Laptop Recommendations

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The only secure way to delete data from flash/solid state memory is to physically destroy the drive.

This 7 pass, 55 pass, DOD level security stuff only works for traditional hard drives.

This from some white hats i'm friends with, and it's been extensively written about.

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You are quite wrong.


Data in RAM
Data remanence has been observed in static random-access memory (SRAM), which is typically considered volatile (i.e., the contents degrade with loss of external power). In one study, data retention was observed even at room temperature.[11]

Data remanence has also been observed in dynamic random-access memory (DRAM). Modern DRAM chips have a built-in self-refresh module, as they not only require a power supply to retain data, but must also be periodically refreshed to prevent their data contents from fading away from the capacitors in their integrated circuits. A study found data remanence in DRAM with data retention of seconds to minutes at room temperature and "a full week without refresh when cooled with liquid nitrogen."[12] The study authors were able to use a cold boot attack to recover cryptographic keys for several popular full disk encryption systems, including MicrosoftBitLocker, Apple FileVault, dm-crypt for Linux, and TrueCrypt.[12](p12)

Despite some memory degradation, authors of the above described study were able to take advantage of redundancy in the way keys are stored after they have been expanded for efficient use, such as in key scheduling. The authors recommend that computers be powered down, rather than be left in a "sleep" state, when not in physical control of the owner. In some cases, such as certain modes of the software program BitLocker, the authors recommend that a boot password or a key on a removable USB device be used.[12](p12) TRESOR is a kernel patch for Linux specifically intended to prevent cold boot attacks on RAM by ensuring encryption keys are neither user accessible nor stored in RAM.
Read the citations. We're talking about a max of 10 seconds at room temperature and shorter at operating temperatures. Nothing from the previous owner will be there by the time the hard drive is wiped.
 
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Wow that's a pretty damn good deal. What's the warranty on that thing? Especially with flash memory now and solid state storage, buying a used computer/device isn't as harrowing as it used to be.
I'm not sure if it came with one. For the price I was willing to take a chance! A few years ago I bought a first generation Surface RT direct from Microsoft for $150 when they were having a firesale. It was a solid web-browsing and video viewing device. The only reason I even bought the Pro 2 was to play Civilization while flying.

Never buy used computer equipment. Who knows what illegal porn the person viewed on the computer. Even if they deleted the porn it is still saved on the harddrive until the bits are overridden. Also probably cached elsewhere on the harddrive. Plus the MAC address is the same and it could have been used for illegal activity. Is any amount of savings worth going to federal prison for 10-20 years?

Ok dude.
 
You are quite wrong.


Data in RAM
Data remanence has been observed in static random-access memory (SRAM), which is typically considered volatile (i.e., the contents degrade with loss of external power). In one study, data retention was observed even at room temperature.[11]

Data remanence has also been observed in dynamic random-access memory (DRAM). Modern DRAM chips have a built-in self-refresh module, as they not only require a power supply to retain data, but must also be periodically refreshed to prevent their data contents from fading away from the capacitors in their integrated circuits. A study found data remanence in DRAM with data retention of seconds to minutes at room temperature and "a full week without refresh when cooled with liquid nitrogen."[12] The study authors were able to use a cold boot attack to recover cryptographic keys for several popular full disk encryption systems, including MicrosoftBitLocker, Apple FileVault, dm-crypt for Linux, and TrueCrypt.[12](p12)

Despite some memory degradation, authors of the above described study were able to take advantage of redundancy in the way keys are stored after they have been expanded for efficient use, such as in key scheduling. The authors recommend that computers be powered down, rather than be left in a "sleep" state, when not in physical control of the owner. In some cases, such as certain modes of the software program BitLocker, the authors recommend that a boot password or a key on a removable USB device be used.[12](p12) TRESOR is a kernel patch for Linux specifically intended to prevent cold boot attacks on RAM by ensuring encryption keys are neither user accessible nor stored in RAM.

Data remintance for seconds unless cold booted...I already told you that. In all practical purpose, data cannot be recovered from RAM. So if you're buying a used computer, the person you're buying from has to power it off before sending it to you. So the data is already gone. okay? If you happen to carry liquid nitrogen with you just as he's powering it off then yes anything is possible...just like it's physically possible for you to walk through a wall with infinite attempts.

Anyway...moving on...
 
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Have had a dell XPS 17inch laptop (prime for gaming, sc2) since the summer before starting pharmacy school in 2013. Still working great, would recommend.
 
The only secure way to delete data from flash/solid state memory is to physically destroy the drive.

This 7 pass, 55 pass, DOD level security stuff only works for traditional hard drives.

