgeons general, into a single Unified Medical Command.

Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England decided this month not to endorse such a major streamlining of the military health care system given that Air Force leaders are so strongly against it.

Instead, England approved a more modest "new governance plan" for the health care system that directs joint oversight over four "key functional areas." Dr. William Winkenwerder, assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, explained England's "conceptual framework" in a phone interview Tuesday [Dec. 12].

Areas targeted for joint oversight are:

Medical research. The Army Medical Research and Material Command, headquartered at Fort Detrick, Md., would oversee all military medical research. Winkenwerder said a process would be established "to ensure that the interests and equities of all three services are represented in setting priorities and ensuring that appropriate research gets done."

Medical education and training. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure legislation already directs creation of a joint center for enlisted medical training at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio. England embraces that change and wants more common training, standards and approaches. At the same time, said Winkenwerder, England recognizes that certain aspects of medical training will have to remain service unique.

Health care delivery in major military markets. Starting with San Antonio and Washington D.C., the services are to shift toward a single service being in charge of care delivery in areas where there are large beneficiary populations and multiple hospitals.

Shared support services. The services are to consolidate certain support services including information management and technology, facilities' construction, contracting and procurement, and perhaps some logistical and financial functions.

Whatever entity is created to oversee shared support services it will report directly to his office, Winkenwerder said. But just as the Army will control medical research, a single service will be responsible for medical education and training, and for health care delivery in major markets.

The details are left to a transition team that soon will be named to review options and recommend steps to implement England's concept. Winkenwerder said he doesn't know yet who will be on that team. He predicts it will require a minimum of two years to implement the changes.

The TRICARE Management Activity will remain but will focus on health insurance, support contractor management and benefit delivery. TMA will lose other joint support responsibilities such as information technology. Those duties will shift to the new shared support services organization.

Though the course that England has set is less ambitious than a unified medical command, it still "needs to be planned and implemented in a very careful, detailed, thoughtful way," said Winkenwerder.

Everyone recognizes, he added, that the military health care system delivers care anywhere in the world, achieves "incredible results" in saving lives and treating wounded and provides "a benefit highly prized by beneficiaries." Therefore, "an underlying theme in all of this is we did not want break anything that was working well."

Army and Navy plans for a Unified Medical Command seemed to gain momentum in September after receiving a vigorous endorsement from the Defense Business Board, a group of business leaders who advise the secretary and deputy secretary of defense. Economists with the CNA, a think tank that does a lot of Navy work, had projected savings of at least $500 million a year and the business board said that was conservative.

How much England's revised plan will save isn't known. But Winkenwerder said it will "create greater efficiencies and cost savings, improve coordination of medical care, improve support to our war fighters, better leverage medical research and create greater ‘jointness' and standardization in our training and education of…medical personnel."

Lt. Gen. James G. Roudebush, Air Force surgeon general, had argued against a unified command on the grounds that service missions and cultures were just too different and those differences justify keeping separate medical staffs and resources. In an interview Wednesday, Roudebush was gracious in victory, saying the debate had been important for military medicine.

The Air Force, Roudebush said, "has its medical support intertwined and woven into the mission and the line of the Air Force" and "is something we feel very strongly contributes to our ability to support the joint war fight."

Vice Adm. Donald C. Arthur, Navy surgeon general, conceded he had "a different concept" for the future of military medicine. But it came down to "what could realistically get done without a lot of disruption to the system."

"The point was to get us talking about what are things we could be doing together" to achieve "more collaborative, more interoperable combat service support. I think the new construct that the deputy secretary of defense has signed out…does get us talking about common logistics, common information management and information technology and doing some things together that get us to be more interoperable…That's a good thing."

Many hurdles remain. The new guidance to streamline care delivery in major markets, for example, "challenges us to do things uniformly without a uniformed command," Arthur said. It can be managed, Arthur suggested, but the medical departments clearly have a lot negotiation ahead of them.

http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,120543,00.html
 
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This is very depressing.

I wonder what happens to my combined Army/Navy Ortho program next year? Maybe I can at least take heart in the "combining delivery of care" portion. That and the fact that the unification is really far along, so maybe military inertia will take care of the rest.

I don't suppose I can just blame the Air Force? Probably not . . .
 
The Air Force, Roudebush said, “has its medical support intertwined and woven into the mission and the line of the Air Force” and “is something we feel very strongly contributes to our ability to support the joint war fight.”

Does anyone have an informed opinion on the real reason that the Air Force is opposed to merging the medical services? I don't even understand what the above statement means, and it is clearly just bureaucratic doubletalk.

On the surface, it would seem that a merger would fit right in with the Air Force program of essentially eliminating all of their non-essential (i.e. non-flight surgery) medical services. What is really going on with the SG?
 
Does anyone have an informed opinion on the real reason that the Air Force is opposed to merging the medical services? I don't even understand what the above statement means, and it is clearly just bureaucratic doubletalk.

On the surface, it would seem that a merger would fit right in with the Air Force program of essentially eliminating all of their non-essential (i.e. non-flight surgery) medical services. What is really going on with the SG?

I'm not sure why the air force was so strongly against it either. It may be that due to the fact that they've done a better job with things like keeping deployments shorter (not as many 12 month deployments for docs, and chair force has air conditioning) and meeting their hpsp recruitment goals (unlike army and navy).
 
A friend in Washington tells me one of the reasons the Air Force was so against the merger was that they feel the Air Force "flight surgeon" role is so unique/specific that it could not be adequately done by an Army or Navy physician. 🙄
 
I'm guessing, like Mirror Form, that the opposition stems from the deployments. If Army and Navy want to meet their recruiting goals, they're going to have to reduce deployment frequency and length (among other things).
 
I'm guessing, like Mirror Form, that the opposition stems from the deployments. If Army and Navy want to meet their recruiting goals, they're going to have to reduce deployment frequency and length (among other things).

the USAF (my opinion) does not want to join in with the USN and Army because

1) the USAF has a reputation, an innaccurate one, but a reputation nontheless, that is better than that of the other services in terms of quality of life. They want to maintain that "advantage"
2) because of the "misinformed" med students, thinking that the USAF is "better", the HPSP pipeline has not sprung as many leaks as has the pipeline to the USN and Army. The USAF wants to maintain their own pipeline.
 
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This is very depressing.

I wonder what happens to my combined Army/Navy Ortho program next year? Maybe I can at least take heart in the "combining delivery of care" portion. That and the fact that the unification is really far along, so maybe military inertia will take care of the rest.

I don't suppose I can just blame the Air Force? Probably not . . .

Your residency program will continue business as usual. You will notice no impact. The Unified Medical Command is just on hold for the moment. It will happen, just not under the most recent proposal.
 
'Everyone recognizes, he added, that the military health care system delivers care anywhere in the world, achieves “incredible results” in saving lives and treating wounded and provides “a benefit highly prized by beneficiaries.” Therefore, “an underlying theme in all of this is we did not want break anything that was working well.”'

Heh.
 
'Everyone recognizes, he added, that the military health care system delivers care anywhere in the world, achieves "incredible results" in saving lives and treating wounded and provides "a benefit highly prized by beneficiaries." Therefore, "an underlying theme in all of this is we did not want break anything that was working well."'

Heh.

1) no one needs to fear that they might break something "working well". Your chances of finding a rarity like this are zilch.

2) and in the bigger picture........ FOR ALL THOSE MEDICAL STUDENTS thinking about joining the HPSP.........I joined, and you may join with the following assumptions: you know you may get deployed, you will get paid less money, you will live where the military says you will, you will follow military rules, you will have less autonomy in your medical practice. These you are all well aware of.

It is the FALSE ASSUMPTIONS that you will make that will be most frustrating. You may well assume that you will be free from having your name listed in lawsuits, you may think you will be treated as a physician and officer, you may think that the military has a quality healthcare program, you may think that Core Values are more than lip service, you may think that you will have at least a safe minimum quality of staffing, you may think your quality of life when not deployed will be reasonable, you may think that YOU WILL GET to CHOOSE WHAT SPECIALTY of physician you become. THINK AGAIN !!!!

If you find the above list of assumptions, both the likely true, and the false, something you have no problem with, then HPSP might be exactly what you want. Do I hope things change for the better, absolutely. Do I expect it to happen...absolutely NOT.

Happy New Year everyone, and God Bless America, and God Bless our troops overseas and here.🙂
 
although these are a few years old, they are very relevant. Not much, if anything has changed for the better over the past few years in military medicine. Many things are worse. FYI some opinions from many others already "in the field".

Bureaucrats In Charge
Cause Problems For Docs

I agree with [Dr. Koenig's] article in US MEDICINE. I am in the process of retiring, though I have been ready to do so for a number of years now. I have only stayed in to allow my oldest to graduate from high school—certainly the Army has no attraction for retention.
In my specialty the HMO-induced scare that resulted in a tightening of the civilian job market has eased, and there are numerous opportunities now. I would expect the Army's shortage to get much more severe in the near term.

Of course they will do too little, too late. Another factor under leadership you didn't discuss may be considered small in the big picture but nevertheless is a major irritant to many. That is the intrusion of the line into AMEDD. In my duty station's case this is a post commander who is requiring all, docs included, to document PT three times a week, even if the PT test is passed. This is an affront on many different levels. If the standard is being met, what business is it of his? This treating docs like the lowest common denominator by the BICs (bureaucrats-in-charge) is insulting. There was a time where being an officer meant being held in trust and regard—not any more. This poor treatment of personnel by bureaucrats in senior positions who lack leadership skills has been well publicized and documented but appears to be being ignored.

This is true not only in AMEDD but the line as well. One thought I've had in regards to the AMEDD being protected from unwarranted intrusion by the line, who does not understand that we do our mission day in and day out, often without proper support, and that we don't have all the time in the world to train as they do, is that in the past senior leadership in the AMEDD have been surgeons. Individuals who aren't afraid to stand up for their people and say no, hell no, if needed.

