Navy USS Theodore Roosevelt COVID-19 crisis

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Esper probably suggested he resign or stick around and be fired, tomorrow.

Modly was unfit for that job, and it showed. He doubled down on his already bad decision, was insulting and exacerbated the issue and made himself as much the story as the contagion on the Roosevelt. All not good.
 
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The story of the response to CAPT Crozier's letter, particularly the transcript of Modly's speech, should be mandatory reading for junior officers. I have never seen a better example of how much losing your temper undermines your credibility.
 
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So now what does the post-Modly Navy do with Crozier, assuming he isn’t in any hurry to retire and prefers to stay for 30 (in 2022)? What is going through N-1’s mind right now in charming Millington?
 
So now what does the post-Modly Navy do with Crozier, assuming he isn’t in any hurry to retire and prefers to stay for 30 (in 2022)? What is going through N-1’s mind right now in charming Millington?

Should give him his damn ship back.
 
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There probably should still be an investigation, but at this point it seems really unlikely that Crozier would face UCMJ action due to both A. unjust command influence and B. optics
 
It isn't over yet. That RADM Strike Group commander, Stuart Baker, should go also. His intransigence contributed to this fiasco.
 
Seemingly the only people who support Modly are pathological supporters of Trump or super-salty military vets who think that the military has gone soft.

Im a conservative and I’ve already gotten into arguments with family on the topic. Cozier was unfit for duty. He deserved to lose his position. But absolutely other heads should roll. Glad SECNAV is out, what an embarrassment. How about further crushing morale of an already demoralized crew dealing with an on ship epidemic. What a tool
 
Modly was fired for mishandling a Captain. Spencer was fired for mishandling a chief.
 
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Cozier [sic] was unfit for duty.

I don't agree. Not at all.

Crozier had an impossible choice: continue with the deployment and deal with an uncontainable contagion and risk a medical disaster, and go against CDC and NAVADMIN instructions or go around an obviously dysfunctional senior chain of command and pressure the dysfunctional links of that chain to give way to stopping the deployment and disembarking the crew for medical isolation and quarantine. The chain of command failed him. RADM Stuart Baker failed him, ADM Davidson failed him, as did ADM Michael Gilday and ADM John Acquilino and of course the most craven and erratic-acting Secretary of the Navy now departed station. The senior line chose not doing anything that might aggravate the vanity of President Trump over the safety of the crew of the Theodore Roosevelt. That is the shame and disgrace of it. The argument that somehow some weakness of the force was revealed is just ludicrous. No naval vessel afloat, of allies or adversaries, save an unmanned drone, has the capacity to contain a highly contagious pneumonically-spread epidemic. No vessel of any navy anywhere. All that was demonstrated was that when fast, decisive decisions to do the correct measures were needed, the politically-cowed senior leadership of the U.S. Navy could not deliver. That was the wrong thing.
 
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Seemingly the only people who support Modly are pathological supporters of Trump or super-salty military vets who think that the military has gone soft.

Im a conservative and I’ve already gotten into arguments with family on the topic. Cozier was unfit for duty. He deserved to lose his position. But absolutely other heads should roll. Glad SECNAV is out, what an embarrassment. How about further crushing morale of an already demoralized crew dealing with an on ship epidemic. What a tool

The (now-former) SECNAV certainly could have handled things better, or at least with more tact. His resignation itself is evidence that even he agrees he erred. All that said, I don't see any concrete reasons to believe he was untruthful about his reasons for relieving Capt Crozier, as detailed in the earlier memo.

If his account is to be taken at face value, it appears that Capt Crozier actually did not first avail himself of options short of a nuclear memo to dozens of people. Why didn't he limit the email distribution to the handful of people in his chain of command? People in this thread have guessed that maybe he had already spoken with them, or "knew" that they would not take his concerns seriously. True or not, you don't get to skip the formal consultation with superiors just because you fear you won't like the answer you think they'll give.

The media keeps bringing up how much his crew loved him, and that's nice. Desirable. But a commander being liked isn't a goal in and of itself, or even a mitigating factor for other lapses. Good leaders are usually but not always popular; popular ones can certainly be poor leaders. The standing ovation he got as he left the ship is neither here nor there. (Except perhaps as an alarming demonstration of not-social-distancing in the midst of a pandemic.)

I remain un-outraged by Capt Crozier's relief.