This from some white hats i'm friends with, and it's been extensively written about.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_Online_Forensic_Evidence_Extractor

About Data Security with unfortunate practical experience with federal computers:
The only secure way to delete data from any hard drive is to physically destroy the drive and physically dispose of the pieces in a distributed manner (some go to the trash, some go into the lake, and some go into the recycle bin), and then you're running a statistical risk. Most police technology can deal with consumer software-enabled deletes, any federal agency and most state police agencies can deal with any including industrial software-enabled delete on magnetic media. If you are running Windows, there's COFEE for you which gives me God mode on your computer (and yes, I've been the recipient and the viewer at various times due to work). Apple Compliance does the same thing for Mac OS. The only two secure OS that I've seen consistently able to beat up my tech colleagues is a control point Secure Linux installation (which is not hard for the general user to set up) and OpenVMS which requires a high level of tech knowledge and willing to put up with extreme annoyances as no consumer software is written for that OS type. And what I mean by that is it's defeatable, it just means there's no apparent clever way to do it outside brute force. And, in case you're wondering, consumer grade commodity HP Superdome (or a string of DL 580/980s) servers are sufficient firepower to break 64-bit keys in a reasonable timeframe (<1 month). The special ones that are purpose built work much faster. The only times when the FBI in particular doesn't hack through consumer grade software/hardware is when they don't want to let people know that they have technology X and it would be obvious to the public if they used it. The general technology is so widely distributed in the federal government that even VA (an agency with no business doing that sort of work) has ASIC purposed built machines to deal with internal lockouts.

http://www.notebookcheck.net/Dell-XPS-13.69052.0.html
Back to the OP, any consumer grade laptop will fit the bill from the processing and memory standpoint if it's not a Chromebook. I'd personally get something that's extremely energy efficient (actual 10+ hours of battery use under normal circumstances) and light with a full size keyboard myself. Besides that, you couldn't possibly screw up the buy. If you do want to go different and buy Mac, Uni tech support might not like you as much in terms of integration, but all the pharmacy reference materials work just fine on either. If you're going Linux (hard to get with an off-shelf laptop), both Thomson (Micromedex) and Lexicomp will work for their installed versions.

Personally, nothing replaces the easy destructiveness and functionality of paper for me and I'm a senior techie at work. My work issued laptop is that Dell XPS 13 as above, and I like it without touchscreen as there isn't mind-mapping software that is good enough to replace paper flowchart drawing yet. My home computer is a P4 from my pharmacy school days (15+ years old) running Linux Mint and is good enough to last and Citrix into work and bad enough that I won't spend too much time on it on the off hours (this is a specific reason why I won't replace it). Interestingly, the speed difference is minimal as all the developments after P4 have been on multiprocessing and power levels, the single speed which concerns the programs I run remain the same on both my work and my home. My work "desktop" is a G3 HP 980, but that is because I run my statistical software (S-Plus/R and Stata) and Embarcadero on that which needs that kind of firepower. My runabout laptop is a Chromebook as it's disposable as I'm careless with losing stuff.
 
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The only secure way to delete data from flash/solid state memory is to physically destroy the drive.

This 7 pass, 55 pass, DOD level security stuff only works for traditional hard drives.

This from some white hats i'm friends with, and it's been extensively written about.
This is true. Tho, SSD manufacturer has their own software to handle secure SSD wipe or use a TRIM command, it basically resets your SSD to a fresh state, surge it with voltage spike to flush out all stored electrons. I don't have to deal with it yet until I am selling my current laptop. But, an easier way to secure your hard drive is to put encryption, full drive encryption, it's available on Windows or Mac. Delete the files normally, don't need to do anything else, if someone tries to read the data. It will look like random nonsense unless they have the key.
 
This is true. Tho, SSD manufacturer has their own software to handle secure SSD wipe or use a TRIM command, it basically resets your SSD to a fresh state, surge it with voltage spike to flush out all stored electrons. I don't have to deal with it yet until I am selling my current laptop. But, an easier way to secure your hard drive is to put encryption, full drive encryption, it's available on Windows or Mac. Delete the files normally, don't need to do anything else, if someone tries to read the data. It will look like random nonsense unless they have the key.
I don't understand why a 55 passes would not work on a SSD. The whole point of the passes is to randomize the state of every single bit on the harddrive. How can any data remain or be found when this random process can not be reverse engineered?
 
I don't understand why a 55 passes would not work on a SSD. The whole point of the passes is to randomize the state of every single bit on the harddrive. How can any data remain or be found when this random process can not be reverse engineered?
When a spinning drive writes data, it goes to a specific physical location. Then sequential bits can be read faster because their location is next to each other and the heads don't have to move around as much. SSDs don't need to do this, so if they're told to write a "zero" then a "one" at each location, they don't write to every physical spot. They just pretend using virtual locations. The physical proximity of sequential file bits no longer matters, so the drive is designed to do its own thing as efficiently as possible.
 
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