You got me interested. What is the fallacy?
Not a formal fallacy, but mistaken argumentation. By training and clinical practice, I use virtue ethics, principlism, and casuistry in my ethical reasoning. The fallacy of emotivist logic is that it implicitly assumes that it is impossible to cast value claims in true/false language. Alasdair MacIntyre wrote an extended, compelling argument showing how virtue ethics overcomes this kind of reasoning (the *extremely* condensed version: it can be shown that particular characteristics are objectively good for humans to possess (i.e., particular traits are virtuous, regardless of whether any particular individual wants to possess them or not), so a value claim can be cast in "true/false" language to the extent that the action in question produces this particular virtue. This discussion is fleshed out over several texts (
After Virtue,
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, and
Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry - I'm working my way through
Dependent Rational Animals at the moment, but it's taken a back burner to fleshing out the classes I'm teaching this semester, so I can't add it to the list). Relativism, emotivism, and absolutism are all meta-ethical positions, and there is no point to ethical inquiry if one adheres to relativist or emotivist philosophy.
Translated into English → you don't like that emotivism states that right and wrong is a construct of the human mind. 😉
Not really, as that's not really an accurate picture of emotivism.
😉 Emotivism makes the argument that judgments are personal preferences (along the "Nazis? Ick poo!" kind), not that it is a mental construct.
But I am sure there are situations were a special action would bring about an outcome which is the best possible for everyone involved. If you want to, semantically, you could call that action, resulting in that outcome, for the RIGHT action.
Problem #1: Define "best", which has had a long and complicated history in philosophy.
Problem #2: This tends to be the consequentialist argument (and more specifically, the utilitarian argument), but is not the argument made by moral methodologies that allow for pluralism and *multiple* right human actions.
But as soon as there are some individuals who would benefit more from another strategy, there is no universal RIGHT, that would be YOUR mind telling you that e.g a utilitarian solution would be the right one. Is there anything in that statement you think is fallacious?
First, I'm not a utilitarian, and don't buy into the methodology. Second, the mere fact of benefit does not convey moral authority (especially when "benefit" is left vague - hypothetically, I could "benefit" everyone by giving them all heroin, considering its euphoric properties). Third, there can be multiple "universal rights", especially if one uses an agent-relative or pluralistic methodology. "Agent relative" is not relativism, it simply argues that one does not have to treat all potentially affected individuals identically (i.e., one can prefer friends and family members while still performing a moral action), and pluralistic methodologies allow for multiple "right" answers without yielding relativism or emotivism.
A quick "for instance" - let's say you have an extra $1000 and are looking to give it away. There are two immediate recipients: your friend, who needs the money to pay the rent and keep the utilities on, and the United Way, who can use that money for charitable ends and can benefit 50 kids. In an agent neutral system (e.g., utilitarianism), the utility calculus can generate a scenario in which the morally obligatory action is to donate the money to the United Way and leave your friend in a lurch (e.g., the benefit to the children outweighs the benefit to your friend, and the principle of utility argues that the *only* moral action is that which generates the maximum utility for the affected individuals). In a pluralistic and agent-relative system, however, there are multiple possible moral actions. Charity is an objective virtue (see Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics for a much more detailed and nuanced presentation than I can present here), so it would be right for the you to donate the money. Friendship and fidelity are also objective virtues, so you would *also* be acting morally if you were to give your friend the money. Both scenarios make you more virtuous, and hence, are both morally licit and "universally right". Not all moral actions/decisions require "either/or" dichotomies, and moral complexity does not require moral relativism or emotivism.
My head is spinning.