On a related topic, I'd like to hear more discussion about the decision to go ahead with the March 5th port call in Vietnam. Thus far, the information put forth was that the risk was believed to be negligible. This is very different than a more understandable scenario: assessing the risk as substantial but balancing that risk against important strategic benefits and going ahead with the port call with eyes wide open. One way or another, there's another error here worth considering.

Commercial cruise ships were canceling port calls in Vietnam a month earlier. Why we assessed the same risk differently deserves some scrutiny.
 
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The secretaries should go to their Georgetown parities and leave the heavy lifting to the professionals. The worst was Mabus. Now a lawyer has taken the helm.
 
The (now-former) ASECDEF certainly could have handled things better, or at least with more tact. His resignation itself is evidence that even he agrees he erred. All that said, I don't see any concrete reasons to believe he was untruthful about his reasons for relieving Capt Crozier, as detailed in the earlier memo.

If his account is to be taken at face value, it appears that Capt Crozier actually did not first avail himself of options short of a nuclear memo to dozens of people. Why didn't he limit the email distribution to the handful of people in his chain of command? People in this thread have guessed that maybe he had already spoken with them, or "knew" that they would not take his concerns seriously. True or not, you don't get to skip the formal consultation with superiors just because you fear you won't like the answer you think they'll give.

The media keeps bringing up how much his crew loved him, and that's nice. Desirable. But a commander being liked isn't a goal in and of itself, or even a mitigating factor for other lapses. Good leaders are usually but not always popular; popular ones can certainly be poor leaders. The standing ovation he got as he left the ship is neither here nor there. (Except perhaps as an alarming demonstration of not-social-distancing in the midst of a pandemic.)

I remain un-outraged by Capt Crozier's relief.


On a related topic, I'd like to hear more discussion about the decision to go ahead with the March 5th port call in Vietnam. Thus far, the information put forth was that the risk was believed to be negligible. This is very different than a more understandable scenario: assessing the risk as substantial but balancing that risk against important strategic benefits and going ahead with the port call with eyes wide open. One way or another, there's another error here worth considering.

Commercial cruise ships were canceling port calls in Vietnam a month earlier. Why we assessed the same risk differently deserves some scrutiny.

Personally, I am choosing to refrain from judging since I don't actually know the details. But I will say that even the former acting SECDEF said that he was in communication with CAPT Crozier, and at that time they were not taking Sailors off the ship. That didn't start until after the memo went public. Take that for what it's worth.

As for the port call, someone who was so concerned with his Sailors that he was willing to tank his career doesn't seem like the sort of person who would pull into a port with known COVID cases unless it was either very important, or the call wasn't totally his (or his at all). If he had chosen to pull into that port on his own, they would have used that to justify even further his relief. But they defended it, likely because they were involved in the decision. But again, that's just speculation.
 
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. . .


On a related topic, I'd like to hear more discussion about the decision to go ahead with the March 5th port call in Vietnam. Thus far, the information put forth was that the risk was believed to be negligible. This is very different than a more understandable scenario: assessing the risk as substantial but balancing that risk against important strategic benefits and going ahead with the port call with eyes wide open. One way or another, there's another error here worth considering.

Commercial cruise ships were canceling port calls in Vietnam a month earlier. Why we assessed the same risk differently deserves some scrutiny.
That decision was defended (in his public statements) by then-acting Secretary Modly, so the decision to proceed with the port call can be presumed to have been made at or above his level.

The fact of contagion in the port was known to commercial interests well before, and was no secret. Whether the risk as-known was discounted or not but taken regardless in the interest of other objectives is something for an investigation. Whether one will occur at the level of the Secretariat is doubtful (I can't believe the DOD IG would initiate one without Esper signing off which would be politically-fraught) unless Congress forces the issue. That probably won't happen unless there are significant casualties resulting among the crew of Theodore Roosevelt, in the event that has yet to fully unfold.
 
I don't agree. Not at all.

Crozier had an impossible choice: continue with the deployment and deal with an uncontainable contagion and risk a medical disaster, and go against CDC and NAVADMIN instructions or go around an obviously dysfunctional senior chain of command and pressure the dysfunctional links of that chain to give way to stopping the deployment and disembarking the crew for medical isolation and quarantine. The chain of command failed him. RADM Stuart Baker failed him, ADM Davidson failed him, as did ADM Michael Gilday and ADM John Acquilino and of course the most craven and erratic-acting Secretary of the Navy now departed station. The senior line chose not doing anything that might aggravate the vanity of President Trump over the safety of the crew of the Theodore Roosevelt. That is the shame and disgrace of it. The argument that somehow some weakness of the force was revealed is just ludicrous. No naval vessel afloat, of allies or adversaries, save an unmanned drone, has the capacity to contain a highly contagious pneumonically-spread epidemic. No vessel of any navy anywhere. All that was demonstrated was that when fast, decisive decisions to do the correct measures were needed, the politically-cowed senior leadership of the U.S. Navy could not deliver. That was the wrong thing.