These days we have preventive medicine types, nurses, etc., who are much more pliable and afraid to stand up for what is right. They "go with the program" no matter how silly.

NAME WITHHELD



Military Physicians Need
Unit/Corps Identification

I read with great interest your article in U.S. MEDICINE (July 2000) regarding physician retention in the armed services. In 1972, at the request of Gen. [Richard] Taylor, then Army surgeon general, I went to Washington on invitational orders to discuss problems of physician retention in reserve and active-duty units. I pointed out that retention of reserve physicians wasn't a monetary issue as much as a time problem for private practitioners who could ill-afford an entire two weeks off during the summer.
It was shortly thereafter that rules were changed to allow reserve physicians to participate in CME activities and receive reserve credit for the time spent as long as they went in uniform. I have always been impressed by the responsiveness of [the surgeon general's office] in this case, and believe it actually helped with physician retention in the late 1970s and 1980s.

I continue to believe that while comparability allowance to bring medical officer pay scales closer to those of their civilian counterparts is very important, other factors, many of which you discussed, are even more crucial. A sense of mission for example—feedback that lets the doctor know how he/she is appreciated—an understanding that the military physician isn't just working for a big HMO, but in an organization that serves to defend our country, our culture, and our constitution from "all enemies, foreign and domestic."

Psychiatrists generally agree that job satisfaction is the one of the biggest factors in defining personal happiness—happy people don't look for changes like others do. In reviewing your article, I certainly agree with every point made. I do wish to briefly mention another factor that may have something to do with retention: the problem of unit/corps identification for physicians. This has always been a bit complex in the military because of the functional nature of the assignments. However, I'll bet it could be shown (hopefully without another study) that military physicians who identify strongly with their branch or corps are far more likely to stay in for a career.

Doctors in the service miss out on a lot when they don't belong to any unit other than a medical outfit. A physician in a hospital is just another provider, but the same physician assigned to a line unit receives an entirely different level of attention and respect. Personally, my most memorable military time was spent with non-medical personnel, learning how "real soldiers" operate. Line troops know that the doctor may be extremely important to them someday, and are generally more than willing to share their knowledge and expertise with an interested novice.

[This is] a topic about which I have always had strong feelings. I hate to see the services shoot themselves in the medical foot as they seem to do so regularly.

Finally, regarding your section about adventure, I'd like to mention that Louis L'Amour's definition of adventure was "just trouble away from home."

ALBERT E. BRELAND, JR. M.D.
Former Medical Advisor, MAC-V
Psychiatry and Neurology
Veterans Affairs Medical Center
Jackson, Mississippi



Retaining Junior Physicians
An Issue Of Environment

Thanks for [Dr. Harold Koenig's] articulate piece in July 2000 U.S. MEDICINE. I am very interested in the things that "keep docs in" as opposed to those who leave. I wrote a brief piece in the same periodical in 1990 when I left for civilian training, and I have stayed beyond my "payback" for many of the reasons [Dr. Koenig] mentioned. I want to underscore what [Dr. Koenig]mentioned about leadership. I think that it is up to us to create an environment where junior physicians want to work. There will always be circumstances beyond our control, but there is a lot that can be done. I looked at residents trained at TAMC [Tripler Army Medical Center], for example, for a talk on military pediatrics I gave recently. Of graduates between 1980 and 2000 including 1996 resident graduates whose payback was up, 40 per cent are still on active duty. I think that says something for the timbre of this place.
The credit, of course, belongs to my mentor, Jim Bass. (Emerson said that an institution is, "The lengthening shadow of a man," and I think it true of TAMC Pediatrics.)

In any case, one more suggestion. I wonder how many senior physicians there are in administrative or "other" roles, who continue to draw specialty pay although they never see any patients in that area. I struggle to still cover pediatric intensive care unit patients, but feel that it is the only way to justify the specialty pay as an intensivist (and the only way to get seven children college opportunities!). How many docs are in this position, I wonder? And how much money for specialty pay is the system dishing out for professionals who really aren't practicing. Is it worth looking at? It may not be (and in fact, I may not like the idea in a few more years!), considering that these very senior physician executives are probably underpaid relative to what they would make as hospital administrators, etc. on the outside?

Here's a thought—how about taking the money saved and funneling it back into the professional development opportunities for junior physicians [Dr. Koenig] mentioned: funding for medical readiness trips, CME etc?

LT. COL. CHUCK CALLAHAN, MC, USA
Pediatric Pulmonology
Chief, Tripler Pediatrics



Small Steps Could Make
Big Difference In Retention

I read [Dr. Harold Koenig's] article "Physician Retention Within The Military" in U.S. MEDICINE with great interest. I recently completed my military obligation as a maternal-fetal medicine subspecialist in the Army. I had planned to leave the military for a civilian academic position, but changed my mind at the last minute (for a variety of unforeseen personal reasons).
In general, I am content with the structure of the Medical Corps and would like to make a career of the military. I have always felt privileged to care for the active-duty and dependent patients. I've found that my colleagues are technically proficient, talented professionals who can stand tall with any academic faculty. Equipment, at least at our facility, is comparable if not better than what's found at the civilian facilities. But with any system, there are areas which could be improved.

The pay differential certainly starts off every list but it is not solely the problem. Most of us are satisfied with the specialty bonus schedule. The real problem is the pension system. At the end of obligated service, most physicians are 0-4s who must complete 8-12 years of service before becoming eligible for retirement. Anything less than 20 years provides nothing. I can think of very few civilian professional organizations which expect to retain personnel for 20 years, so there is some vesting of pensions after a short time frame (5 years).

Also, the refusal of all three services to recognize the four years of medical school training while wearing the uniform, either as a reservist in HPSP or on active duty at USUHS, is particularly galling because we all were liable to be called to service, submitted to military rules/regulations of conduct, and perform 30-45 days of active duty training each year which, under Reserve guidelines, would have qualified for enough points to be a "good" year.

The direct result of the pay/retirement issue is many physicians feel compelled to leave as soon as possible to earn a higher income and save a large fraction of the windfall to make up for the lack of a pension plan during the first 12 years of our working lives.

This is a significant reason why there is a lack of mid-level (senior O-4, junior O-5) officers in the Medical Corps. If the medical school training years were added to the total number of years of service, many physicians facing the end of obligated service would choose to remain on duty for 4 to 8 years to complete 20 years of service. There is no doubt that the majority of military physicians work hard, but much of this effort could be performed by clerical staff and ancillary medical personnel. There is a dramatic difference between the civilian and military practices with regard to the ratio of support personnel to providers. Even at a tertiary care facility, we feel fortunate to share one secretary between four physicians.

Retention of qualified clerical workers is also a problem. Many are military dependent wives who rotate every 2 to 3 years as their active-duty sponsors move. Because military physicians rotate frequently, it would be ideal to hire more permanent clerical staff, particularly long-term civilians who can grease the wheels of the bureaucracy and free the physicians to perform the duties for which they are uniquely qualified. Physicians also are expected to fill out a plethora of forms which correspond to billing documentation in the civilian sector. The difference is that civilians hire billing clerks (usually one for an office of 2 to 3 physicians) who code and file forms.

If productivity and cost-efficiency are the goals, provide the appropriate mix of clerical and professional staff so that each person is maximizing the work output commensurate with their skills.

Lastly, there has been a movement in the Army (I cannot speak to the Navy or Air Force) to hold physicians to the same standards as other officers for promotion and career advancement. The requirements for military schools and mixes of deployments/overseas tours are not compatible with delivery of medical care in the present workload mix. The Medical Corps has both a peacetime mission (care for dependents) as well as a wartime mission (casualty care). While most combat arms units spend the majority of time training and preparing for the deployments, the Medical Corps is fulfilling the peacetime mission. Time for training (weapons qualification, physical fitness training and testing, common task training-soldier skills, staff schools) is added on top of a full clinical schedule.

If time is scheduled for such training, clinical workload is shifted, but not commensurably reduced. Try explaining to the IG why a patient couldn't be seen in a timely fashion because the providers were humping a ruck or running at the track. At the same time, see how many line officers expect to work anywhere from 4 to 10 nights a month on top of a full daytime work schedule. Promotion boards had previously been composed of medical officers with a line officer to provide a perspective from outside the medical care areas. Recently, the officer mix has been inverted to include only a single medical officer, the remainder of the board being line officers. There is little understanding of qualifications unique to medical care, so the heaviest weight seems to be placed upon physical fitness (the physical training test and height/weight).

An anecdote is that among my contemporaries who were selected to attend civilian subspecialty fellowships at some of the most distinguished teaching centers, approximately half were not promoted from O-4 to O-5 (hospitals included UC-Irvine for gynecologic oncology, Barnes-Jewish Medical Center in St. Louis for maternal-fetal medicine, Johns Hopkins for reproductive endocrinology). I believe that the lack of PT tests during the fellowships was a significant negative discriminator.

Promotion boards should have better representation of officers who understand the unique qualifications and duties of the Medical Corps (nurses, medical service, veterinarians, dentists, or physicians). I would feel unqualified to judge the promotion files for military intelligence, logistics, mechanized armor, infantry or artillery officers.

Retention cannot be improved if physicians expect to be let go for non-promotion or be left in career limbo without promotion over issues which have little bearing on their mission or duties. I don't wish to sound negative about military medicine, but as an insider who truly loves the mission and profession, small improvements could be made which would go a long way to encourage good people to remain on active duty.

MAJ. BRUCE CHEN, MC, USA
Department of Obstetrics/Gynecology
Tripler Army Medical Center
Honolulu





Implementation Of TriCare
Leads To Physician Exodus

Bureaucratic Train Needs
To Travel Different Track

Hip hip hooray for your article! I am preaching along the same lines as you at my local Army Community Hospital where I am a department chief. I feel as though military medicine is a rambling bureaucratic train, but articles such as yours may help to nudge it along a different and better track.
Keep up the good work. I am glad to read about others thinking about these issues from a common sense, grasssroots physician perspective.

JOHN JANOUSEK, MD



Physicians At Disadvantage
For Positions Of Leadership

I have a few comments about [Dr. Harold Koenig's] article on physician retention, then another completely off-subject idea. One of the most disturbing trends (at least in AF medicine) has been what we call "OMG-the objective medical group."
Not that I'm against all the other corps (nurses, BSCs, MSCs, Dental) having a fair shake at command, but I think it's gone the other way and become "anti-physician." By that, I mean that physicians with aspirations of command get "locked into" roles that take them out of contention for leadership positions, until they are the ranking officer and made leaders by default. This just sets us up to fail.

For example, I'll leave this assignment as an O-5 or O-5 select. I can throw my hat in the squadron commander selection pool, but I've never even been a flight commander, because another physician in Mental Health outranks me. Therefore, I will either not get selected due to my lack of experience, or I will get selected based on my rank, and be expected to command with no experience. In contrast, the nurses and medical "admin" folks shuffle around from flight to flight (I think in the Navy hospital, the equivalent is either the "division" or "department"), gaining leadership experience, even though some of the physicians outrank them. No one has ever asked me if I'd like to be the flight commander of Family Practice or medical records flights, to gain leadership experience. Now, I'm not saying that I'd necessarily want to be shuffled around, but if promotion to higher ranks is based on ability to lead, somewhere there is a disconnect.

Another "issue" has to do with the disconnect between the values and practice, again, as pertains to promotion. In the AF, our core values are "Integrity first, service before self, and excellence in all we do." However, in contrast, for promotion, it appears that excellence is not as valued. My squadron commander, working on my promotion recommendation form (PRF), noted that for line officers promotions below the zone are common, but for physicians the attitude is "wait your turn."

In fact, most physicians who have served their time and "checked the squares" will get promoted on the anniversaries of their med school graduation. I checked all the squares (double board certification, overseas assignment, flight surgeon's wings, consultant to MAJCOM surgeon, PME) soon after pinning on Major. Where does the excellence come in? Excellent clinical care is valued by the patients, but not by the people who promote; in fact, I was told that for promotion to lieutenant colonel, my PRF probably should reflect very little direct patient care information. And although there are similar problems in civilian practice (I did my fellowship on "deferred" status), in the military a lousy resident is not usually "fired," but sent out to serve his/her service commitment as a GMO (or sent to another residency).

So, I agree with you that physician retention will continue to be a problem until the folks driving the train look at the underlying problems and fix them. I liken this to the current medical emphasis on "prevention." Perhaps they need to address the issues before the "exit interviews" of the separating physician. Prevention in this sense involves making the physicians feel appreciated for their work, and getting them to "buy in" to the system from the day they put on the uniform, and fixing the problems as they arise—instead of after all the good folks have gotten fed up and leave.

Now, onto my other issue.

I'm very interested in the discussions on the future of military medicine, and have voiced this idea at a previous deployment medicine conference, but it kind of fell on deaf ears. Given that the role of military medical officers appears to be mirroring the changing role of the military in general (as it should), and the military is tasked more and more with the humanitarian relief missions, I agree that it makes sense for the medical corps of the respective services to be involved in these activities. However, tying together the issues discussed in some of your [previous] articles, I wonder if a "revolution" would allow us to address many of the concerns at once.

Is it possible/feasible/practical for the military medical system to completely re-organize? Instead of large military hospitals trying to recapture funds and patients, can we "move Mohammed to the mountain?" Can we expand the MHS, but "deploy" the medical personnel to civilian facilities, including those in our own inner cities or rural communities? Military beneficiaries could get the same care as their civilian counterparts, in the same facilities, but the military would not be primarily responsible for the overhead/upkeep of the facilities. We could "train" for humanitarian missions by taking care of the huge underserved/uninsured populations within our own country, many of whom probably deal with similar medical problems. In contrast, treating retirees with medical problems due to lives of excess probably does not prepare the physician to address those problems of refugees plagued with lifetimes of poverty and poor health care.

Can we "increase the pool" of potential deployed docs by recruiting into the reserves large numbers of docs who would essentially practice in the public sector, but agree to deploy if called, often to perform similar tasks (as you recall during Desert Storm, many of the reservists complained that deployment would ruin their practices)? By selecting from those who are already committed to such public service, and paying them standard salaries, you remove the financial disincentive for their choice to practice on the uninsured. Much of this work would fall under what are currently the hot issues nationwide (not just in the military): prevention of disease, early identification and treatment, public health measures (e.g. smoking prevention/cessation), mental health.

If this sounds like socialized medicine, it is. But I already think military medicine is a form of socialized medicine (unfortunately, the "HMO factor" you recently discussed is at odds with this cultural model). Another criticism my colleagues had of my plan is that the USPHS is supposed to be doing what I propose. Except that the Public Health Service does not support a military service, and they are not currently large enough to provide the scope of services to the nation that I propose. I suppose SOME military training would need to be accomplished, but the current military specific training for civilian-trained physician accessions is not large volume. I suspect that the military could develop a standard course, and that all the reservists in my plan could rotate through on a yearly or bi-yearly schedule.

Note that I'm not proposing, as others have, that we should do away with the military medical system completely. Instead, I'm proposing that we train and pay MORE military medical personnel, but that we shift their place of work away from the military hospitals. We will continue to provide most of the care for our beneficiary population, but also will serve the national interest by providing medical care for those who otherwise are underserved (which is exactly what we do when we deploy for humanitarian missions).

This "public service" contact with military medical personnel may also address the general decline in enlistments, which I believe is due to the decreased number of people in the U.S. who have personal contact with a military person as they grow up.

There--we've solved military physician recruitment, training, and retention (I'm assuming that picking those who enjoy that type of work in the first place will enhance their job satisfaction and lead to continued service). In the meantime, we've addressed the issue of costs to renovate military medical facilities (we wouldn't have to renovate—but we could direct that money into other public service areas or improve facilities at which our beneficiaries receive care). And we've addressed the not so little problem of the uninsured in our own country. I consider it an embarrassment that we lead the world in medical expenditures but lag behind in several outcome measures of health. Of course, there is the small issue of getting those folks with a lot invested in the current system to consider such a radical proposal. I suspect it also would hit the "different pots of money" argument along the line. But that's where people like you [Dr. Koenig] come in.

DAVID L. KUTZ, M.D.



Studies Can't Replace
Lack Of Appreciation

I read with great interest the article published in the July 2000 edition which [Dr. Koenig] authored. Some very good points were raised, and for the most part I would agree with [its] assessments. Several points, however, have a side not covered in this article, and it is these which I would like to discuss.
Over my past seven years of active duty, I have watched the senior officer corps in the medical sector being gutted by retirements and separations of those senior physicians who have 15+ years active duty, only to choose to "throw it all away" and change to the civilian sector. As my Health Professions Officer Indoctrination Course taught me, I questioned the reasons why these leaders made their decisions, because this information is invaluable in planning your future career. You are exactly correct when you say that the practice of "pure medicine without the hassles of administrative burden" still promised on the recruiting postcards which I receive frequently in the mail is worlds away from the reality. Administrative burden is not only heavy, there is an anemic ancillary staff that can scarcely help with daily duties, leaving the bulk of administrative issues to the physician himself. Flawed metrics (I dread this concept) perpetuate this problem without any help in sight. Certainly civilian physicians have their share of administrative burden, but in discussing this issue with recently retired or separated doctors, administrative assistance makes this job much more palatable.

Deployments are fun, and I would agree excellent training. However, to use the example of a surgical team on a two- week humanitarian mission is to ignore the very real burden placed upon the MTF staff during their departure. Being a lowly "PCM," our productivity numbers (set at unachievable goals) reflect maximum output 100 per cent of the time without staff being gone for deployments. I consider myself a good internist but hardly think that "picking up the slack" with 10-minute new patient appointments (for complicated patients) does not impact quality of care. Elective surgery certainly can be postponed for some time, and non-PCM clinics with the ability to send business out to the network may not see such a drastic impact with short deployments, but this is not the case with the majority of clinics. Extended deployments in my department to Turkey and Saudi Arabia (of course without any back-fill help) will foster the discontent on both the physician and patient side with the promises made under TriCare and inability to deliver. TriCare puts an enormous burden from an array of metrics on the Primary Care Manager which simply does not mesh with the deployment mission the military is pursuing.

Leadership is important and I have chosen to follow those individuals whom I trust and respect by separating from the Air Force and pursuing a civilian career. I would take offense at any innuendo that this is influenced by money or not being patriotic, for it certainly is not. The decimated senior medical officer corps is the writing on the wall that tells me what the proper thing to do is at this stage in my career. My efforts for working hard are rewarded by requests for more work; unfortunately, as evidenced by the empty parking lots I see when I arrive and depart the medical center, this is to benefit coworkers and not myself.

My Chief Resident during my residency instructed me my first day of training that the best readiness is actual patient care. And, patient care should be the yardstick by which we are primarily measured. I am proud of my patient care and would defend my work ethic and productivity if ever brought into question—this is not the issue. I am leaving at a time when I actually feel sorry for the staff members whom I leave behind. My position will not be replaced, and we are losing another slot to another facility from my department. When I started my internist position, we had deployments and administrative duties, but as a rule, all members were very satisfied with their job. Discontent is widespread, with more bad news every day. The spirit has been broken for many of my colleagues whose lofty goals and ideals have been smashed by the stark realities of the bureaucracy of the military.

I will not have to deal with these issues as I start terminal leave on 30 July and plan on resigning my commission—a painful reality in that it is a deviation from my initial plan and my patriotic instincts. However, this is the logical choice. I will join a group of very satisfied prior-service physicians at a local practice and hope to continue to care for many of the over-65 veterans whom I am deeply committed to serving. I will fill the void created by the shrinking access to care for those most deserving veterans over the age of 65 for whom I have become extremely fond. My posters of military themes will accompany me, and I am grateful of my opportunities while in the military. All the studies in the world fail to take into consideration the overwhelming discontent and lack of gratitude currently experienced by military physicians.