You’re a senior member and you don’t understand the concept of chain of command? That’s troubling
 
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Modly stated repeatedly that his COS spoke directly w CAPT Crozier. Clearly the chain of command was compromised from above. At best, it had already been sidelined. At worst, they were the problem.

no one has the right to command a ship and although @pgg is right that speculation about prior communications is speculation, we do know that Crozier had some conversations with SECNAV’s office. When he decided to send that letter (really more a Memo for the Record), he knew the consequences would include the loss of future promotion and possibly relief.

All Modly has to do was wait 3 days for the investigation and then say “CAPT Crozier had an ineffective relationship with his senior officers and thus needed to be relieved.” Brief grumbling and move on. What he did instead was bizarre and it’s easy to believe that his behavior was the problem. If you want to tout the chain of command as sacrosanct, SECNAV doesn’t talk about giving personal cell phones to O6s.
 
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That decision was defended (in his public statements) by then-acting Secretary Modly, so the decision to proceed with the port call can be presumed to have been made at or above his level.

The fact of contagion in the port was known to commercial interests well before, and was no secret. Whether the risk as-known was discounted or not but taken regardless in the interest of other objectives is something for an investigation. Whether one will occur at the level of the Secretariat is doubtful (I can't believe the DOD IG would initiate one without Esper signing off which would be politically-fraught) unless Congress forces the issue. That probably won't happen unless there are significant casualties resulting among the crew of Theodore Roosevelt, in the event that has yet to fully unfold.
Agreed; I wasn't implying fault with any one person for the port visit. Canceling a port call by the first major US warship to make one in Vietnam in 40 years isn't like canceling dinner reservations because you're not that hungry.

I'll also concede that second guessing the go/no-go decision on the port call, whoever made it, is perhaps not a useful line of discussion at this point.
 
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@pgg it is useful from a lessons-learned perspective. Did they consider the risk? What information did they have? What can we learn from that error to decrease the chances of a repeat in the fall when COVID is “gone”?
 
I still can't fathom why he flew all the way to Guam to slander Crozier in front of the crew. Just reeks of insecurity and bad leadership.

If the Navy thinks they've had a retention/recruiting problem before, how are they going to sell this one? "Come join the Navy, if you get sick in a pandemic, we're going to leave you out to dry to save our own necks. If you report a problem when we screw up, we'll make you our fall guy."
 
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@pgg it is useful from a lessons-learned perspective. Did they consider the risk? What information did they have? What can we learn from that error to decrease the chances of a repeat in the fall when COVID is “gone”?
What I meant was that while it's possible for us to discuss and weigh the COVID-19 risk associated with the port call, we'll probably never have any insight into the things on the other side of the equation - the political, diplomatic, strategic benefits to doing it. Maybe it's not even fair to call it an error. Not every GO decision with risk is an error if the risk shows up.

What was known, when, who knew it, etc may never be public information to inform our discussion.

I don't know. I've gone back and forth on this in my mind a few times already.
 
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You’re a senior member and you don’t understand the concept of chain of command? That’s troubling
Don’t think that because I said the chain of command in this incident wasn’t effective—it was badly defective in many ways—that I believe that chain of command is unimportant. You have a duty nonetheless if you suspect the chain is not responding to important information to persuade or failing that, to warn of consequences. In the long- knives world of major command, that comes with a price, which CAPT Crozier surely knew and paid.
 
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Don’t think that because I said the chain of command in this incident wasn’t effective—it was badly defective in many ways—that I do not believe that chain of command is unimportant. But you have a duty nonetheless if you suspect the chain is not responding to important information to persuade or failing that, to warn of consequences. In the long- knives world of major command, that comes with a price, which CAPT Crozier surely knew and paid.

There is a chain of command. If your immediate chain of command is unresponsive, you go up your chain of command. You don’t send a blast email out to over 20 people, compromising security and your mission. He lost his job at that moment. It was inexcusable. If his immediate chain of command was making a poor decision and compromising the health of our sailors, he also stands accountable. But that does not change the fact that Cozier failed. The SECNAV didn’t lose his job because what he said was inaccurate...he lost his job (or resigned if you want to call it that) because he was a dickhead about it.
 