Just my thoughts, as I depart my military career. I am telling you the realities of the retention issue as seen now by military physicians and not my superiors who left active patient care when there was much more autonomy enjoyed by the Medical Corps.

My honesty is the reality; all the studies in the world cannot replace the lack of appreciation and respect currently experienced by the Medical Corps.

ROBERT J. SAWYER, USAF, MC
http://www.usmedicine.com/article.cfm?articleID=60&issueID=16
 
and for part 2 of these insightful LETTERS to the EDITOR. And I want to say, I am NOT AGAINST anyone joining military medicine. Those who do, are doing a great service for our country and our troops. What I am hoping to do, is let you know what you may be getting into.

Letters To The Editor (Part II) -


Physician Departures:
Let The Dialogue Begin!

I found Dr. Koenig's article to be insightful and pertinent to the problem of physician retention in the USPHS as well as military. I especially identified with the comment that "things are wrong and being ignored." I think that people with some "real world" experience who occasionally wander into the system are undervalued and their potential contributions ignored.
I think that the morale in the Corps is very low. My wife and I, both board certified specialists, volunteered to work with the IHS and were commissioned five years ago, after several years of successful private practice, and not feeling quite ready to retire. We are now planning to leave the system, instead of renewing four-year contracts. We enjoy caring for Native Americans and even the challenge of working in challenging hospital settings and do not find the lower remuneration to be a problem. We do appreciate the freedom from the burdens of private practice and practicing with a team of other physicians.

Our primary reasons for leaving are the frustrations of having no control over an administrative bureaucracy that does not recognize or is incapable of fixing relatively straightforward problems. When decisions are made that negatively impact the image of our hospital, with little input from physicians, and when the hospital regularly runs out of money at mid year for equipment and medications, while the billing department flounders in inefficiency, it directly impacts how we are able to serve our patients. On a local level, our services are welcomed and valued, but on a regional or national level, we feel like we are treated like high school students, in view of the systems for monitoring our performance and evaluating our past experience and potential contribution.

Thank you for beginning the discussion of this important topic. If we are to retain physicians in government service, we must start a dialogue to understand why new physicians as well as more mature ones, decide to move on rather than feel like they have an important role in the system.

PAUL SCHREIBER, M.D.



Most Senior Physicians
Focus On Themselves

I'm a retired Air Force physician assistant (PA). I read with interest your article in U.S. MEDICINE on physician retention. You state that "The vast majority of senior military physicians are superb mentors, role models and champions of their younger colleagues." I couldn't possibly disagree more. Seven PAs and one physician "leader," a grossly overweight lieutenant colonel board-certified in internal medicine, staffed the primary care clinic at Scott AFB Ill. He saw active duty only. Meanwhile, I would be in the office with an 80-year-old who was taking 15 different medications. See anything wrong with this picture? The higher "leadership" in the hospital knew all about this, and did nothing.
At Brooks AFB Texas, I had to work for a 63-year-old lieutenant colonel physician. After 14 years in the Public Health Service, this individual came into the Air Force because the PHS wanted her to move out of Texas, and she didn't want to go. Not exactly a poster child for "Service above Self," wouldn't you agree?

She did not understand the Air Force corporate culture or the promotion dynamic, didn't know how to write an officer performance report or a promotion recommendation form, and didn't want to know about any of the above. Her sole interest was punching the time clock until she could retire. In short, she was a disservice to everyone who had to be supervised by her. Not willing to go on for pages, I will simply say that the described individuals are the rule in military medicine, not the exception. The Air Force Medical Service (AFMS) is infected with these types. I refuse to believe that the Army and Navy differ significantly in their physician make-up. Indeed, as a former Navy corpsman, my insight extends to that service as well.

These individuals were my "superb…role models?" I don't think so. The only thing the vast majority of AFMS "leaders" can represent is how not to be a role model.

The problem is leadership. Medical/nursing/dental schools are technical schools. No one learns anything about leadership or management in these technical schools. That fact is, all too often, all too painfully obvious. Those in military medicine leadership positions tend to be in way over their heads. Almost always, they have too much arrogance to admit it. That's a bad combination. Defining terms, arrogance is when you don't know what you're doing, and have nothing to say, but insist on your point of view. Indeed, this definition accurately describes most of the AFMS senior individuals. The reason they're in leadership positions is that they're the only ones left. Anyone who is not a strict careerist took one look at what was going on and got out a long time ago.

"Some senior physicians successfully navigate a career in military medicine by ‘playing it safe?' " Negative repeat negative! Try almost all instead of some. When all the people of integrity walk out, all you have left are don't-rock-the-boat types who have one interest—the furtherance of their own careers.

There are two kinds of people in military medicine. In the decided minority, we have those who believe that we must do what is right. In the vast majority, there are those who believe that the end justifies the means. In case there's any doubt, that "end" would be their next promotion. That's the mainspring of every decision these people make. Rather chilling to think of these individuals supervising people, say, in a wartime situation, isn't it?

As to those in the minority, I'm happy to say that I met one just yesterday. He is a young, bright specialist physician with a lot of common sense, a level head on his shoulders and a brilliant future ahead of him. He separates from the military in two weeks to go to a civilian residency, and is extremely happy about it. Can't say that I blame him.

CHIP SEIDERER



Patient Care Must Be Made
Military's Top Priority

I just finished reading [Dr. Harold Koenig's] article entitled "Physician Retention Within The Military," and I would like to share my comments and experiences with you concerning this issue. First, after reading your article, I felt as if you were speaking about me. I am a GMO in the USAF who entered into the military through an HPSP scholarship. I took this scholarship not only for the obvious financial benefits but also because of an underlying sense of proud patriotism. My father, uncles, and both grandfathers all served in the United States armed forces in one capacity or another. So, I entered into the USAF with expectations of serving my country proudly as my elders have done.
However, I have become quite discouraged during the past three years of active-duty service. After finishing a general surgery internship, I was sent to Kunsan, ROK, for a year as a GMO. Then I was sent to Los Angeles Air Force Base, where I have completed the second of my four-year active duty service commitment. I would like to relate to you my experiences with respect to Professional Development, Leadership, and Working Conditions.


Professional Development:
As stated above I am a GMO. My initial plans were to enter into a urology residency after medical school; however, the USAF did not need very many urologists my year, so I was sent to a general surgery internship. I had very little primary care training in medical school and virtually none in internship. Yet I was sent to Korea for a year to be one of four physicians in a remote primary care clinic.

I was lucky, because the other three docs were family practitioners who took me under their wings and taught me a lot. I call the type of medicine that GMOs practice "trial by fire" medicine. We are thrown into staff positions with very little training, and we are expected to function like fully residency trained physicians. So, all that we can do to survive and not hurt anyone is to learn quickly on-the-job.

I have indeed run into several situations where I was and am being held to a higher standard than that to which I have been trained. The most negligent is the fact that I am required to work a single-physician Saturday clinic once a month where half the patients are children. I have absolutely no training in pediatrics, and I related this fact to my supervisors. The other physicians in the clinic were very concerned about this issue, but because of a "manning shortage" I was told by my nurse commander that I had to do this anyway—even in spite of my concerns about my lack of training.


Leadership
I feel that there is a total void in the area of medical leadership. In medical school and internship, we were always around older physicians who could be called mentors. These physicians were full of experience and insight. They helped us develop into competent young physicians. They helped us choose our paths into residency and beyond.

There is very little mentorship within the Medical Corps. I am very worried about my future after the military: how competitive am I for a residency? Which residency should I pursue? etc. But there are no elder, wiser docs with whom to talk. My colleagues are straight out of residency. They are as young as I am. How are we to succeed professionally without the proper guidance?

Furthermore, I feel that you missed a very important aspect of leadership. We physicians are in a very tough situation with regards to choosing a career in military medicine. If we stay on active duty, then inevitably we will become administrators and not clinicians. Right now, this occurs by the time that one pins on Major. My SGH at Kunsan was a Major just two years out of his FP residency. He saw almost no patients during the whole year. How sad is that?

Most physicians that I know went into medicine because they liked to see patients—not because of a desire to push a pencil. But this becomes a much more sinister problem. Since most physicians have shied away from the "admin" roles, there are many essential leadership positions that have become available. These positions are now filled by nurses, which leads to a fundamental management problem. How can a career nurse understand the day-to-day frustrations not to mention the career goals of a physician when he/she has never been in that scenario?

In my opinion, the clinics should be managed by folks trained in hospital administration not in medicine or nursing. We doctors should be consultants to our managers. In my current clinic, the nurses are more concerned about the "numbers" rather than patient care. We doctors try to make suggestions that would best benefit our patients, but these are often very unpopular with our commanders because they may sacrifice a "good" metric.

My question: who are we serving if we are not working on behalf of our patients? This is absolutely ludicrous.


Working Conditions
I sometimes feel like I am working in a 3rd world country, even though my office is in the middle of a major metropolitan area. We have supply problems all of the time. At one point, we had no table paper, gyn speculums, or tongue depressors—in addition to the fact that we are required to see 25 patients per day with minimal support staff. Civilian doctors see many more patients a day than we do, but they have 4-5 exam rooms, plenty of ancillary staff, and they dictate their notes. How are we supposed to compete with this?

How are we supposed to give good care to our patients in a 15-minute time slot when we spend half the time finding out why the patient is here because there is no chart and the other half of the appointment is spent writing?

If the Unites States military is the least bit concerned about retention, then they certainly are not showing it very much. I would like to say that I am in complete agreement with your assessment. If more of today's leaders would listen to the messages that are being sent by today's military physicians, then I believe both physician and patient would be much happier. And this in turn would lead to more physicians making a career out of the military.

Physicians are a very committed bunch. We toil through medical school and residency in spite of our family and other personal commitments. When we come onto active duty, why can't we be treated with the respect that we deserve? We are our patients' advocates.

Until some kind of paradigm shift is made so that the patients as well as the doctors who treat them are regarded as priority-one, I believe that the military will certainly "hemorrhage" doctors.

AN AIR FORCE PHYSICIAN



Silence By Senior Officers
Leads To Physician Loss

Dr. Harold Koenig's editorial on physician retention certainly touched a variety of necessary changes to combat the physician exodus from the military. But [the situation] is not an "ooze" as he describes, but rather multi-system organ failure from a serious volume loss due to massive hemorrhaging of talent from our military's medical corps.
Many of us joined the military not merely for the financial incentives of medical student debt relief, but for reasons of patriotism and giving back to our country our medical talents to our fellow military active-duty and retired personnel and their families. It was during this advocacy for our active-duty personnel while a destroyer squadron physician with the USS AMERICA battlegroup during the Bosnia conflict in 1995-1996, that I found my greatest pride in our military. It was there on the ships that I met the greatest sailors you could ever ask for. It was also there I learned that the only member of the crew required to set sail was the Independent Duty Corpsman (IDC)— not the CO, XO or any other member of the crew. It was the senior enlisted corpsman (IDC) that was required at all times to be onboard while underway.

I realized then, as I understand now, that the medical oversight on our Navy ships is imperative and must not be compromised. For it is the IDC who checks the water, food and any other inoculum (vaccines, TB skin tests, etc.) or other health related issue, and is solely responsible to protect his/her fellow sailors and Marines. If we lose his/her oversight function, our country stands close to the edge of a military medical casualty resulting in needless morbidity and mortality.

This is what I believe is happening with the Anthrax Vaccination Immunization Program (AVIP). Shortly before I decided to resign my commission and leave the Navy, I heard from many of my old IDC friends from their SURFLANT deployments. I was appalled by what they told me. They were instructed to "look the other way" regarding any health reactions to this vaccine. Further, they were instructed to squelch anyone wishing to file a VAERS form (FDA/CDC required adverse reaction form).

The IDC's role as supreme medical safety advocate for his fellow shipmates was being threatened by a Naval community headstrong in "making this vaccination program work." Interestingly, I heard the same thing about TriCare, months earlier from our Navy Surgeon General. This was alarming and I could no longer remain in an organization that literally threw away its medical responsibility "to do no harm." Where were my fellow medical corps officers? I spoke out publicly on this issue in the Navy/Army/Air Force and Marine Times and was summarily tossed in the career trashcan. I was even passed over for lieutenant commander; for a physician it is a relatively rare event, and one I remain extremely proud of.

Sadly, it is the relative silence by our senior medical leaders which I find so disturbing. Not only junior medical officers are watching this silence in disbelief, but junior corpsmen are equally disturbed by our medical officers' lack of health advocacy for our men and women in uniform. I applaud Dr. Koenig's attempt at bringing to light a variety of important issues as to what is causing the exodus of talented personnel from its ranks. But besides money, promotion, working conditions, expectations, and adventure is the profound lack of medical leadership on a variety of issues, including TriCare, AVIP, defective chemical suits, heat exhaustion from improper hydration during fitness runs, documented harassment of various kinds leading to deaths of soldiers, airmen, Marines and sailors within a number of military bases throughout the world, including suicides far in excess of societal norms.

Until our medical corps of our services begin to take a moral, ethical and legal responsibility for the health and safety of our military, both active and retired, will we ever come close to turning the tide of an impending demise of what was a great heritage—military medicine.

CRAIG MICHAEL UHL, MD
Monarch Beach, California



Existing Problems Affect
Medical Officer Retention

I must say, you have impeccable timing with your recent article entitled "Physician Retention Within the Military."
In my e-mail inbox I have, among others, four e-mail messages. The first message, from my previous department head, says he submitted me for a Navy Commendation Medal for my work in a previous position under him. He submitted it before I changed positions; however, an MSC lost the award package. When the DH found out, he resubmitted it, but because it was past the CO's deadline for awards (the deadline being three months after a position change), it was not approved by the CO. "Sorry."

The second message mentions the two awards this branch clinic won in February 2000—both of the only two DoD/TriCare awards given to an Army/Navy/AF outpatient clinic, one for customer satisfaction, one for access to care. Each award came with $15,000 for the clinic to use for "morale building purchases."

Clinic staff decided on a new staff lounge, paintings for the clinic and exercise equipment. We have been waiting to buy all this since February 2000. However, the CO says the hospital is still low on funds and she has higher priorities for the money at the main hospital (medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, etc.) so we will not be able to buy anything with it until after October 1, "Hopefully then."

The third message is from my OIC saying that my request for my one and only medical conference for the year (the American Association of Family Physicians Convention in Dallas, Texas, in September 2000) has been disapproved due to lack of funds. The CO "suggests reading some medical journals and submitting the cards for CME." It's not the same thing.

Then the fourth message, sent to the fleet by the new CNO, contained the following paragraph:
"We prize leadership as the foundation for mission success in our profession. I expect every Navy leader to uphold the highest standards of leadership—that's a given. As shipmates and colleagues in service, we are bound by a voluntary covenant to our country and to each other, up and down the chain of command. As part of that covenant, leaders promise respect, clear direction, meaningful work and the tools and training to do that work, recognition for a job well done, and opportunity for personal and professional growth. The measure of any leader is the extent to which he or she fulfills that promise."

When there is such an obvious disconnect between the levels of the senior chain of command, is it really surprising that there is dissatisfaction among those of us on the front lines seeing the patients? And people ask me why I, as a commander, am getting out next year instead of retiring. (Actually, more of the reason I am getting out is to be able to take care of my elderly in-laws in upstate NY. They live near Fort Drum, and I asked the detailer if he could arrange for me to finish my time at the Army Family Practice clinic there, maybe switching places with an Army doctor—which, as a USUHS grad, does not seem unreasonable to me, especially given Fort Drum is in the snow belt and the Navy has some nice locations—but the detailer said his job is to "Find Navy people for Navy billets.")

After a previous e-mail conversation we had, I put down on paper some thoughts about how I feel Navy medicine could be improved to meet the current needs of the Navy as well as the needs of the Navy medical personnel. I had intended to submit it as an article for publication…but my COC discouraged me from doing so. I found it fascinating that your article was so similar to a portion of the article that I wrote, our coming from such different perspectives.

Following is an excerpt from mine.


Medical Staff Satisfaction: On a day-to-day basis, I would say most nurses, physicians, corps staff, and Medical Service Corps officers are generally happy doing what they are doing. They are satisfied with their lifestyles, opportunities to travel, call schedules, and access to entertainment in the area of the base. The general inclination of a professional is to make the best of their situation and try not to dwell on the problems, especially those over which they have no control. Nevertheless, problems exist and they affect overall satisfaction of the medical staff with the Navy. Difficulties with physician retention are one sign of this.

Problem areas/Ways to improve:

1) Staffing: See comments under "efficiency," above. Doctors enjoy training corpsmen, medical students, interns and residents. Corpsmen want to be trained, they want to see patients-they do not want to spend all of their waking hours taking vital signs.

2) Becoming administrative to advance: It is a generally accepted fact that most staff corps officers will not make captain unless they are in a department head or other administrative position. On the other hand, the civilian world is looking for doctors who are clinically great physicians, who see patients quickly, who practice cost-effective medicine, who have a wealth of clinical experience, and who are warm, friendly, and caring.

The Navy needs to put an emphasis on retaining physicians who meet those same qualities. They are not well-reflected in the current fitness report. Paradigm shift: Great doctors should be recognized and advanced regardless of how much "admin" they do. Maybe patients should be able to have some say in this.

3) Work hours: Many clinics are now open weekends and evening hours with no increase in staffing.

4) Access to recent technology: Even just three years ago I was at a facility that had 39 physicians and about 10 medical students sharing one computer. The computer situation is gradually improving as Y2K concerns forced most clinics and hospitals to replace their outdated computers, but there are still entire clinics in which no physician has a computer, there are physician department heads without computers, and there are physicians with old computers or computers that lack Internet access.

We need computers, but we need even to go beyond simply the acquisition of computers and start using the technology in a useful and time-saving way:

a) Upgrade to multimedia computers with Internet access, CHCS (Composite Health Care System—the medical net), word processing, voice recognition, and e-mail capability for each physician. With voice recognition, the provider can dictate patient records directly into the computer, avoiding need for a transcriptionist.

b) Establish an e-mail listserve for each specialty. I am the list-serve manager for the Navy's Family Practice List-serve, which is an e-mail group of 174 physicians, whose purpose is to share educational materials, billet opportunities, and other information relevant to all Navy FPs. The other specialties should also have listserves. (For information contact me at [email protected].)

c) Navy-sponsored access to medical references available via the Internet. Some great sites with on-line up-to-date medical journals are costly for individuals, as are journal prescriptions.

d) Computerized medical records: Longtime promised, but slow in the coming. Once they are here, we will need access to digital cameras to put a picture of that "difficult to describe" rash into the record, or to document how that mole looks now to compare to any future changes, or to e-mail to a dermatologist for help with diagnosis. We will also need access to digital video to document procedures done via scopes, such as flexible sigmoidoscopy.

5) Respect: The erosion of respect for physicians as professionals in the civilian world (evidenced by frivolous lawsuits, HMOs dictating how to treat patients, decreasing physician "perks" at most hospitals, etc.) has made it into the military. Though respect between military personnel is an integral part of military culture, in certain subtle ways there is a decided lack of respect for physicians as professionals. Some physicians have an exam table in their office because other clinic personnel do not want to share an office in order to give the provider a separate exam room.

I have heard senior staff members seriously state, "What does a doctor need a computer for?" At one hospital recently an administrator spontaneously moved the physicians' call room four floors up without asking the physicians—because he wanted a larger office with a window. At another clinic, the physicians have to search for a parking space 200 yards from the clinic and walk by 15 parking spaces reserved for enlisted and civilian staff—since only one physician has a reserved parking space.