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There is a chain of command. If your immediate chain of command is unresponsive, you go up your chain of command. You don’t send a blast email out to over 20 people, compromising security and your mission. He lost his job at that moment. It was inexcusable. If his immediate chain of command was making a poor decision and compromising the health of our sailors, he also stands accountable. But that does not change the fact that Cozier failed. The SECNAV didn’t lose his job because what he said was inaccurate...he lost his job (or resigned if you want to call it that) because he was a dickhead about it.
The A-SECNAV subverted the COC and admitted to as much, to the extent of having his staff give the CO his cell number. That is the tell that he didn’t have much confidence in the effectiveness of the chain either.
 
The A-SECNAV subverted the COC and admitted to as much, to the extent of having his staff give the CO his cell number. That is the tell that he didn’t have much confidence in the effectiveness of the chain either.

Again irrelevant. If your immediate COC is dysfunctional, you still stick to protocol. You work your wayup the chain. You don’t do what he did. I don’t see how this is a surprise or debated.

I’m sure that Coziers immediate chain is currently under fire. If his chain was AWOL or essentially told Cozier to deal with it we’ll see more heads roll. But it’s not going to change Coziers fate.
 
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Again irrelevant. If your immediate COC is dysfunctional, you still stick to protocol. You work your wayup the chain. You don’t do what he did. I don’t see how this is a surprise or debated.

What do you think would have happened to CAPT Crozier if he had stayed within the chain of command and, as a result of the delay, they lost a sailor to sudden respiratory or cardiac failure while underway?
 
What do you think would have happened to CAPT Crozier if he had stayed within the chain of command and, as a result of the delay, they lost a sailor to sudden respiratory or cardiac failure while underway?

The Pacific navy chain of command would have relieved him for not protecting his crew. That was the scissor he was caught in, not that I am saying he regarded his own career self-interest before his crew's interest.
 
Again irrelevant. If your immediate COC is dysfunctional, you still stick to protocol. You work your wayup the chain. You don’t do what he did. I don’t see how this is a surprise or debated.

I’m sure that Coziers immediate chain is currently under fire. If his chain was AWOL or essentially told Cozier to deal with it we’ll see more heads roll. But it’s not going to change Coziers fate.

In at least some reports, he had done that with no response. In an interview with RADM Stuart Baker, Commander of the Pacific Strike Force, who was berthed aboard the Theodore Roosevelt, the RADM admitted that he would not have done anything about the shipboard contagion.
 
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I am having flashbacks to My Lai. I think Crozier was truly caught in a no-win situation.

Dakota Meyer’s Medal of Honor actions in AFG began with him disobeying orders to disregard a distress call he received - he ultimately saved more than two dozen afghan soldiers personally, and provided cover for the 3/3 Marines there-likely saving dozens more.

I’m sure he realized he might be facing an Article 92 investigation but he took that risk.

Not saying this is a parallel by any means to the TR, just that sometimes personal judgement about a tactical situation-and the outcome from it- turns out better than the order‘s received.
 
What do you think would have happened to CAPT Crozier if he had stayed within the chain of command and, as a result of the delay, they lost a sailor to sudden respiratory or cardiac failure while underway?

It’s just amazing to see the about of inside knowledge there is on the subject. The amount of assumptions that are being made by the protectors of this man is making me dizzy. You, nor anyone else, knows what happened with the breakdown of chain of command. Lots of assumptions based on bias but you really know nothing. The only things that we do know are the details of the email, that Crozier went outside of his COC, and that the SECNAV is a jack hole. Everything outside of that is assumptions based on bias.

Based on the facts we have, Crozier frantically broke chain of command. That alone could get you removed from your duties. You can’t have men in control of weapons that can bring down an entire countries breaking very basic military etiquette.

And frankly, saying that we aren’t at war? That’s insulting. We are at war. We’ve been at war for going on two decades. I don’t think that we should have men in charge of aircraft carriers that don’t think that we are at war. That’s complacency.
 
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. . .

Based on the facts we have, Crozier frantically broke chain of command.

There is no evidence that he did anything "frantically." He was dealing with the contagion issue from Vietnam. His letter /appeal/email was a well-drafted and well-referenced document. His inside channel communications that preceded it are not in the public domain, at least yet. We have only statements made to reporters by other elements of the Pacific Navy COC, among them RADM Baker.