6) Compensation: The recent increase in base pay and the coming "adjustment" for middle-grade officers are certainly welcome. Increasing the bonuses, too, may get some short-term gains in retention, but the issue is actually more involved.

a) Pay discrepancy: When Navy physician pay is compared to civilian physician pay, it seems the maximum possible military pay (captain with no military obligation signing up for 4 years) is used and compared to average civilian pay for the specialty (including physicians newly out of training)—this is not a fair comparison.

For just one example, a lieutenant commander family practitioner with 10 years out of medical school but still with military obligation (the category of physician most likely to be debating about getting out of the Navy) makes about $83K (K=$1,000), compared to about 110K for the Navy captain physician. Starting pay for a civilian FP fresh out of training is $100 to $120K, but the average pay for an experienced civilian FP is $165 to $215K. The average physician assistant in the U.S. makes about $68K. Yes, some of the pay is tax free, but there is still a sizable difference in pay, and the civilians are not moving their families every few years and putting their lives in dangerous situations.

b) Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA): As a result of DOPMA, which went into effect in 1986, the time physicians spend in medical school as ensigns does not count toward time in service or pay. This means that a physician who spent four years as an ensign at USUHS and graduated before 1986 would start out as a "LT over 4" (for pay) and be able to retire 16 years after graduation, whereas a physician who graduated in 1987 would start out as a "LT under 2" and have to wait 20 more years to retire.

I rarely hear DOPMA discussed, but it is a significant reason that post-DOPMA graduates are opting to get out now. Post-DOPMA physicians are now finishing their three-year residencies and their seven-year obligations for USUHS and are looking at 10 more years before they can retire instead of just 6 years—they do not make as much and have to stay in longer to retire. What other Navy officer cannot retire until 24 years in?

c) Retirement pay: Physician bonuses do not count toward calculation of retirement pay, only base pay. Retirement pay for a Navy captain might be about $30K, which admittedly is good money, but is a 73 per cent drop in income, and would only be 18 per cent of their income if they get out of the Navy and make $165K.

d) Decreasing medical benefits: Navy physicians are not simply care providers, they and their families are also consumers of Navy medical care themselves and also have a vested interest in what is happening with Navy medicine from that perspective. Though the Navy medical system certainly has some positive aspects to it, the decision to no longer care for retirees for free in Navy medical facilities, the seemingly frequent comparisons by civilian physicians of TriCare compensation to Medicaid compensation, the increasing dependence of the military system on civilian care, the relatively poor dependent dental coverage, and the types of problems that chronic budget shortfalls are causing cannot help but make one wonder about the future.

7) Recognition: The previous dearth in awards given to physicians in the past is much improved in today's Navy. Awards, though, are still given primarily for administrative responsibilities, and sometimes for research participation. The civilians want doctors who are great doctors—impeccable medical expertise, well-trained, see patients quickly, efficiently and cost-effectively—not simply great administrators or great leaders or great researchers.

The Navy "fitreps" and physician peer review certainly picks out the "bad apples," but we need to go the next step and find a way to truly recognize outstanding medical care.

8) Sufficient variety of experiences to maintain skills: As the Navy silently slides toward active duty-only medical care there is an inevitable erosion of the variety of patients that all physicians need to maintain their skills. There is a limit to how long a general surgeon (or family practitioner, or psychiatrist, etc.) can stay on board an aircraft carrier and expect to remember the intricacies of operating on a trauma patient (or for an FP to deliver a baby, or psychiatrist to treat a schizophrenic).

Likewise, replacing general medical officers in active duty medical clinics with specialists like family practitioners can only work if the clinics are truly converted to family practice clinics—which means the FPs are allowed to see ALL ages, from newborns to geriatrics, are allowed to see and deliver obstetric patients, and have access to the full spectrum of family practice procedures, including flexible sigmoidoscopy, colposcopy, exercise stress tests, vasectomies, obstetric ultrasound, and endometrial biopsies.

9) Homesteading: Many physicians are moved far too frequently, especially the specialists. Consideration needs to be given to improving the degree to which physicians are able to homestead. It would be nice to be able to stay six years in the same location.

There is also a significant urge for many physicians to want to live near family, and the detailers should do what they can to make that happen. That might sometimes mean talking to Army or Air Force detailers to do a personnel switch occasionally—though I am not in favor of a "purple" Medical Corps—Washington D.C. has, after all, three tri-service hospitals now. Interservice cooperation should not be anathema.

10) Exit Interviews: All of the above are heard in exit interviews, but the most common trend seen is that the physician is not able to practice the full spectrum of medicine that he/she would like to.

CDR. GLENN THIBAULT, MC USN
http://www.usmedicine.com/article.cfm?articleID=61&issueID=16
 
several other threads have adressed the "is military medicine a ggod idea financially" question. Below is a discussion on the topic. My opinion is that HPSP is nice during med school, but in the long run DO NOT JOIN the military for financial reasons. As a doc, you will be fine financially no matter what you do. Why assume all the risk that comes with HPSP (the military deciding your specialty, your residence, your staffing, etc) when they have proven that they should NOT be trusted in these areas.

http://www.usmedicine.com/article.cfm?articleID=76&issueID=17

Military Pay Deficit Found 'Significant' - Nancy Tomich




WASHINGTON—There is a significant gap in compensation levels between military and civilian physicians that serves as a major "dissatisfier" for retention, a study by the Center for Naval Analyses concludes.

"We find that a substantial current compensation gap exists between military and private-sector physicians, particularly at the end of the 7-year career point, and the disparity in total compensation varies widely by medical specialty," the CNA report states. For example, it relates, military family practitioners experience a 12 per cent salary deficit compared to their civilian counterparts at the end of seven years, whereas orthopedic surgeons experience a 48 per cent deficit.

This pay gap decreases as length of military service increases, the report advises, making it more financially advantageous for military physicians to remain in service until retirement and then enter civilian practice. However, CNA officials caution, some of the assumptions involved in this calculation must be examined—such as the assumption that civilian physicians practice until age 65. CNA said it anticipates contracting with the American Medical Association to determine just how many civilian physicians do remain in practice until their mid-60s.

While the CNA comparison of pay levels deals primarily with Navy physicians, its findings likely are applicable to the Army and Air Force as well, since pay levels are the same across the medical departments, CNA officials have noted.

"If you can get them to stay until retirement, and they work full-time as a civilian until the age of 65, you're okay," advised one official familiar with the study. "But you have to put that in context." Most physicians, the official noted, do not make career decisions based on earnings at age 65. "Many just say gosh, I can make twice as much now, and it's a less irritating environment—let's go."

The CNA analysis, prepared at the request of Navy surgeon general Vice Adm. Richard A. Nelson, examined job satisfaction for Navy physicians compared with civilian physicians working in managed care environments to determine if the irritants for Navy physicians are related more to managed care or to "military-unique" factors. Compensation was found to be the "overwhelming" dissatisfier voiced by Navy physicians.

"This has been exacerbated by the managed care support contracts," noted the official. "A radiologist may look across the table and see a civilian counterpart who is not susceptible to deployment, PCS [permanent change of station] orders, or having to stand a military personnel inspection but who is making twice their salary." The CNA study is based on civilian physician compensation data from the Hay Group and represents the first comprehensive updating of the Hay Group data that formed the foundation for the special pay program instituted in the early 1990s. The CNA study has been reviewed within the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, and a final document is expected to be released this month after some "smoothing out."

Another "prong" of the CNA analysis examines retention of Navy physicians and finds it declining. Details of that analysis also will be available sometime this month. Officials said the next step will be to formulate a "game plan" for dealing with the issues raised in the CNA studies—including the potential desirability of trying to retain physicians for 30 rather than 20 years. "You wouldn't have as much turnover, and you wouldn't have as much cost in terms of accessions," the Navy official said, noting that the CNA analysis offers a model on which to build possible solutions for retaining physicians.

"In football terms, we now have a playing field and we've laid down some talc powder for the lines. We can place the football on the 20-yard line and see if we slip or move ahead. It's a valuable tool to have," the official observed. The CNA analysis dealt only with physicians on active duty and did not examine retention problems in the reserve forces.


The CNA Methodology
The CNA analysis examines compensation for Navy physicians—which includes such factors as regular military compensation, special pays, health care benefits, retirement benefits and the like—at three career points: 7, 12, 17 and years of service. In comparison, compensation for private-sector physicians encompasses such factors as base salary, bonuses, health benefits, pension, 401K plans and the like, using data assembled by the Hay Group. The CNA comparison includes only those private-sector physicians who work in managed care settings—specifically, 22,000 physicians from more than 90 employer-based healthcare organizations, 56 per cent of which are hospital-based, 29 per cent of which are group practices, and 15 per cent of which are HMOs.

Two sets of assumptions are used in the CNA analysis of compensation levels for Navy and private-sector physicians:

Current compensation—a "snapshot" of the value at July 2000 of cash compensation and benefits at the three career points.
Present value of compensation—the present value of the "stream" of future cash and benefits a Navy physician could anticipate receiving by remaining on active duty, or by separating at one of the three career points and then practicing in the private sector.

The report notes that the 7-, 12-, and 17-year career points were chosen because both 7 and 12 years are "logical" career decision points, and at 17 years physicians encounter the "rapidly growing value" of the military retirement system. It also points out that some specialties remain in service obligation at some of these career points, and comparisons at these levels would not apply to them. The report's analysis is based on a "typical" accession and training profile for most Navy physicians: four-year Health Professions Scholarship Program, followed by one year of GME while on active duty, then two years as a general medical officer, with residency training then following. Private-sector physicians are assumed to begin a year of internship following graduation from medical school at age 26, then to enter residency and fellowship training, and then to enter practice.
Basic and special pay rates used for the study are those in effect on July 1, 2000, and October 1, 1999, respectively. The study assumes no future increases in specialty or incentive pays, since such increases would require action from Congress "that cannot be predicted with certainty." Compensation data for private-sector physicians are taken from the 1999 Physician's Total Compensation Survey conducted by the Hay Group, and then "trended" by 4.5 per cent to 2000 levels. The report makes "cross-sectional comparisons" between Navy and private-sector physicians—that is, comparing total earnings at the three career points.

"We present these cross-sectional comparisons because these data are often a compelling factor for many individuals faced with the decision to continue in their current career path or change course," the report relates. "For this reason, cross-sectional comparisons may have a significant role in physician retention."


Summary Of Findings
Current compensation for military physicians ranges from 12 per cent below the median private-sector level for those in family practice to 48 per cent below for orthopedic surgeons at the 7-year career point. At the 12-year point, that disparity changes, with current compensation for those in family practice 2 per cent below the medical private-sector level, while those in neurosurgery are 56 per cent below.

When "present value" of compensation is examined at 12 years of service, career compensation ranges from 13 per cent above the median private-sector level for family practice to 7 per cent below for general pediatrics. At 17 years of service, military physicians' career compensation exceeds the median private-sector level for all specialties except neurosurgery, which is 3 per cent below. "One of the most important issues facing Navy Medicine is how to continue to cultivate a workforce that is dedicated to caring for patients, knowledgeable, committed to continuous performance and productivity improvement, and is adaptable and competent in both wartime and peacetime benefit settings," the CNA report observes.

"The implementation of TriCare is placing more demands on providers. Military medical officers are increasingly asked to work in interdisciplinary teams, to collect and interpret data, and to be active participants in quality improvement efforts while being held accountable for expanding productivity, patient satisfaction, and the training of non-physician providers within the work center."

Determining the appropriate level of compensation for military physicians is essential, the report states, because they are "costly to access and train" and possess skills "that are readily interchangeable to the private sector." "If compensation is perceived too low for the demands and duties required, medical officers may abandon the military for a private-sector career path," the report cautions. "Conversely, total compensation should be no higher than the amount required to attract and retain a quality force," it adds.

The report's summary of findings concludes with this cautionary note: "Maintaining the desired force structure requires close monitoring of the pay gap between military and private-sector physicians and of retention rates."


Provider Satisfaction Study
CNA's examination of provider satisfaction levels and "dissatisfiers" found the top six factors influencing Navy physician job satisfaction to be: insufficient monetary compensation; devaluation of clinical excellence; decreasing professional and career growth opportunities; inadequate administrative and technical support; poor business practices; and decreasing recognition and value of physician contributions. In comparison, it found the top six factors that influence civilian physician satisfaction in the managed-care environment to be: loss of income; loss of autonomy; negative effect on the quality of care; increased administrative burden; negative effect on physician-patient relationship; and breaks in the continuity of care.

The report makes these observations about Navy physician satisfaction:

Military policymakers and healthcare executives must understand, when importing managed care practices into military medicine, that physicians do not give up their autonomy easily.
Some Navy physicians see their civilian counterparts as having higher incomes for shorter hours, without the risk of deployment.
Managed care has increased the administrative burden on civilian physician practices. Navy physicians already perceive insufficient support—unrelated to managed care.
Adequate clerical and technical support staff is lacking, causing physicians to perform administrative functions instead of providing care. This finding of a "Blue Ribbon" panel in 1988 remains valid, and in fact is exacerbated by the increasing focus on productivity.
Erosion of the physician-patient relationship is a concern voiced frequently by both Navy and private-sector physicians. Navy physicians perceive that they have little or no ability to "fix" such problems as patient scheduling, parking or TriCare claims processing—but these types of issues often are imported into outpatient visits by angry patients.
Military policymakers and healthcare executives must remember to disentangle factors that affect military physician productivity tom imposed constraints and inefficient business practices.
The perceived declines in fellowship opportunities was seen as a significant factor for some specialists in deciding whether to remain in the Navy until retirement.
Military physicians can be expected to voice more of the concerns expressed by private-sector physicians as more civilian managed-care practices are imported into the Military Health System, such as "optimization," emphasis on productivity, use of clinical protocols and increasing scrutiny of military medicine from senior officials.
 
several other threads have adressed the "is military medicine a ggod idea financially" question. The report’s summary of findings concludes with this cautionary note: "Maintaining the desired force structure requires close monitoring of the pay gap between military and private-sector physicians and of retention rates."
. . . .


Provider Satisfaction Study
CNA’s examination of provider satisfaction levels and "dissatisfiers" found the top six factors influencing Navy physician job satisfaction to be: insufficient monetary compensation; devaluation of clinical excellence; decreasing professional and career growth opportunities; inadequate administrative and technical support; poor business practices; and decreasing recognition and value of physician contributions. In comparison, it found the top six factors that influence civilian physician satisfaction in the managed-care environment to be: loss of income; loss of autonomy; negative effect on the quality of care; increased administrative burden; negative effect on physician-patient relationship; and breaks in the continuity of care.

The report makes these observations about Navy physician satisfaction:

Military policymakers and healthcare executives must understand, when importing managed care practices into military medicine, that physicians do not give up their autonomy easily.
Some Navy physicians see their civilian counterparts as having higher incomes for shorter hours, without the risk of deployment.
Managed care has increased the administrative burden on civilian physician practices. Navy physicians already perceive insufficient support—unrelated to managed care.
Adequate clerical and technical support staff is lacking, causing physicians to perform administrative functions instead of providing care. This finding of a "Blue Ribbon" panel in 1988 remains valid, and in fact is exacerbated by the increasing focus on productivity.
Erosion of the physician-patient relationship is a concern voiced frequently by both Navy and private-sector physicians. Navy physicians perceive that they have little or no ability to "fix" such problems as patient scheduling, parking or TriCare claims processing—but these types of issues often are imported into outpatient visits by angry patients.
Military policymakers and healthcare executives must remember to disentangle factors that affect military physician productivity tom imposed constraints and inefficient business practices.
The perceived declines in fellowship opportunities was seen as a significant factor for some specialists in deciding whether to remain in the Navy until retirement.
Military physicians can be expected to voice more of the concerns expressed by private-sector physicians as more civilian managed-care practices are imported into the Military Health System, such as "optimization," emphasis on productivity, use of clinical protocols and increasing scrutiny of military medicine from senior officials.


Why weren't the shorter one, four and five year milestones also selected for analysis? The one year point, at the end of internship has been noted before, by Adm. Koenig and others as a significant decision point for many physicians accessed through HPSP, and that the decision to remain in the military for service beyond GME-1 and a GMO tour was made as early as internship by those who elected to exit at their earliest opportunity. Most doctors who left before returning to residency training made their decisions to do so before even finishing their military internships, and well before their experiences as GMOs. Those leaving after service year four and five, the point when normal three and four-year HPSP scholarship active service repayments are complete, have followed through with their initial plans or have elected to decline further training in the military in preference to civilian training opportunities. Choosing seven-year exits as the model of the first "career decision point" for examination completely ignores the much larger numbers the services fail to retain who leave two and three years earlier than at seven years' service. That is a significant selection bias. It selectively chooses to ignore those whose accessions the services pay significantly for but who leave at their earliest opportunity, not necessarily at seven years when presumably the officers being considered would have finished their post-residency utilization tours. Given that many GMOs, and all Navy flight surgeons have a minimum fleet assignment with flight surgery training that extends to three years, and that the earliest a returning resident could complete a residency, two years after finishing a flight surgery tour, and longer for anything besides FP, IM or peds, the earliest most one-tour flight surgeons could even consider a post-residency exit is at eight to nine years post-internship. So the seven-year point is a narrowly-selected group for any kind of meaningful examination.
 


as stated before; many of the unique, and many of the positive aspects of being a military physician are/have already been eroded away. Many of the worst aspects of civilian medicine (especially in military primary care) have been adopted by military medicine.

You figure out what that combination does to the careers of military physicians. 👎 🙁 😡
 
It seems that the overwhelming consensus of this forum is this:

Military medicine is very, very, bad.

However, there must be a reason that several hundred students a year choose it, and not all of them can be naive idiots, so can someone tell me honestly what some of the benefits of joining military medicine are?
 
It seems that the overwhelming consensus of this forum is this:

Military medicine is very, very, bad.

However, there must be a reason that several hundred students a year choose it, and not all of them can be naive idiots, so can someone tell me honestly what some of the benefits of joining military medicine are?

Well, I do think a lot of them are driven by the overwhelming desire to avoid debt (which may result in great dissatisfaction in the end). That being said, I invite you to check out this "feel good thread:"

http://forums.studentdoctor.net/showthread.php?t=354101
 
No, we're not naive idiots, just naive and poor. We get all of our information about HPSP from recruiters and don't find out about residency issues, lack of cases, poor quality research, O6 nurses, mandatory CBT and PT, payment disasters, lack of staff, scutwork as attendings, and Tricare until after we sign the contract.
 
It seems that the overwhelming consensus of this forum is this:

Military medicine is very, very, bad.

However, there must be a reason that several hundred students a year choose it, and not all of them can be naive idiots, so can someone tell me honestly what some of the benefits of joining military medicine are?


Read the pro thread. While the most positives are taking care of the most deserving people, there are too many negatives that impede that.

This forum did not exist when I signed up, and 12 yrs passed from when I signed on, till I went on active duty. Unfortunately great negative change occured during that time.

You need to really read this forum well, and many of your questions will be answered.
 
No, we're not naive idiots, just naive and poor. We get all of our information about HPSP from recruiters and don't find out about residency issues, lack of cases, poor quality research, O6 nurses, mandatory CBT and PT, payment disasters, lack of staff, scutwork as attendings, and Tricare until after we sign the contract.

Wait, Deuist, aren't you a med student like me?

Students get slammed all the time on here when they extol the virtues of military medicine when they have no experience with it. There should be a similar rule that you can't trash it until you've lived it.
 
Wait, Deuist, aren't you a med student like me?

Students get slammed all the time on here when they extol the virtues of military medicine when they have no experience with it. There should be a similar rule that you can't trash it until you've lived it.