And frankly, saying that we aren’t at war? That’s insulting. We are at war. We’ve been at war for going on two decades. I don’t think that we should have men in charge of aircraft carriers that don’t think that we are at war. That’s complacency.

We are not at war in the Pacific, with China or any other nation there. And in fact, we are not at war anywhere. Our intelligence and special operations activities in the middle east and Afghanistan are somewhere in-between peace and war. (But of course, none of those are in the Pacific.) Really, you would have to be divorced from reality, or be seriously deficient in reality testing to believe differently. Just because the White House Press Office and the President use a war-like rhetoric, or refers to our present (metaphorically, although he probably couldn't tell you the difference) crisis as a "war," or absurdly styles himself as a "wartime president" doesn't make this a war nor does it make routine naval deployments warfare. Words do have meaning, and those meanings are important.
 
There is no evidence that he did anything "frantically." He was dealing with the contagion issue from Vietnam. His letter /appeal/email was a well-drafted and well-referenced document. His inside channel communications that preceded it are not in the public domain, at least yet. We have only statements made to reporters by other elements of the Pacific Navy COC, among them RADM Baker.



We are not at war in the Pacific, with China or any other nation there. And in fact, we are not at war anywhere. Our intelligence and special operations activities in the middle east and Afghanistan are somewhere in-between peace and war. (But of course, none of those are in the Pacific.) Really, you would have to be divorced from reality, or be seriously deficient in reality testing to believe differently. Just because the White House Press Office and the President use a war-like rhetoric, or refers to our present (metaphorically, although he probably couldn't tell you the difference) crisis as a "war," or absurdly styles himself as a "wartime president" doesn't make this a war nor does it make routine naval deployments warfare. Words do have meaning, and those meanings are important.

yeah if we can’t even reach an argue to the point that we are at war...there really is no need wasting either of our time.
 
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yeah if we can’t even reach an argue to the point that we are at war...there really is no need wasting either of our time.

Where are we at war in the Pacific? We are at economic and political war with China. Where is the evidence that we are in combat with any nation in the Pacific? Is it too much to ask for you to explain your argument that we are at war in the Pacific? I'd like to understand your perspective. Thanks.
 
Where are we at war in the Pacific? We are at economic and political war with China. Where is the evidence that we are in combat with any nation in the Pacific? Is it too much to ask for you to explain your argument that we are at war in the Pacific? I'd like to understand your perspective. Thanks.

Do you not think cold war is war?
 
Guess Braithwaite will be inheriting quite a hornet's nest.
 
It’s just amazing to see the about of inside knowledge there is on the subject. The amount of assumptions that are being made by the protectors of this man is making me dizzy.
I didn't make any assumptions. I didn't make a statement. I asked you to answer a question, to the best of your ability, based on your knowledge of and experience with the military.

What do you think would have happened to CAPT Crozier if, as a result of keeping his concerns within his chain of command, one or more of his Sailors had lost their lives to COVID while the Roosevelt was underway?
 
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Do you not think cold war is war?
The Cold War was a historical period. It was, as the term itself implies, not a "shooting war," which during that period carried the fearful connotation of nuclear exchange. It's main feature was a period of strong diplomatic tension, relaxed occasionally and also punctuated by combat in proxy wars. The Berlin Crisis, the Korean Conflict, the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, proxy wars in Africa, all military conflicts of the period. With that came the undercurrent of intelligence activities by all principal parties, many of which were violent. But was it a war itself? No.
 
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And now the bill for the former acting Secretary's flight to Guam and back (on a G550/C37B executive jet, no less) $243,000. 35 hours at nearly $7K/hr. And he is a "businessman." Thanks so much for that.
 
A TR sailor was just admitted to the ICU

 
The only things that we do know are the details of the email, that Crozier went outside of his COC, and that the SECNAV is a jack hole.

We also know from Modley's rant that he was intimately involved in the decision making process prior to the email and directly communicated with Crozier. This mean's that Crozier had complete visibility into what the plan, or lack therefor, was going to be from the top down and decided to send his letter with that knowledge.

If Modley's behavior after the letter was made public is any indication of what the plan, or lack thereof, was going to be then Crozier's action is justifiable. Hopefully, an unbiased non-partisan investigation occurs and we learn the details of what occurred.
 
A TR sailor was just admitted to the ICU


[had erroneous information, appears the article was updated from when I first read]


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