True, I may not have experienced O6 nurses, but I already have to do CBT every federal holiday where the take-home message is "Don't drink and drive." I already have problems trying to look up information about reimbursements, ADT's, and the residency process. Even though these systems are required, the Air Force gives us no direction. And I'm scared to death of the residency point system---which I only recently discovered and realized that getting the specialty of my dream is near impossible.
 
latest issue of the UNIFORMED FAMILY PHYSICIAN is online now. Being ex-USAF I am always most interested in the USAF rep editorial which this year shows some reasons to believe that the "pendulum" is starting to swing back the other way (sad to say the pendulum has been completely in the toilet for 5+ years now). Below is the link. Anyone in, or considering being in Family Medicine in the military should read. Keep in mind that this is a "pro-Mil" journal, but I have found it to be a fairly honest journal that just mentions more of the good than the bad, as one would expect.

http://www.usafp.org/Word_PDF_Files/2007-Winter-Newsletter.pdf
 
latest issue of the UNIFORMED FAMILY PHYSICIAN is online now. Being ex-USAF I am always most interested in the USAF rep editorial which this year shows some reasons to believe that the "pendulum" is starting to swing back the other way (sad to say the pendulum has been completely in the toilet for 5+ years now). Below is the link. Anyone in, or considering being in Family Medicine in the military should read. Keep in mind that this is a "pro-Mil" journal, but I have found it to be a fairly honest journal that just mentions more of the good than the bad, as one would expect.

http://www.usafp.org/Word_PDF_Files/2007-Winter-Newsletter.pdf


and make note of the advertisement for CIVILIAN FPS to work at the MTFs. Decent pay for an strickly outpt setting.....and w/o as much of the military extra-work. But still with the "bare-bones" staffing levels at times, lack of charts etc.
 
FYI: estimated that the USAF will be about 100 Family Docs short of being able to fill all the billet slots in FY 2008.
 
as stated before; many of the unique, and many of the positive aspects of being a military physician are/have already been eroded away. Many of the worst aspects of civilian medicine (especially in military primary care) have been adopted by military medicine.

You figure out what that combination does to the careers of military physicians. 👎 🙁 😡

My son was/is a FP in the military and I agree with the desciption of things discussed on this site. I know she was disappointed at what was going on in military medicine in general.🙁
 
USAFDoc: Thanks for providing the nice link which will shed more light for noobs like me. 👍

In reference to what you and others have brought up about the shortage of docs in all the services: will there just be more civilian replacements to fill in the gaps for as long as it is possible? Are the pay scales for GS-15 (such as in the ad you mentioned) that much higher when compared to FPs in uniform? I'm just morbidly curious as to whether or not the entire system will atrophy or implode on itself even before I have a chance to find out firsthand... with shortages in all the services' recruitment and apparently not that much done being done to rectify the problem. Anyone, out of curiosity, also happen to know what the budgets are for each service's medical corps or where to find out such numbers? (Appropriation bills, budgets, etc.)?
 
USAFDoc: Thanks for providing the nice link which will shed more light for noobs like me. 👍

In reference to what you and others have brought up about the shortage of docs in all the services: will there just be more civilian replacements to fill in the gaps for as long as it is possible? Are the pay scales for GS-15 (such as in the ad you mentioned) that much higher when compared to FPs in uniform? I'm just morbidly curious as to whether or not the entire system will atrophy or implode on itself even before I have a chance to find out firsthand... with shortages in all the services' recruitment and apparently not that much done being done to rectify the problem. Anyone, out of curiosity, also happen to know what the budgets are for each service's medical corps or where to find out such numbers? (Appropriation bills, budgets, etc.)?

As far as filling slots with civilians go, I can tell you what my experience has been. So far we've lost 2 general surgeons, 1 urologist in the last year, and will lose me (ENT), ophthalmology, and 1 orthopod, and 2 more general surgeons by this summer. None of those slots have been filled by civilians even though there are contracts to have them filled. Apparently, there is a dearth of civilian docs who want those spots at MTF's. Why that is I'm not sure because they'll pay my civilian replacement more than double what I make and he won't have to take call, do all the military bullcrap training, and will work only 9-5. Not a bad deal if you can put up with the staffing, low pt volume, and bureaucracy.

The AF has had mixed success filling primary care slots with civilians, but they're currently short of their goal. When they do fill, they are more often than not taken by older guys/women who are well past their prime--we have an 82yo applying for one of the IM slots, for example.

It's not going to be a pretty site in my MTF in the next 3 years or more unless something drastically improves.

Not bloody likely.
 
No doubt they are planning to push the bulk of specialty care into the civilian sector, and primary care likely not far behind, esp for dependents.

The civilian contractors seem to be hit or miss. Some seem pretty competent, others are way out there.
 
No doubt they are planning to push the bulk of specialty care into the civilian sector, and primary care likely not far behind, esp for dependents.

The civilian contractors seem to be hit or miss. Some seem pretty competent, others are way out there.

some of the problems I saw as our USAF clinic went "civilian" with docs:

1) our clinic hired a physiatrist to take over the INTERNAL MED clinic (when the USAF cut all IM doc billets from our base)...needless to say the physiatrist floundered and quit/was fired after 3 months with the military docs having to try and train her and get her "up to speed", cover her patients etc.

2) 8 of 9 civilian docs quit, usually within a few months to a year.
3) Our clinic would be accepting/enrolling nrew patients to civilian doc billets even when there was no "real doc" yet hired to fill the job.....ie, more patients for the remaining military docs to cover.

4) The civilian docs usually had no call, and never had any of the collaterral duties the military docs have, so as the clinic became more civilianized, (smaller % of mil docs), the military docs were assuming more and more coallateral duties (I had 15 collateral "duty hats" at one time......pathology officer, ACLS officer etc).

5) Repeated problems with the reporting lab results on those patients sen by civilian docs because of the computer system (Ie the doc quits, the lab results keep on rolling in to that docs computer (no paper printed results) and nobody is reviewig them........numerous "misses and near misses" in terms of patient outcomes.

6) When I left, we had been waiting to fill the civilan doc slots for a little more than a year on my clinic (we had 3000+ pts enrolled to them)........so out of 6 providers in the clinic (all panels full) we had 2 100% missing civilian docs, a new mil NP that missed a substantial time with pregnancy etc, a PA (once deployed), myself, and another mil FP (also deployed). Remember also that in the USAF, physician extenders are treated as docs so they have thier own 1500 pt panels.

overall, I would call the civilian "experiment" a failure, at least the way my clinic Commanders implemented it. a FAILURE in terms of who they hired (although several were good and just objected to the same managment failures we all did), how it affected patient care, and how it affected the military staff.👎
 
My urgent care has done the civilian experiment twice. It failed the first time, but the second time (when they raised the pay for the contractors and thus got good people), it is working great. We have a great staff of stable, competent providers. 6 contractors, 2 military docs, 1 civilian pa, 1 military pa.

Couple of interesting thoughts from the above posts, but the one that is intriguing to me the most is the idea of AD docs only taking care of AD patients. At first this would seem difficult to implement, but as I thought about it, that's exactly how our Dental Squadron works. They only see AD, not dependents, not retirees, nobody. They are the largest DS in the AF and see lots of patients and have enough to have a thriving residency program both in general dentistry as well as OMFS in conjunction with the local university. How they're flourishing like this while the rest of the MDG languishes is beyond me, but it's happening. I can definitely see a day when MDOS does the same thing--we only take care of AD troops and not all TriCare beneficiaries.

It would solve the need right now of doing more with less. It would also eliminate the problem of the need for specialists. We just don't need them and can farm AD patients out to the community specialists as needed--the real question is whether money would be saved. Too bad the AF doesn't have actuaries, or anybody with any fiscal acuity for that matter.

The other interesting thing happening at our base is that they tried to sell our MTF to one of the 2 med centers in the city who want to have more of a presence in outlying areas like where our base is. Our MTF is off-base by about a mile. Both universities evaluated whether it would be beneficial to buy the MTF building and then the AF would maintain a joint presence there. Neither felt it would be worthwhile, but the larger university decided to build a ritzy community hospital about a mile from the MTF. Our MDG is already planning on shutting down all activity at our MTF in the next 2 years while the hospital is built except for strict clinic appointments and pharmacy. Everything else from radiology to labs to OR (though there won't be much left of surgery anyway) will be done at the new community hospital.

At least where I am, military medicine is circling the drain, perhaps for the best. Our base MDG, caring for the largest wing in the AF, is going to be reduced to a mere fraction of a fraction of what it was just 3 years ago when it was a full-fledged hospital.

To applicants: the writing is on the wall. Just make sure you read it before signing.
 
Couple of interesting thoughts from the above posts, but the one that is intriguing to me the most is the idea of AD docs only taking care of AD patients.
It would solve the need right now of doing more with less. It would also eliminate the problem of the need for specialists. We just don't need them and can farm AD patients out to the community specialists as needed--the real question is whether money would be saved. Too bad the AF doesn't have actuaries, or anybody with any fiscal acuity for that matter..

some of the benefits would be:
1.) that when the docs deploy, the troops are deployed too, so their is an automatic "right-sizing" that occurs to balance the 2.

2)sending the "older" civilian patients to a civilain doc would also give them better continuity with their doc

3) when the military docs are really in short supply, the patients they see in general, will be healthier, able to wait for days when appts avail.

the downside would be cost. The military is getting the BEST DEAL in the WORLD with what they pay docs, especially how many hours we work (at least what I saw). Even as a FP, I was working 300 hrs plus a month.....thats about 2 1/2 BUCKS an HOUR................wow, I made more at McDONALDS when I worked there 25 years ago.:laugh: :laugh: :laugh: 😱
 
Even as a FP, I was working 300 hrs plus a month.....thats about 2 1/2 BUCKS an HOUR................wow, I made more at McDONALDS when I worked there 25 years ago.:laugh: :laugh: :laugh: 😱

You made 750 dollars a month as an Air force doc?
 
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